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Description
The following is an edited transcript of the fiftieth in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was hem on September 14, 2007 in the Caucus Room of the Cannon Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding.
CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR.: president, Middle East Policy Council
This morning, we are talking about a neglected topic, North Africa, where many things are happening and much attention is not being paid in the United States. This is odd because this is strategically a very important area with a close relationship to Europe, and it is a source of Muslim populations in Europe that have become a matter of interest and concern to us.
I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN: Jacob Blaustein Distinguished Professor of International Organizations and Conflict Resolution, SAIS
I'm going to present an academic's eye view of American policy in North Africa. I have never made that policy, although God knows I've tried. I'd like to talk first of all about the strategic importance of the area in U.S. eyes, then the view of the individual states, and then policy reaction - in fact, response--to that situation.
The region is of strategic importance. It may not be of direct, primary strategic importance in the same way that the Middle East itself is. We don't have commitments as we do to Israel or Lebanon, and it doesn't have the oil concentration that the Middle East does. But it's important. First of all, it's the western-most extension of the Mediterranean, which leads to the Middle East. We usually talk about strategic importance looking at geography, but its importance is geographic and political. North Africa is one of the shores that give access to the Mediterranean and, were it hostile, our ships would be beyond gun range, no doubt, except in the Straits.
It's also Western Europe's backyard. It is Europe's Mexico. Therefore, it is, again, indirectly important, because it's important to people who are of primary importance to us. But third, as the western end of the Mediterranean, it's important because it's been more or less an area of political friendship. The countries of the region are not and--except for Libya at one point--have not been hostile to the United States, though with various degrees of friendship and policy friendship. Second, it's important because it's the western end of the Arab world. That is not its sea importance, but its land importance. Maghreb means the area where the sun sets, and it is, and Morocco's name is, the extreme western end of where the sun sets. It provides access to a political community that is of importance to us: access to the eastern and the core area of the Arab world as Arab heads of state, the Islamic Conference, and so on meet there. Thus, the United States has developed a flee-trade association with Morocco and Jordan, so as to frame an area over which we look to unfurl a free-trade umbrella.
It's also a cap on the African continent. We have the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Initiative, which the North African states take part in. It, too, represents countries that are not just geographically close to us, but includes countries that are the closest among the Arab countries to us, countries that cooperate wholeheartedly, officially, in many American policy initiatives, as well as countries that do less, as I will get to. So its strategic importance is great.
With individual states, we have both negative and positive interests. Morocco is an old ally of the United States. Every time you mention Morocco, you have to say that it was the first country to recognize the United States, and it has the oldest friendship treaty still in existence. It's been a steady political supporter of U. S. initiatives, particularly in the Arab world. Morocco has been helpful in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations and publicly supportive after the 9/11 incident. It is part of a free-trade area, as I mentioned, and it has an increasingly politically liberalizing atmosphere. It just held free and fair elections in a multiparty system, under a monarchy, to be sure, but one in which a moderate Islamic party took part and did quite well. It's also a country focused on economic reform and trying to bring its economy, largely agriculturally based but also developing industry, up to modern standards.
Algeria is, in a sense, the reverse. It's a strategic ally but it has frequently been a political adversary. It was a leading Arab country in the rejectionist front; it's a friend of Russia and the former Soviet Union and has gone through a heavy-weapons rearmament program with Russia. It does not have free and fair elections, although it has a multiparty system. And it's important to us as a window to the radicals.
Tunisia is an old ally, a long-time moderate friend that also does not hold free and fair elections. It cooperates, as does Algeria, in anti-terrorist activities and follows a kind of Chinese model of economic liberalization and political control.
Our policy aims, I think, are quite simple and broad in this area: economic development, both in our interest and theirs, because economic under-development creates an atmosphere that leads to terrorism; political liberalization, both in our interest and theirs, because it produces stability and a common value system stems from it; and anti-terrorist cooperation, in which all three countries have participated very effectively. The problem in this situation is that Morocco and Algeria are enemy brothers, bitter rivals for a long time, for reasons that I can develop if anyone wants to question it, but it's a fact. Because of their negative and positive interest to the United States, Washington does not want to offend either side. It has ties with Morocco but is wary of the danger of pushing Algeria further into a radical orientation. So American policy is one of balanced relations, presenting a framework of initiatives that are not too strong in any particular direction, but trying to develop close ties, while at the same time expressing our values. So, we regularly chide Tunisia for its lack of civil rights and restrictive political system, but it doesn't cost us anything. And we sympathize with Algeria's recurrent terrorist problem but chide it because of civil rights, while at the same time congratulating Morocco for its enormous improvement in a previously bad civil- rights record. We give a few non-lethal weapons to Algeria, which troubles the Moroccans tremendously. Therefore, we have to look to a balance in regard to both sides. Human-rights embarrassments in Tunisia are also troublesome as we try to maintain positive relations.
The biggest problem is the issue of the Western Sahara, which brings Morocco and Algeria really nose to nose. Algeria is a principally interested party in the Western Sahara conflict. There is no direct U.S. interest in the Western Sahara--we couldn't care less; it's of no value to us. But there's an enormous indirect interest. First of all, as has been noted since Henry Kissinger, it is not in the U.S. interest to see another microstate in this region, another mini-Mauritania. It would be a source of instability. The country has very few resources, and it would be the prey of lots of political attempts at destabilization or control in the region. It's also a threat to Moroccan stability. The Western Sahara is an existential issue for Morocco, not just of one party, the Istiqlal or the king, but of the entire population. Were it to lose in this situation, it would be a destabilizing event.
What's U.S. policy on this? First of all, it's a policy of backing self-determination and finding ways to implement that slogan in reality. Second, it recognizes Moroccan administration but not sovereignty, as the United Nations does, over the territory. Third, after long supporting the UN position of a referendum, it recognizes that a referendum is impossible, given that both parties block it because each of them supports a different list of voters.
Therefore, the United States backs the current UN position on negotiation between the parties, essentially on the basis of the first proposal to come out halfway between the extreme positions: the Moroccan position on autonomy. The United States is impatient to get this monkey off the world's back. It is always in danger of bursting forth in a more violent form and disturbing relations between Morocco and Algeria and between them and the United States. So the Maghreb is an area of strategic interest with some troublesome problems of importance to be resolved [See Zartman article, this issue].
REINHOLD BRENDER: Delegation of the European Commission to the United States
The EU has a keen interest in seeing North Africa enjoy the benefits of political and economic modernization. Reasons for this are geographical proximity, the importance of political, economic and cultural relations, and the risk of the overspill of problems and tensions to Europe itself.
The challenges faced by North Africa are enormous. The analysis developed in a series of UNDP Arab Human Development Reports has found widespread recognition, since this analysis reflects reality well. The deficits of the region according to these reports are: (i) a freedom deficit in political and civil liberties, (ii) a knowledge deficit in terms of education and access to information, (iii) a so-called "gender-deficit"; that is to say, Arab women are clearly at a disadvantage in their societies. The EU has long recognized that the way out of the region's current situation must encompass both political and economic reforms.
Starting from these general observations, let me present the two main frameworks of EU interaction with this region, namely the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process) and the European Neighborhood Policy. The overall objective of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to strengthen relations between the EU and Mediterranean partner countries, in particular by promoting political and economic reforms in these countries. For more than ten years, the Barcelona Process has been a central framework of the relations between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean countries: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Turkey. It was launched in 1995 in Barcelona in the wake of the Madrid conference (1991) and the Oslo Agreement (1993) in order to create a multilateral framework for dialogue and cooperation. The 1995 Barcelona Declaration marked a turning point by establishing a true partnership in several dimensions: political, security, economic, financial, cultural and human.
Over the years the Barcelona Process has developed into a solid platform for the EU and its partners to discuss and act on a wide range of issues of common interest, including the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean free trade area, transport and energy networks, and environmental issues. In the political sphere and despite negative repercussions from the Middle East conflict, the Barcelona process has helped strengthen confidence and trust. To give just one example: all Euro-Med partners, including Syria and Israel, cooperate on issues of civil protection, and in the 2005 Barcelona Summit all adopted a common code of conduct on countering terrorism that now is being implemented.
Trade liberalization has also made significant progress. Since 1995, we have concluded bilateral Association Agreements with our Mediterranean partners. They provide for free trade in industrial... |
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