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Description
The first half of 2007 ended with a reminder about the reality of global terrorism when two failed car bombs were found outside the Tiger Tiger night club in London on 29 June. The next day, a car loaded with burning gas cylinders was driven into the main terminal building at Glasgow international airport, an attack linked to the failed London bombings. Arrests occurred over the next few days in Britain, and on 5 July, Indian-born doctor, Mohammed Haneef, was detained at Brisbane airport under Australia's terrorism laws trying to catch a flight back to India.
Terrorism, once more of a matter between domestic police and law enforcement authorities and their international counterparts, has come to define much of the strategic landscape for Australian foreign policy. As Hugh White noted in the context of discussing the challenges for defence force planning, there are two basic strategic realities confronting the making of policy. On the one hand, there is "the growing importance to Australia's security of non-state, sub-state and transnational threats". Although not all non-state threats necessarily relate to .terrorism, it (terrorism) overwhelmingly dominates these new non-states threats and continues to drive policy in its own right. As Prime Minister Howard reaffirmed in July, terrorism is "a major political and military struggle that will go on for many years". (1)
The second reality is that "we live in an era of profound change in the global distribution of power among states, especially in Asia, with uncertain strategic consequences". (2) Across the Indian and Pacific Oceans, a more confident Japan, the emergence of China and India as great powers, and possibly of Indonesia as a significant power in a more distant future, preoccupies our strategists. Whereas the rule book for making one's way in a world of several great powers was not so long ago disregarded as old-school diplomacy, determining Australian policy in Asia, whose power configuration is rapidly changing, is the modern challenge. Although the United States will remain the preponderant power in Asia and the world for the foreseeable future, the era of its undisputed hegemony is ending. This creates a great uncertainty for a country like Australia. Our security policy had always appeared a simple matter of attaching ourselves to the great Anglo power of the day: first Britain and then the United States. With the rise of China in particular, this becomes immensely complicated. As Coral Bell put it, Australia is "living with giants" and the challenge is finding our place in this more complex world. (3)
Broad strategic outlooks aside, the more immediate political driving forces of policy remain as important as ever and probably more so given the yet to be called federal election in the second half of 2007. For example, Australia has troops active in Iraq, Afghanistan, and also scattered throughout the Pacific (East Timor, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands.) The decision to deploy them, in many instances, remains controversial. The decision to keep them there or pull out, especially in Iraq, has become a fundamentally political and not just strategic issue. In an election year and with the Howard Government so far unable to catch up to the Opposition in the polls, promoting the "national security" credentials of the respective political parties in every policy articulated takes on a special significance.
Iraq--the Politics of an "Exit Strategy"
Iraq remains the most politically sensitive and emotional issue in Australian foreign policy since the Vietnam War. Undoubtedly, the desire to ensure that some kind of national order and unity emerges out of the current situation there is genuine. However, Iraq remains the great polarizing issue of the day and the handling of policy is one that is the most vulnerable to the dictates of politics and perception, rather than longer-term strategy. The steady trickle of American casualties in Iraq was certainly a factor in the mid-term elections in America in 2006. The last few years of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's leadership, culminating in his decision to step down from office on 27 June, were haunted by the problems in Iraq. So far, Prime Minister Howard has come away relatively unscathed.
In a sense, Iraq is at the centre of many contradictions at play in the foreign policy and political debate. The decision to invade Iraq is broadly seen as both a failure in terms of execution (in terms of post-war planning) and also conception. Polls continue to indicate that it is one of the most unpopular wars in living memory. Furthermore, polls also indicate that an overwhelming majority do not believe the decision to go to war has made Australians any safer from terrorism--one of the most prominent arguments for joining the "Coalition of the Willing". (4) The Labor Party under both Mark Latham and Kevin Rudd was against it and has followed the "I told you so!" line ever since. Yet credible political polling has consistently revealed that the Liberal Party led by Howard is considered more capable of handling issues of national security than the Labor Party led by noted foreign policy expert Kevin Rudd. (5)
For this reason, Prime Minister Howard must walk a fine line. On the one hand, the ability to take the "hard" decision to go to Iraq proves that the Liberal-National Party has the mettle to grapple with difficult situations and the wherewithal to successfully nurture the American alliance. Incidentally, calls to reconsider strategy in Iraq even if it falls short of withdrawing troops has offered the Coalition the opportunity to dismiss such policy as ill-thought out, "cut and run" and weak on national security. On the other hand, the problems in Iraq remain the most public, painful, and open wound for the government. The saving grace so far, resulting from both design and good luck, is that there have been no Australian casualties from battle. Howard is well aware that Iraq remains both the political strength and weakness of current Liberal-National foreign policy.
As noted in the previous "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy" article, the release in November 2006 of the Iraq Study Group Baker/Hamilton Report in the United States revived the whole issue of exit strategies. No one has been under any illusions that Australia wields a significant influence on Iraq's future. We do not. Although Australia's military contribution was genuinely valued by the Americans, our political support for an unpopular war is really what President Bush is grateful for. Thus questions of "why", "how", and "when", to withdraw from Iraq are as much a continuation of a political debate as a military or strategic one.
Debate in 2007 about an appropriate "exit strategy" began spectacularly in early February when Prime Minister Howard criticized Senator Barack Obama's pledge to withdraw US troops from Iraq by March 2008. The night before, Senator Obama, who had been one of the few outspoken Senators against the war from its very beginnings, had declared his intention to seek the Democratic pre-selection for the 2008 Presidential race. In an unexpected departure from diplomatic protocol--something which the Labor Party proclaimed as "unprecedented"--Howard... |
More articles from The Australian Journal of Politics and History
Northern Territory: January to June 2007.(Political Chronicles), December 01, 2007
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