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Article Excerpt
Introduction
Most scholarly and journalistic analysis presents the odyssey of climate change policy in the United States as if America was a unitary system of government. This leads to a familiar tale, whereby the federal government signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, spurned ratification four years later, and neither the Clinton nor subsequent Bush Administration and respective Congresses have been able to agree to anything beyond climate research funding and voluntary reduction programs. At the same time, conventional analysis has assumed that climate policy would entail bargaining and implementation among nations, culminating in a world climate regime. More than a decade after the signing of Kyoto, it is increasingly evident that climate policy is proving far messier than prevailing depictions had anticipated. The Kyoto process is in tatters, attributable not only to American disengagement but also to an inability of many ratifying nations to honor their commitments. This is reflected in numerous failures to approach pledged emissions reductions, as in the Canadian and Japanese cases, or to successfully implement national or multinational policies, as in the stumbles of the Emissions Trading Scheme in the European Union. There also continues to be enormous uncertainty about engagement by developing nations, at the very point where China is primed to eclipse the United States as the world's leading national source of greenhouse gases.
But perhaps the biggest single surprise as climate policy continues to evolve is that in the American case and many others, it is becoming increasingly evident that climate policy constitutes an issue of federalism or multilevel governance. As the recent emergence of California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger as a claimant to the title of "world leader" in the development of far-reaching climate policy attests, individual units across different federal or multilevel governance systems may have more in common with one another in climate policy than they have with the neighboring units of their overall federation. Indeed, one can see stronger parallels between such jurisdictions as Connecticut and Sweden, Pennsylvania and Germany, New York and New South Wales, and North Carolina and Ontario than exists across many members of the same federation.
This paper will focus primarily on the American case, considering more than a decade of state and federal policy experience and attempting to distill lessons that could guide future policy development. First, it will offer an overview of American subnational policy development, attempting to provide a review of the tapestry of policies that have been enacted over the past decade and some of the key factors that have led to such a robust state response in the absence of federal mandates or incentives. Second, this will lead to a consideration of the divergent paths taken by the 50 states, reflected in their carbon dioxide emission trends since 1990 and varied levels of climate policy development. This section will explore the unique contexts facing various states, particularly the differing strategic considerations for them (and for their representatives in Congress) as they consider unilateral policy steps or the possibility of federal policy in the 110th Congress and beyond. Third, the collective state experience offers some possible lessons for future policy development at either subnational or national levels. In particular, we will see that there appears to be a nearly inverse relationship between those policies that policy analysts tend to endorse as holding the greatest promise to reduce emissions in a cost-effective manner and the political feasibility of respective policy options. These patterns could offer significant lessons for the future of climate policy development, outlining both challenges and opportunities for future policy whether enacted at the single-state, multistate, or federal levels. Finally, we look ahead and consider alternative scenarios for future development of American climate policy, building on recent experience to anticipate possible next directions (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007).
Toward a State-Centric American Climate Policy
The recent trend toward state-driven policy is not unprecedented in American federalism. In many instances, early state policy engagement has provided models that were ultimately embraced as national policy by the federal government. This has been evident in a range of social policy domains, including health care and education, and can either result in federal preemption that obliterates earlier state roles or a more collaborative system of shared governance (Manna, 2006; Teske, 2004). In some instances, states have taken the lead and essentially sustained policy leadership through multistate collaboration and the absence of federal engagement. Such policy arenas as occupational licensure and regulation and oversight of organ donations have remained largely state-dominated, despite occasional federal exploration of legislation or regulation. To date, American climate policy is following the latter pattern, with prolonged federal inability to construct policy, leaving substantial opportunity for state engagement and innovation. At the same time, Congress continues to weigh a variety of policy options, many of which could ultimately encourage, constrain, or preempt existing state policies. However, the institutional impediments to any federal action remain significant, suggesting that there may well be continued state latitude to play a lead role for some time to come. In turn, this could ultimately give a number of states a strong bargaining role in any future federal policy formation or implementation, given their sunk institutional and policy investments. Many states now possess a considerable body of climate policy expertise that may well rival or surpass federal institutions (Rabe, 2004, 2007b).
Many scholars scoffed at the very possibility of "bottom-up" American climate policy during the previous decade, but several factors have converged to place states in increasingly central roles. First, many states have framed early steps that would have the effect of reducing greenhouse gases as being in their economic self-interest. This helps explain the expanding state government interest in developing a set of technologies and skills to promote renewable energy, energy conservation, and expertise to foster a low-carbon economy. Indeed, virtually every governor has now embraced the notion of developing "home grown" energy sources, at least in part, in order to foster long-term economic development. This has resulted in an active exploration of various policy tools that might achieve these goals alongside reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Second, a growing number of states are beginning to experience significant impacts that may be attributable to climate change, whether through violent storms, forest fires, species migration, prolonged droughts, or changing vectors of disease transmission. Some of these are having the classic effect of "triggering events" that create an impetus for a policy response, however modest the climate impact that any unilateral state efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions may be (Repetto, 2006). Third, some states have consciously chosen to be "first movers," often taking bold steps with the explicit intent of trying to take national leadership roles on climate policy. In some instances, such as California's legislation to restrict carbon emissions from vehicles and New York's efforts in the northeast to establish a regional carbon emissions trading zone, states are also trying to establish models that will influence their neighbors to join them and possibly position themselves to influence any future federal policy. In this regard, states are similar to corporations; some seek an early and active role, sensing potential strategic advantages over their more recalcitrant competitors (Hoffman, 2006; Kamieniecki, 2006). Fourth, state capitals have proven very fertile areas for the development of epistemic communities and policy networks advocating climate policy. In many instances, earlier state efforts reflected leadership from higher levels of state agencies working in environmental protection, energy, or other areas relevant to climate (Montpetit, 2003; Rabe, 2004). These policy entrepreneurs continue to operate but increasingly partner with other forces, such as legislators and advocacy groups, to form policy networks that build support for policy strategies that are particularly appealing to an individual state (Selin & VanDeveer, 2007). Fifth, states also provide venues for alternative approaches to policy formation, including direct democracy and litigation that confronts federal institutions. Ballot propositions are proving an increasingly popular way to advance climate initiatives in cases where representative institutions stall. At the same time, the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court verdict in Massachusetts et al. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency indicates that a collective of states can wage and ultimately win an intergovernmental court battle that may serve to force a reluctant federal agency to designate carbon dioxide as an air pollutant. The decision in this case is already triggering additional multistate efforts to use the federal courts as a venue to challenge other decisions by the private sector or federal agencies.
Variations in State Emission and Policy Adoption Trends
None of these factors converge in identical ways in differing states. Indeed, no two states have uniform profiles in terms of actual rates of greenhouse gas emissions growth or climate policy adoption. Just as the nations of the world diverge on these dimensions, so do American states. In turn, as we shall see, the combination of emissions growth and policy development to date varies greatly among states and this may prompt them to consider different strategic positions. This may apply to either further state policy adoption or any bargaining position that they might assume in future negotiations over federal policy.
State Emission Trends
The range of emission trends may be particularly surprising, when weighed against the widespread reporting of national averages for emission rates. With 1990 established as a near-universal baseline internationally, American emissions increased approximately 15 percent overall from that point through 2003. This reflects steady growth throughout the 1990s, with a somewhat slower pattern in more recent years. The most recent estimates suggest that American emissions have been essentially stable since 2003, but reliable state-by-state emissions data are not yet available. The overall pattern between 1990 and 2003 varied markedly when looking at the rates of change in the 50 states and the District of Columbia (see Table 1). One state, Delaware, is actually on track to meet the reduction targets that would have been imposed had the United States ratified Kyoto, and twelve other states have contained growth rates to single digits. These include several states such as California, Pennsylvania, New York, and Michigan that have very large emission bases and would rank among national leaders in emissions were they not part of a federation. At the same time, many other states, particularly those of the southeast and southwest, have registered rates of emissions growth that are double or greater than the national average.
Such a range of emissions is not unique to the United States, despite the tendency to focus only on national-level trends. Despite its ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, Canadian national emissions increased 26 percent between 1990 and 2003. Only Manitoba and Quebec approach those states toward the lower end of the growth continuum in the United States, whereas many others such as Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, were far above the national average. Similar variability exists among the nations of the European Union, ranging from outright reduction (Germany and the United Kingdom) to major increase (Ireland and Spain). In that case, differential national reduction targets were negotiated as part of the price for ratification, but many individual nations have vastly exceeded their particular targets. In each instance, political leadership of individual jurisdictions...
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