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Article Excerpt
In this article, I argue that the meaning and use of reintegration, both as a concept and a postconflict peacebuilding practice, is overloaded and unclear, thus contributing to problematic policy responses and impeding accountability. I draw on the Liberian case to show how vague, platitudinal, or contradictory understandings of reintegration can translate in the field to ad hoc and disengaged planning processes and programs that lack a clear strategy and lead to overblown expectations. I also contend that the ongoing securitization of reintegration can actually undermine both developmental and security objectives by instrumentalizing reintegration's original, socioeconomic aims, at the same time that it engenders frustration arising from inflated and unfulfilled expectations. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the thinking, practice, and evaluation of reintegration. KEYWORDS: disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, Liberia, postconflict, securitization, development.
Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs are integral to international community interventions in postconflict countries. Yet DDR's effectiveness, particularly in reintegrating former fighters--the focus of this article--owes more to assumption than to evidence. Assumptions--about how conflicts and affected societies are constituted and organized--also factor strongly into reintegration's conceptualization, which in turn tends to be so broad in scope and aims as to undermine chances of effective implementation. Relatedly and, I argue, problematically, reintegration operates in the service of two ends, security and development, not necessarily best served by the same means. Cumulatively, these elements--an oft-misguided basis for policy formulation combined with multiple policy justifications, aiming toward an unclear endstate--critically undercut reintegration's potential utility.
In this article, I contend that the meaning and use of reintegration, both as a concept and a practice, is overloaded and unclear, thus contributing to problematic policy responses and impeding accountability. I draw particularly on the Liberian case, but the arguments are intended to have broader application to the practice and thinking around reintegration and DDR.
The argument has two main strands, both relating to how policy conceptualization affects, complicates, or excuses implementation. The first strand identifies how reintegration has become an open-ended, catch-all policy engendering varying and sometimes contradictory claims without identifying a clear endstate that can form the basis for programming implementation and accountability. I argue that, because there typically is not a mission-specific, nonplatitudinal consensus on what reintegration comprises or should foster, policy interventions are insufficiently grounded in the specific context, impeding their effectiveness and enabling unintended consequences. Moreover, the lack of a clear endpoint inhibits analyses of the appropriateness of the means, while the indeterminate time span enables longer-term impacts on ex-combatants and the affected society to be sidestepped by international actors. The lack of clearly defined and realistic goals for reintegration also complicates attempts to manage expectations and fulfill promises, which may undermine its overall effectiveness.
The second strand, closely related to the first, focuses on how the tension between security and development imperatives and goals complicates reintegration. Although reintegration, since the 1990s, has been conceived and implemented primarily as a development project--the "soft" counterpart to the technical disarmament and demobilization components, funded out of donors' development budgets--it has become increasingly securi-tized. (1) The emphasis on security as both a justification and desired outcome of reintegration implies that its original socioeconomic focus is no longer an end in itself. Instead, reintegration becomes a means to an end. The securitization of reintegration also forwards a somewhat reductionist view of postconflict security, integrally relating it to ex-combatant idleness. The merits of this view can be debated. Also debatable is the extent to which security and development imperatives overlap or contest each other and what this means for the international community's ability to deliver on its promises. Does the securitization of reintegration fulfill either aim?
These arguments are fleshed out with primary recourse to the Liberian case, briefly examined in the following discussion. (2) Observations from Liberia form the basis for a broader examination of how reintegration is conceived of and translated into practice, focusing on the issues outlined above: the dependence on reintegration as a catch-all policy, and the friction between security and development approaches. Attention is paid to how these more conceptual issues complicate, even undermine, the operational effectiveness of reintegration programming. The assumptions underlying reintegration in Liberia are then examined. The article concludes with recommendations for improving the thinking, practice, and evaluation of reintegration. The analysis primarily focuses on rank-and-file fighters rather than on the higher grades that may be integrated into governing or command structures in reformed institutions.
First, however, two definitions. The United Nations defines DDR as "a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods." (3) Reintegration, meanwhile, "is the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance." (4)
DDR in Liberia
DDR in Liberia has been well examined elsewhere. (5) I do not duplicate those efforts here but provide a basic overview. Liberian DDR began in December 2003, a few months after the August 2003 signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), in accordance with the priority placed on the rapid enactment of DDR. (6) The program began disastrously, owing to the precarious security situation in the one finished cantonment site (and in the country as a whole) and to rushed planning that did not adequately account for the situation on the ground. (7) DDR also lacked acceptance by some of the main parties, while a poor communications strategy meant ex-combatants did not know what to expect from disarmament. After deadly riots at and outside the site, the program was halted, resuming in April 2004 after the security situation stabilized. The process then proceeded relatively calmly until the DD components were concluded in November 2004. After disarming, ex-combatants were given a DDR identification card, were cantoned briefly, were given two cash payments of US$150 each, and were entitled to reintegration programming, which consisted of formal education, vocational training, public works training, or agricultural, livestock, and fishing programs. Those enrolled in reintegration programs were to receive a monthly stipend while participating and have their school or training fees paid for up to three years. They were also to receive appropriate tools when they completed the course. Significantly, many more DDR participants preferred resettlement in Montserrado county (which includes Monrovia) than elsewhere. (8) This may be considered in conjunction with Kees Kingma's observation that reintegration is often less successful in urban than in rural areas. (9)
A decisive aspect of the Liberian program was the downgrading of entry requirements during the December-April interlude: from originally requiring presentation of a weapon, the resumed program required only 150 rounds of ammunition. This shift facilitated an explosion in numbers of DDR participants, while reducing the numbers of weapons collected. Thus, by the end of the DD phases, 102, 193 people were registered as disarmed (versus earlier estimates...
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