|
Article Excerpt
Well into President George W. Bush's second term, history appears to be repeating itself--second terms are far more problematic than first terms. Are problematic second terms inevitable, and if so are they caused by the Twenty-second Amendment? In this article I explore the constitutional and historical dynamics of presidential term limits, focusing on the leadership and clerkship roles the president performs in the constitutional system, constrained by the dynamics of political time. The article examines the classic arguments for and against term limits, comparing Hamilton's focus on stability to Jefferson's concern for tyranny. It then surveys the scholarship on second term problems to tease out the effects of term limits from the more general problem of second terms. I conclude with an analysis of second term and term limit problems from a political time perspective, suggesting that presidents are more constrained in the pursuit of their constitutional functions by the dynamics of regime cycles than they are by term limits. It appears that term limits add little to the functions of the presidency in the constitutional order.
There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the people to continue in off we men who had entitled themselves, in their opinion, to approbation and confidence, the advantages of which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
Federalist No. 72
As this article is being written, the nation is well into the final quartile of President George W. Bush's presidency, and it would appear that history is repeating itself. Despite a reelection win that was clearly stronger than his first victory, and despite claiming political capital he was willing to spend, Bush's second term has witnessed plunging public approval, a troubled policy agenda, and significant midterm election losses. The administration entered its second term having undertaken a study of previous second terms to stave off the inevitable, to no apparent avail (Balz 2007, 25). History demonstrates that second terms are far more problematic than first terms, afflicted with "sixth year itches," "sixth year curses," and the more generic "second term blues" (Sabato 2008; Shogan 2006; Fortier and Ornstein 2007).
One explanation for this phenomenon is the president's status as a lame duck due to the term limits imposed by the Twenty-second Amendment. This article examines the impact of the two-term limit on the president's ability to do his job, exploring this question from a constitutional and historical perspective, focusing on the leadership and clerkship roles the president performs in the constitutional system, constrained by the dynamics of political time, concluding that term limits are, in Hamilton's evocative phrase, "an excess of refinement." That is, while not the harbinger of doom some portray, they in fact add little to the functions of the presidency. The argument is in four parts. The article begins with a brief review of the president's function in the constitutional order, moving away from a presidency-centered approach in favor of a systemic one, arguing that this is the best way to evaluate presidential effectiveness. Second, it outlines the classic concerns about term limits, both pro and con, comparing Alexander Hamilton's focus on energy and stability to Thomas Jefferson's concern for tyranny and health, arguing that each makes strong and weak arguments, but that Hamilton wins the day. Third, it surveys the scholarship on second term problems, highlighting arguments concerning reelection hubris, administration fatigue, and leadership failure to demonstrate that some problems are due more to the existence of successive terms than to term limits. The article concludes with an examination of term limits in a broader historical context, comparing second term problems to the constraints and opportunities all presidents face at various points in political time, arguing that presidents are limited far more by larger historical forces than they are by a lame duck status.
Presidential Functions in the Constitutional Order
As Jeffrey Tulis outlines in his book The Rhetorical Presidency, the separation of powers system created by the American Constitution helps provide for several different objectives of republican government. By separating various functions of government into distinct groups of officials, the framers hoped to provide for more effective governance, and the three branches of government are structured to make more likely the provision of these functions. Congress is a plural institution designed to represent the people and enact policies in response to the popular will through a complex deliberative process. The federal court system is composed of small bodies of learned experts who have job security that enables them to interpret the law and protect the rights and liberties of the people. Most important for this analysis, the presidency is a unitary institution designed to ensure the security and stability of the nation by acting energetically to set goals, respond to crises, and provide for the steady administration of the law (Tulis 1987, 41-45). Tulis points out that the separation of powers system is designed to regulate the natural tension that exists among these various functions. The three branches of government are structured differently to make more likely the fulfillment of these objectives, and their priority of concerns differs.
Any analysis of presidential effectiveness, then, must begin with a clear understanding of the functions the office performs in the constitutional order. "Success" on the president's own terms may be an understandable goal for the individual inhabiting the office, but individual success may or may not be desirable for the polity as a whole. Far more important is the question of what the presidency as a constitutional office provides to the nation. Inspired by the poor performance of the national government under the Articles of Confederation, Publius clarifies the place of the presidency in the political system, stating that energy in the executive is "essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property ... to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy." It is in part the unitary nature of the office that makes possible this energy, which brings with it such qualities as "decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch," constituting "the bulwark of the national security" (Hamilton et al. 1999, 391-95). According to Publius, the function of the executive consists of "the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense" (418).
Scholars have noted that in the performance of his duties the president wears the dual hats of leader and clerk (Neustadt 1990, 3-9). In his leadership capacity the president sets and clarifies goals and reacts to crises. In his clerkship capacity the president pursues steady administration of the law. Richard Neustadt emphasizes the president's leadership role at the expense of his clerkship role, for leadership tends to be the arena in which the president demonstrates greater strength, however that word is defined. It is important, though, not to ignore either aspect of presidential duty. Herbert Storing argues that the leadership and clerkship roles embodied by the president coexist uneasily with each other, in inevitable and unavoidable tension. Energy is essential for both functions, but the leadership hat worn by the president...
|
