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Article Excerpt
Although philosophers have been discussing normative models of ethical decision making for hundreds of years, descriptive models of the process emerged only in the last half-century (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Rest, 1986). In examining how individuals actually make choices when facing ethical dilemmas, researchers have begun to identify some of the factors shaping ethical and unethical choices. Although several theoretical models of the ethical decision-making process have been advanced (Ferrell and Gresham, 1985; Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986; Trevino, 1986), most empirical work on ethical decision making in business centers either on Jones' (1991) issue-contingent model, which argues that the moral intensity of an issue is most important (see also Carlson et al., 2002), or Trevino's (1986) interactionist model, which examines the interplay of individual and contextual factors on ethical decisions.
Though each of the two models has received some empirical support (Franke et al., 1997; Loe et al., 2000; Paolillo and Vitell, 2002), neither is strongly grounded in the decisionmaking literature (e.g. Ritov and Baron, 1999; Tanner and Medin, 2004). Perhaps more importantly, neither model addresses the role of emotions, which empirical studies in various realms have shown to be an important part of the decision process (Baron, 1992; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Morris and Feldman, 1997; Morrow et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2002). Finally, the two models speak only generally of the justifications cited by individuals, with Jones (1991) focusing on consequence-based explanations and Trevino (1986) addressing cultural and personal reasons for choosing a particular alternative. Justifications are emerging as an important factor in connecting anticipated emotions such as regret to decision-making processes (e.g., Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002).
The present study attempts to connect research on business ethics more closely to decision research in general by examining the effects of two kinds of factors--justifications and emotions--on the ethical decisionmaking processes of individuals. Each category of factors has been explored by decision researchers in recent years, though primarily not in the realm of ethical decision making (Connolly and Zeelenberg, 2002; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Using hypothetical decision situations, we examine the influence of each kind of factor on the choices made by individuals facing ethical dilemmas. Before describing the study in detail, we survey some of the main theoretical approaches that have been proposed.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Ethical decisions often involve a variety of emotions (Gaudine and Thorne, 2001; Klein, 2002), both those experienced in the making of the decision and those anticipated (and perhaps experienced) as a result of the decision. As noted, researchers in the field of judgment and decision making have recently devoted increased attention to the role that emotions play in shaping individuals' choices (Gilbert and Wilson, 2000; Mellers et al., 1999). Researchers have noted both beneficial and detrimental effects of real and anticipated emotions on decision makers (Brief and Weiss, 2002; Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). Among the most important findings are those linking expected emotions to choice (e.g., Mellers and McGraw, 2001; Mellers et al., 1999). Perhaps no emotion has received more attention than regret, "... a negative, cognitively based emotion that we experience when realizing or imagining that our present situation would have been better had we acted differently" (Zeelenberg, 1999: 325). The effect of anticipated and experienced regret on choice is now well established. Examples in consumer choice include Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997), Simonson (1992), and Tsiros and Mittal (2000). Also, Connolly and Reb (2003) and Pieters and Zeelenberg (2005) give examples of the role of regret and justification in a variety of other personal, medical and financial decisions.
A second potentially important emotion in the ethical decision-making process is relief, the feeling experienced by those no longer burdened by a stressful situation (Ortony et al., 1988). Relief has been described as a basic emotion (Ekman, 1999; Mowrer, 1960) that can serve to motivate individuals to act in particular ways. It may be especially salient in situations where fear or anxiety is present. Ethical dilemmas often evoke anxiety as decision makers weigh various alternatives and the outcomes that are likely to follow their decision (Coye, 1986). Reducing or avoiding such anxiety through a thoughtful choice can lead to a feeling of relief (Levy and Dubinsky, 1983). In some ethical dilemmas, choice may lead to increased uncertainty and anxiety, as in the case of a potential whistle-blower who must decide between reporting a suspected infraction or keeping quiet. Both options have the potential to increase rather than reduce the decision maker's level of anxiety.
Finally, many decisions are affected by the satisfaction one expects to experience after making a choice be alternatives (Houston et al., 1991; Oliver, 1997). Though extensive research questions expected utility theory as a complete model of choice, the value of anticipated outcomes clearly plays a substantial part in many decisions, and the role of anticipated satisfaction should not be ignored. Surprisingly, few empirical studies in business ethics have included measures of expected satisfaction with possible outcomes.
Outside the emotions literature, a related stream of research involves the justifications offered by individuals who choose one course of action over another (McMackin and Slovic, 2000; Shaw et al., 2003; Simonson and Nowlis, 2000). Justifications are said to be offered by decision makers who, often in the face of scrutiny by others, accept responsibility for an action and defend its appropriateness by citing some ideological reason or higher-order goal (Scott and Lyman, 1968). (In contrast, excuses are offered by decision makers who admit their acts are inappropriate but deny full responsibility by pointing to some mitigating factor.)
The resolution of ethical dilemmas frequently requires individuals to find a reasonable justification for their choice. Very often, such justifications involve the consequences that would follow the selection of one course of action or another. For instance, a firm that decides voluntarily to make its workplace safer might do so because it believes that the long-term benefits of such an action outweigh the short-term costs. Ethicists have labeled such consequence-based approaches "teleological" or "consequentialist" and have found support for this kind of reasoning in the utilitarian philosophies of John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and others.
Of course, justifications 'cited by ethical decision makers need not involve consequences at all. Frequently, individuals act out of a perceived duty toward others, regardless of the consequences (Coughlan, 2005; Litzky et al., 2006; Moore et al., 2006), as in the case of a factory owner who decides to rebuild after a fire rather than retire with the insurance payment. Such "deontological" approaches, which involve the obligations one has toward other individuals and groups, are illustrated by recent work on stakeholder theory (Evan and Freeman, 1993), as well as earlier philosophical approaches, including Kantian ethics, virtue ethics, and other approaches related to justice and rights. Each of these two major categories of ethical approaches, deontological and teleological, can be described as normative, as they provide a framework for how individuals should act.
A final set of explanations contains arguments that have little connection to moral philosophy. The explanations that fall within...
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