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Article Excerpt
Despite the abundance of literature on international regimes, little attention has been given to how they are funded and the impact of funding on regime performance. This article examines how donor funding has affected the underlying principle of protection in the international refugee regime. It focuses on the case of Tanzania, where refugee protection standards have declined consistently over the past twelve years, and argues that a shortage of funding within the regime has contributed to the shift in government policy in several ways. To the extent that funding cuts have had an influence on declining protection standards, this case suggests that resource shortages may cause practice within an international regime to become inconsistent with its underlying principles, thus weakening the overall regime. KEYWORDS: international regimes, refugees, funding, compliance, Africa.
For years, international relations scholars have been seeking to understand the formation and effectiveness of international regimes. (1) Most studies have focused on how regimes are created, the reasons for co-operation, and the extent to which regimes influence state behavior. (2) Realists argue that international regimes are reflections of state interests and power. They form when the interests of powerful states converge, and they change when those interests change or the distribution of power is altered. They have no independent effect on state behavior. Functionalists see regimes as a response to perceived needs. The uncertainty associated with unregulated patterns of behavior leads to a demand for international regimes, which are supplied by willing states. As long as they continue to be effective, regimes put structural constraints on state action. Constructivists focus on the importance of ideas in the creation and perpetuation of regimes. Through their control of information and decision making processes, regimes create knowledge and socialize participants, thus independently influencing state behavior.
Despite the abundance of literature on international regimes, surprisingly little attention has been given to how they are funded and the impact of funding on regime performance. (3) Funding can provide an incentive for member states to comply with an international regime. In the environmental sector, for example, China's ratification of and subsequent compliance with the Montreal Protocol was driven largely by its access to the Multilateral Fund, established to implement the protocol. (4) The sources of funding within a regime can influence the way in which it functions. One study found that supplementary financiers of agreements negotiated by the International Monetary Fund influenced the conditions placed on those agreements. (5) Similarly, donor governments can use their contributions to an international regime to force changes in its operations. In 1994, the US Congress withheld $1 billion from the World Bank until it adopted sweeping environmental reforms. (6) And, in some situations, competition for funding among actors within a regime can lead to inefficient and less-than-optimal outcomes. The struggle among international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in eastern Congo, for example, undermined their collective ability to protest the misuse of refugee assistance. (7)
This article examines the impact of funding levels on regime effectiveness, defined as member state compliance with the regime's underlying principles. It focuses on the international refugee regime, which is highly dependent on external funding, and its principle of refugee protection. Member state compliance with this regime can be understood by looking at standards of refugee protection in individual host countries. In Tanzania, recent changes in government policy reflect a consistent decline in protection standards for refugees over the past twelve years. As I explain in subsequent sections, a shortage of funding within the international refugee regime has contributed to the shift in Tanzanian policy in several ways. (8) To the extent that funding cuts have had an influence on declining refugee protection standards, this case suggests that resource shortages may cause practice within an international regime to become inconsistent with its underlying principles, thus weakening the overall regime.
Funding the International Refugee Regime
The international refugee regime provides a useful example to examine funding issues because it depends heavily on external resources. The regime centers on an international organization and a series of agreements that are designed to coordinate state behavior on the cross-border movement of asylum seekers. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1950 to provide international protection to refugees. UNHCR is guided by a number of agreements, most notably the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 protocol that broadened its geographic and temporal coverage. There are also several regional agreements, including the 1969 Organization of African Unity convention that expanded the definition of refugee to include persons fleeing generalized violence. Over the years, in addition to its mandate for refugee protection, UNHCR has become the principal coordinator of relief operations.
Increasingly, interests in refugee protection have come into conflict with political and security priorities, forcing UNHCR to make tough choices. In 1991, for example, Turkey refused to admit Kurdish refugees fleeing northern Iraq. Despite concerns about pushing refugees back at the border, UNHCR opted to participate in the creation of "safe havens" within Iraq and assist the Kurds there. UNHCR also faced a dilemma in the former Yugoslavia, where its assistance in evacuating people from situations of danger indirectly facilitated the process of ethnic cleansing. In central Africa, UNHCR provided support to Rwandan refugee camps despite the fact that their residents included people who had participated in genocide at home. In these and many other situations, UNHCR has been forced to choose between its humanitarian mandate to protect refugees and political dynamics on the ground. Often, these decisions are further complicated by the agency's funding concerns.
The question of funding for the international refugee regime is important for two reasons. First, UNHCR depends entirely on voluntary contributions for its field operations. The agency receives just 2 percent of its funds from the UN general budget for headquarters staff. The remaining 98 percent of an annual budget exceeding $1 billion must be raised through appeals to UN member states and other donors. (9) The vast majority of the agency's funding comes from industrialized countries, with the United States, the European Union, and Japan together accounting for 94 percent of government contributions. Because of the particular interests and political priorities of these donors, roughly 80 percent of the funding is earmarked for specific operations or programs. (10) As a result of this funding structure, UNHCR is highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the level of donor contributions.
Second, since its inception, burden sharing has been an underlying norm of the international refugee regime. The 1951 convention recognizes in its preamble that "the grant of asylum may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries" and calls for international cooperation. Subsequent regional agreements in Africa, Europe, and Asia also incorporated the concept of burden sharing. Despite its importance, these instruments did not legally obligate third countries to assist host states financially or otherwise. Thus, starting in the late 1970s, a series of targeted agreements laid out more comprehensive approaches for sharing responsibilities among countries of origin, host countries, resettlement countries, and donors. The Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese...
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