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Two complementary views of peacemaking: the Palestinian-Israeli case.

Article Excerpt
The Palestinian-Israeli dispute is an archetypical example of an intractable conflict: a protracted, violent, drawn-out struggle in which generation after generation is socially conditioned to continue fighting. The phenomenon perpetuates a destructive evolutionary mechanism: almost every element that benefits the conflict survives, while whatever operates against it becomes extinct. In order to change this progression, a beneficial revolutionary process is required that would bring the peace process to the point of no return, a place where extremists, radicals and "professional" spoilers cannot stop the progression toward resolution of the conflict.

Two critical elements are required for an effective peace process: leadership on both sides and the preparation of the opposing societies. These components are interdependent. Leaders who strive to promote a solution to the conflict need the support of their people; people who are prepared for a reasonable peace process demand substantial progress toward resolution of the conflict and the establishment of a peaceful social order. The question is, how to create such a circular structure.

This paper presents two models of peacemaking: the political-elite model and the public-assembly model. The chief purpose of the first is to reach a peace agreement, while the second is mainly designed to prepare the opposing societies for a reasonable outcome. I intend to show that their simultaneous implementation is extremely important for the beginning of a revolutionary peace process in the Palestinian-Israeli struggle.

The political-elite model suggests different kinds of interactions between the elites of both sides as the dominant experience in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. The public-assembly model, which is new in the Palestinian-Israeli case, proposes establishing a public institution for conflict resolution--a multi-party negotiating assembly. This model is based, loosely, upon the mechanisms that helped to stabilize the political situation for quite a long time in two other desperate situations of intractable conflict: Apartheid South Africa and Northern Ireland during the "troubles."

My central claim is that the implementation of an effective combination of these two models, the political-elite and the public-assembly, can help adversaries discover, mostly by themselves, the road to ending conflict and establishing peaceful relations.

THE POLITICAL-ELITE MODEL

The political-elite model offers various forms of interactions between political elites from both sides. Its main purpose is to reach a peace agreement and transfer it to the public. In general, there are three main interactions: track II diplomacy, secret diplomacy and track I diplomacy.

Track II diplomacy involves unofficial bargaining and exploration among a wide circle of leaders, policy makers and public figures, usually in preparation for the actual negotiation. Secret diplomacy is a negotiation between representatives of the official leaderships, aimed at sketching principles for the final agreement. Track I diplomacy is the formal negotiation between official representatives of both sides where, generally, agreements are worked out. (1)

The political-elite model is made up of combinations of these forms of interactions. The Oslo accord of the 1990s can be viewed as a classic example that demonstrates an efficient synthesis among these three tracks. The progression in this historic peace process seems to be taken from an attractive recipe, written in the handbook for peacemaking diplomacy. Track II diplomacy is turned into secret diplomacy that leads to track I diplomacy. The Oslo process was initiated through secret track II meetings between a small group of Israeli academics and several PLO representatives outside of the stagnant 1991 Madrid talks. It was an unofficial exploration of possibilities for an agreement. However, almost from the beginning, any progress was reported back to the political leaders from both sides. The political leaders had to authorize almost every progression toward formalization of official documents. As soon as it became clear that the Oslo talks might result in a formal agreement, the Israeli team was expanded to include official negotiators, and track II diplomacy turned into secret diplomacy.

The Oslo accord was formalized with the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in Oslo, Norway, in August 1993. The agreement was a framework for the future relations between the anticipated Palestinian state and Israel. It was officially signed in Washington on September 13, 1993, by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). After the agreement was signed, track I talks became the main channel for negotiations between the two sides, although back-channeled diplomacy continued to support the process. (2) The intention was to prepare the ground for the negotiation of a permanent agreement, which was planned to begin no later than May 1996.

From a realist point of view, it looks as if one of the main reasons the political-elite model in the Oslo case worked so effectively was the necessity of Rabin and Arafat to deliver an agreement for their own political survival. (3) However, the dependency of the Oslo accord on the...

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