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Article Excerpt
The following is an edited transcript of the fifty-third in a series of Capitol Hill conferences convened by the Middle East Policy Council. The meeting was held on Friday, June 20, 2008, in the Caucus Room of the Cannon House Office Building with Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., presiding.
CHAS. W. FREEMAN, JR.: president, Middle East Policy Council
Much of the concern about a possible Israeli or American strike on Iran has receded in recent days. Yet, within the last week, Israel apparently ran a huge military maneuver in the eastern Mediterranean, exercising its capacity to engage in long-range airstrikes. President Bush has on several occasions declared that he will not leave office without dealing with the menace of Iran, as he defines it.
Over the last several years, various rationales for military action against Iran have been put forward. Initially, the discussion was about taking out Iranian nuclear facilities. When it appeared that the Iranians had suspended the weaponization aspect of their nuclear program, for a while at least, that talk was suddenly succeeded by a discussion of the need for protection of American forces in Iraq, who allegedly were being attacked with weapons deliberately provided by Iran.
Grave concerns have also been expressed, particularly in light of the March incident in the Gulf of Suez, in which an American naval vessel fired on an Egyptian gunboat and killed a couple of civilians. U.S. forces are jittery after the USS Cole incident and operate under more robust rules of engagement that require small boats to keep a distance from U.S. naval vessels. There have also been concerns about the possibility of an incident at sea between the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and its naval flotilla and the United States.
In a recent issue of Middle East Policy (Vol. XV, No. 3), Antony Sullivan analyzed the possible regional metastasis that might ensue from a conflict with Iran, talking about actions in and by Lebanon, in and by Syria, against Israel and, of course, Hamas in Gaza. I encourage you all, if you have not read that article, to take a look at it because it is very sobering.
JOHN DUKE ANTHONY: founding president, chief executive officer, National Council on U.S.-Arab Relations
There is no reason why the idea of attacking Iran militarily ought to be viewed by anyone in the region as necessary, inevitable or unavoidable. A related reaction, as reflected among leaders throughout the Gulf with whom I have met and discussed the matter, is that the Bush administration has deliberately failed to level with the American people about this issue. Within this view is a conviction that the administration has not been forthright about the real reasons that, were they acknowledged and subjected to vigorous public debate by the American people, would likely result in their refusing to support, let alone endorse, such a policy position or action. A third dimension of reactions already in play is the sheer uncertainty of what could follow. This can be seen even now, not only in the significantly higher, fear-induced price of oil. It is also reflected in how rapidly discussion about the possibility of a war has shifted from riveted attention to acute apprehension to sheer anxiety about the likely follow-on implications for the Gulf Arab countries. Here the frames of reference are their respective strategic, economic, political, commercial and defense needs, concerns and interests, not to mention their objectives and relations with each other and outside parties.
As to the requirements side of the equation, in advance of an attack, one is the obvious need for the Gulf Arab governments to persuade their citizenries that every possible precaution is being taken to deter and defend against an attack. Within this requirement is a need to do whatever is necessary to ensure their inherent fight to self-preservation no matter what transpires. Another need is to assure their countries' inhabitants that everything imaginable has been and is being done to provide for national and local emergency contingencies. All agree that being able to meet these basic needs is imperative in the event of a near certainty that an attack against Iran by the United States or Israel, or some combination of the two, becomes not a question of whether but when.
Still another requirement is to be prepared to withstand the probability of a range of retaliatory actions by Iran or its agents following an attack. Certainly, possibilities for retaliation would not be lacking. Among them, to name but a few, could be the inflicting of damage to offshore drilling platforms on the Arab side of the Gulf, to undersea energy valves, gauges and pipelines, threats to shipping in the strategic Hormuz Strait, and attacks on power generation and desalination plants along the coasts.
There would also be obvious need for heightened domestic surveillance and security measures vis-a-vis the Iranians in these countries. Some 400,000 Iranians live and work in the UAE emirate of Dubai alone. Additional thousands of Iranians reside in Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar, although nowhere near the same number in Oman or Saudi Arabia.
There will probably also be a need to be able to deal effectively with a range of likely, as well as unanticipated political consequences, driven by the perceived as well as actual nature, extent and overall effectiveness of what these countries' elite decision makers do or fail to do to prevent an attack. Regardless of their respective actions or inactions, if whatever they do is perceived as inadequate or ineffective, the prospects are considerable that a range of resultant accusations could represent a rhetorical throwback to an earlier era. A frame of reference is the 1960s, when many Arab Gulf leaders were labeled by Arab nationalists as "America's Arabs," "Anglo-Arabs," "running dogs" and "lackeys of imperialism."
If but a fraction of this kind of reaction were to occur, it would not be difficult to imagine how this would negatively affect the perceived legitimacy of these leaders, not only domestically but further afield. Even now, the meaning of the phrase "moderate Arab leaders" has increasingly been debased. In the eyes of critics, it has migrated from being synonymous with a commendable attribute to an epithet applied to any Arab leader seen as inclined to accommodate America's aims.
Regarding other requirements deemed necessary to try and prevent an attack, among the most obvious is the need to engage Iran in every imaginable way. The goal would be to underpin their acknowledged common interests in regional peace, stability and prosperity, which by definition renders the idea of launching yet another war in the Gulf unthinkable. A close cousin to this requirement is the need for insiders and outsiders alike not to be precipitous in concluding that diplomacy has been exhausted. Certainly, a consensus within the region is that a case cannot yet be made that diplomacy has been exhausted. On the contrary, practically all agree that greater and more effective diplomacy is needed.
Further, if an attack is to be prevented, a third requirement applies to the United States and Israel almost equally. If for domestic political reasons they cannot do so publicly, they need privately not to fail to focus to the greatest extent possible on the positive aspects of Iran's behavior over the last quarter of a century, for which a range of evidence is hardly lacking. If only to quiet the extremist warmongers among their respective policy makers, each needs not to lose sight of, and take appropriate measures to commend, empathize with and strategize in relation to these positive aspects.
There's no need to go overboard in this regard. It should be sufficient merely to cite various facts in the chronology. For example, apart from the Iranian complicity in the deadly attack on the Al-Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the strengthening of Iran's occupation of three islands claimed by the UAE in the 1990s, there has been no Iranian actual or potential military attack on any of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries for nearly a quarter of a century. Apart from these two instances, the last serious threat occurred in June 1984. Then, utilizing a combined configuration of American-manufactured AWACs and F-15 aircraft, Saudi Arabia effectively prevented what could easily have been an Iranian armed aerial attack on the kingdom's Eastern Province oil and gas installations. There has been no comparable threat posed by Iran against any GCC country since then. Neither has there been a recurrence of two incidents in Bahrain, one in December 1981 and another alleged in June 1996 by Iran in which its agents sought to destabilize Bahrain and perhaps lay the groundwork for a coup d'etat. Nor has there been anything remotely comparable to the Iranian-instigated attack on the life of the amir of Kuwait in 1985.
If all else fails and an attack occurs, what would be the aftermath in terms of requirements? One almost certain requirement would be to demonstrate an ability to accommodate a set of likely geopolitical, social and psychological challenges as represented by the extent to which the governments would be expected to politically survive intact the after effects of an attack against Iran in the event the attack is mounted solely by the United States.
One high-ranking official of a GCC country informed me of his personal view that the GCC members would likely have a 50-50 chance of being able to weather such an attack were it to be carried out by the United States alone. However, if the Israelis were alleged or even perceived to have been part of an attack, whether independently or in association with the United States, all bets would be off. This official claimed not to know whether any of the governments could cope effectively in the event their citizens reacted with uncontrollable rage and directed their anger at their governments as much as, if not more than, American or Israeli interests in the region.
A further requirement in the event of an attack has to do with a range of logistical, operational, economic and financial dynamics. Aspects of these dynamics are addressed in part by separate Defense Cooperation Agreements that the United States signed and entered into with Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar in the aftermath of Iraq's aggression in Kuwait in addition to a modified Defense Cooperation Agreement between Washington and the United Arab Emirates, and an Access to Facilities Agreement between the United States and Oman, dating from January 1980. It is true that there is no comparable agreement with Saudi Arabia. Even so, in spite of that, what does exist between Riyadh and Washington is a far vaster range of undertakings and understandings. In the realm of defense-cooperation relationships dating over a much longer period of time and involving far more Arabs and Americans than anything remotely comparable with the other seven Arab Gulf countries.
AMB. FREEMAN: The United States cannot conduct military operations in the Gulf without support from countries in the Gulf. An effort to stage military operations without permission, as was the case from Oman with Desert One--the rescue attempt on hostages in Tehran almost 30 years ago--will result in a suspension of military cooperation, as was the case with Oman. Second, because logistics require cooperation from countries in the region, they cannot avoid a measure of complicity with a U.S. operation against Iran, and the word in the region is that Iran has already told Qatar, for example, that if there is such an attack, the Qatari regime is toast. Third, it's not just the use of bases that is involved. We cannot conduct air operations either in Iraq or over Iran, or for that matter in Afghanistan, without overflight of Saudi Arabia, and there is no agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia that guarantees our right to such overflight. It is granted on a case-by-case basis.
The U.S. airbase in Qatar, from which the air wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan are directed, depends entirely on this air bridge. Therefore, the question of complicity cannot be avoided by countries in the region. The likelihood of retaliation, which John Duke mentioned, cannot be avoided. Of course, there would be collateral damage to things like oil prices in such a scenario.
JEAN-FRANCOIS SEZNEC: visiting associate professor, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University
I will try to present what I think the Saudi point of view is. My argument is economic. Having lived in the Gulf for 10 years and being a banker, I have seen the business angle of things and followed it since 1974 quite extensively.
I find that the GCC, and Saudi Arabia in particular, is caught between the anvil and the hammer. They really worry about Iran, of course, for obvious reasons, but they also distrust the United States just as much, if not more, these days. So the Saudis are very worried about a potential U.S. strike on Iran; they feel they can handle Iran on their own. That may sound surprising since their military is not that strong, but neither is the Iranian military.
On the other hand, there is a new paradigm in Saudi thinking in terms of defense and security. The Saudis are seeking to gain time. They want to maximize their economic growth, their wealth and their importance to the world markets. They assume that at the same time, Iran is going bankrupt and because of this, will be forced to change policies. So from their point of view, time is on their side.
A U.S. attack--whether it's U.S. or Israeli, it will be viewed as U.S.-based--would stop the economic growth of the region. It would kill the Saudi chance to become the economic hegemon of the region and one of the hegemons of the world. It would weaken them relative to Iran and Iraq, which they feel they can dominate.
The major points of conflict, of course, are well known. There are the islands and the potential conflict between the UAE and Iran, which has been on the books for a long, long time. The strategic Strait of Hormuz is very important, but the Saudis are not so worried about that. If the Iranians blocked Hormuz, they would be committing hara-kiri, because they could not ship their own oil.
Another issue, which has been alluded to by Ambassador Freeman, is the fact that the Iranians are very worried about the enormous development of the Qatar North Dome Field. It's the largest gas field in the world. The Qataris are developing it like crazy right now, and the Iranians are upset because they own half of that field and they feel that the Qataris are stealing their gas. They have not been able to develop that field for lack of money and lack of technology from overseas.
The other area of potential conflict is the oil platforms on the Kuwaiti-Iraq field. There's been a lot of tension among the Kuwaitis, the Saudis and the Iranians over those platforms. This has somewhat delayed the development of these fields.
The Iranians are not happy that the Saudis are trying to decrease...
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