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Article Excerpt
1. Introduction
This paper explores the problem of how to think about the fulfillment of an ideal-theoretical conception of basic global justice demanding the eradication of global poverty given the recognition of two facts or nonideal circumstances: (a) the absence of robust international institutions and (b) the lack of a strong ethos of cosmopolitan solidarity. (1)
The paper has three parts. Section 2 presents an account of central concepts involved in the discussion of global justice, such as basic and nonbasic global justice, ideal and nonideal theory, and the different dimensions of a political conception and their justification. Section 3 clarifies the exact relevance of (a) and (b) for a theory of basic global justice. I argue that it is a mistake to think that a recognition of (a) and (b) justifies the claim that there are no stringent duties of global distributive justice. Institutional structures and motivational mechanisms should track basic normative principles, not the other way around. What a recognition of (a) and (b) provides is, instead, grounds for demanding serious consideration of nonideal issues of practical feasibility affecting the implementation of such principles.
The final section advances some positive suggestions as to how to move the theoretical and practical agenda of global justice and poverty relief forward with respect to the problems of feasibility identified in section 3. I argue, first, that discussion in political philosophy regarding global justice should take what I call a transitional standpoint. This is the standpoint of political agents that are in the process of changing central features of the institutional and cultural environment in which they act. A transitional standpoint focuses on the identification of dynamic trajectories of political action, which set into motion a sequence of political reforms passing through successive thresholds of feasibility. This approach is sensitive to both ideal-theoretical and nonideal-theoretical considerations. Second, I illustrate this approach by discussing the central importance of agents' political empowerment through dynamic practices of public deliberation, protest, and institutional experimentation.
2. Basic Global Justice and Nonideal Theory
To be fully defensible, a political conception of justice must propose principles, institutions, and strategies of reform that are both morally desirable and practically feasible) It is, however, not always clear how considerations of moral desirability and practical feasibility operate in the development and evaluation of the different dimensions of a political conception. I present in section 2.a a general account of these notions, and apply it in section 2.b to the domain of discussions on global justice.
2.a. Moral desirability and practical feasibility in the development and assessment of political conceptions of justice
(i) Dimensions of a political conception and their justification. Considerations of moral desirability and practical feasibility apply to three central dimensions of a political conception of justice. The following chart may be useful for the discussion that follows.
Kinds of justification Dimensions of a Kinds of political conception theory Abstract DI. Fundamental principles Ideal moral theory Initial DII. Institutional schemes Full political implementing principles political from DI DIII. Processes of reform Nonideal leading to realization theory of schemes from DII
Dimension DI includes a set of fundamental principles. These principles identify the most general kinds of rights and duties that individuals in a just society have. Their defense involves appeal to fundamental moral ideas and the identification of general facts that make their application practically necessary and possible. Take, for example, the two principles of Rawls's theory of "justice as fairness," the first demanding a set of equal civil and political liberties and the second economic schemes that work to the greatest benefit of the worst off against the background of fair equality of opportunity. (3) These principles are defended as morally desirable by appeal to fundamental normative views of persons as free and equal, rational and reasonable cooperators, and are seen as practically feasible by noting that people have the moral powers and general capacities, and the need, to effectively address unavoidable facts of moderate material scarcity and conflict of interests arising in their social life (what Rawls calls the "circumstances of justice"). (4)
Dimension DII involves the identification and defense of institutional schemes implementing the principles provided in DI. While a fundamental principle is defended by showing that it is better than the alternatives in catering to fundamental moral ideas when dealing with the most general facts of human social existence, an institutional scheme is defended by showing that it is better than the alternatives in implementing the principles selected in DI. Considerations of feasibility and desirability operate here through the operation of two filters. The first (regarding feasibility) distinguishes between sustainable or stable and unsustainable or unstable institutional schemes. An institutional scheme is sustainable or stable when its continued presence is not incompatible with general empirical truths about how people are or can be in their social life. The second filter identifies morally optimal institutional schemes. An institutional scheme is morally optimal when it is better than the alternatives at implementing the principles from DI. (5) What I will call the initial political justification of a political conception consists in showing, for a certain context, that the schemes it proposes pass the two filters (i.e., that they are the morally optimal ones among those sustainable). Thus, in the case of his principles of justice, Rawls thinks that their best institutional implementation in a contemporary society would be through the institutions of either a "property-owning democracy" or a "liberal democratic socialism," not through the institutions of a "welfare state capitalism" or a "laissez-faire capitalism." Even though the latter might be sustainable, they would not, as the former, provide the best feasible instantiation of the demands of political freedom and economic equality. (6)
A third dimension of a political conception, Dill, is focused on identifying and defending strategies of political reform leading to the realization of the institutional schemes from DII when these are not in place. Again two filters concerning feasibility and desirability operate here. The first distinguishes between accessible and inaccessible institutional schemes. Following Allen Buchanan, we can see an ideal conception of justice as accessible to certain agents when "there is a practicable route from where [they] are now to at least a reasonable approximation of the state of affairs that satisfies its principles." (7) This means that institutional schemes satisfying the fundamental principles of justice can realistically be reached by agents in a certain context. Accessibility can thus be seen as a more context-specific form of feasibility. The second filter identifies morally optimal reforms. These are the ones that, when compared to the alternatives, are the best at approximating the realization of the just schemes while imposing acceptable moral costs to those affected. The second filter demands, in fact, a double moral test. It tests reforms for the moral value of both their results and the process leading to them. To use the helpful terminology proposed by Amartya Sen, we are here assessing "comprehensive outcomes." (8) Political judgment is always needed to determine the appropriate balance between process-related and result-related considerations. The ideals and principles from DI normally provide guidelines with which this can be done. Returning to the example of Rawls's conception of social justice, reforms introducing egalitarian economic schemes might not be appropriate if they involve tampering with people's civil and political rights (which have, according to Rawls, priority over economic ones). The full political justification of a political conception would then involve not only the proposal and defense of certain fundamental principles and institutional schemes, but also the exploration and defense of political strategies through which the latter can realistically be accessed. (9)
Three comments about this account are necessary. First, it sees both considerations of feasibility and of moral desirability as crucial. Demanding considerations of desirability are necessary if a political conception is to avoid a cynical realism that fails to criticize social injustices. Considerations of feasibility are also necessary if a political conception is to avoid the impotent idealism of merely extending injunctions that are very unlikely to be fulfilled. Second, this account does not conflate feasibility and desirability. The following two claims are perfectly consistent:
(1) The institutional scheme S1 is just.
(2) S1 is infeasible.
The truth of (2) does not entail the falsity of (l). S1 may not be accessible or sustainable in a certain context. This does not make S1 unjust. We can still see S1 as just while noticing that we cannot realistically expect to have it. Another scheme, S2, may be, on the other hand, feasible but not just. Normative political argument looks for the intersection between desirability and feasibility, without conflating the two. These considerations certainly apply to DIII: a reform may successfully lead to a just scheme (and thus render the latter accessible) and yet be morally unacceptable (due to high moral costs involved in the process).lo
Notice, finally, that as we move from DI to DII to DIII, considerations of feasibility become more context-specific and involve a greater deal of contingency and uncertainty. The relevant empirical considerations involved in the defense of a strategy of reform are more specific than those involved in the defense of institutional schemes, and the latter are more specific than the very general empirical assumptions backing fundamental principles of justice. Accurate claims about what people can realistically be expected to do depend not only on general facts about human psychology and social organization, but on the specific ways in which these operate in different cultural and institutional settings. This makes the notion of practical feasibility imprecise.
This imprecision is frustrating, and the philosopher has the natural tendency to eliminate it by stipulating a more precise definition. But we should recognize that there are strong intuitions pulling in different directions here. Both have significant bearing on the idea of responsible moral and political judgment, but they construe the obviously correct dictum "Ought implies can" in different ways. The first intuition leads to a very minimal definition of practical feasibility in terms of logical and physical possibility. This view clears the path for morally desirable action in the face of seemingly fixed social obstacles. Political history shows that indeed there are moments in which political agents (including, in particular, inspired leaders) reshape and correct perceptions of what is politically possible by pursuing ambitious projects that turn out to be realizable despite initial general dismissal. The second intuition leads to an expansive definition in terms of historical possibility rooted in contextually specific psychological and social mechanisms. This view is supported by sobering experiences of voluntaristic plans that fail in the face of strong psychological and social tendencies. While an expansive definition of feasibility may lead to conservative narrowness, a minimal one may lead to voluntarism and wishful thinking. Responsible moral and political judgment needs to steer clear of both. But there is no obvious way to do it. And this, I think, is what makes the notion of feasibility imprecise. Notice, however, that attention to specific social and psychological mechanisms need not be paired with conservative narrowness. Identifying mechanisms that stand in the way of the realization of normative demands, and mechanisms that foster their realization, can be equally relevant for critically lucid practical judgment. I will explore this point in more detail as we proceed.
(ii) Temporal variation and transitional standpoint. Contextual considerations of feasibility loom particularly large in Dill. These considerations may involve temporal variation and be significantly agent-dependent. Imagine the following scenario: (a) a certain scheme S2 is considerably more morally desirable than another, S1; (b) S2 is accessible in a context C2 but not in C1; (c) we are, here and now, in C1, not C2; (d) S1 is accessible in C1; and (e) S1 is very likely to generate C2. If (a)-(e) are true, and the moves to S1 and from S1 to S2 do not involve unacceptable moral costs, then it makes sense to...
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