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Article Excerpt
The case of Singapore is somewhat of a conundrum for students of security sector governance in at least two ways. On the one hand, while there is little question over the extent of professionalism within Singapore's security sector, the perceived lack of democratic governance of the Singaporean polity makes for a less than robust case insofar as the general theory of security sector governance is concerned. On the other hand, the stark differences between Singapore's security sector and those of its regional neighbours complicate attempts at a contingent argument of security sector governance with regard to the whole of Southeast Asia. Whether these distinctions together merit a case for a Singaporean "exceptionalism" is not entirely evident. Measured against the two aforementioned contexts, it is probably easy enough to surmise that while Singapore does a better job than most other Southeast Asian countries at governing its security sector, the compulsively technocratic manner in which it does so, compounded by the common view of Singapore as a soft autocracy or illiberal democracy, arguably justify the need for some level of reform.
That having been said, while it may be fair to contend (as some do) that security sector governance, a principally "Western" agenda, has had a relatively limited impact on Southeast Asia due to the apparent irrelevance of its foundational assumptions and lack of appreciation for the ground realities in Southeast Asia, (1) a closer reading of Singapore's governance of its security sector raises the possibility that the Singaporean city state has more in common with Western democracies with respect to problems and prospects than common wisdom about security sectors has generally allowed. This paper will begin by reviewing pertinent developments in the theory of security sector governance thinking and more specifically of security sector governance in Southeast Asia. It will then discuss the evolution and state of Singapore's security sector, the specific challenges that confront it and its future prospects.
Security Sector Governance
Globalization today presents national security planners and analysts with new challenges. With the apparent decline in conventional interstate wars and the growing interconnectedness of economies and societies, international policy attention has expanded to include consideration of the rise of non-traditional and/or transnational security challenges, not least religious extremism and terrorism, financial meltdowns, pandemics, natural disasters and the like. (2) According to Heiner Hanggi, this fundamental strategic shift has facilitated two noteworthy ideational and institutional developments. (3)
The first development has to do with the evident widening and deepening of the concept of security. On the one hand, the growing recognition that national security can no longer be defined strictly in military terms has led to a widened understanding of security to include political, economic, societal, environmental and other non-military aspects. (4) On the other hand, greater appreciation for the differential impacts these security considerations have on states and societies has deepened the understanding of security to include sub-state dimensions, society (societal security) and individual (human security). The second development has to do with an equally widening and deepening notion of governance. In this respect, where the Westphalian conception of state had historically permitted, at the state and sub-state levels, an understanding of "governance by national governments" primarily, the contemporary era has spawned at the international level an expansive conception where, in the absence of world government, "governance with multiple governments" through rule-based cooperation between and among national governments, international institutions and various transnational non-state actors. In short, a multi-level, multi-actor concept of governance is obtained. (5) A second possibility of widened or widening governance, also existing at the international level, is that of "governance without governments", where reliance on so-called "private regulations" steers the control, say, of the Internet. However, most security scholars see this third form of governance as the exception rather than the rule. (6)
Combining the notions of "security" and "governance" at the state level, the concept of security sector governance thereby consists in a principally state-centric view of security and governance, "but one which shares with the concept of human security a concern for the welfare and safety of individuals, groups and society", for whom insecurity mostly arises from poor governance of the security sector. (7) The acknowledgement--that security is interdependent with welfare, safety and other development-related concerns--is crucial. Thus understood, the "prerequisite for social development and human-rights protection", as two observers have insisted, "is the security and stability that comes with an effective, impartial and humane introduction of law and order, alongside the extension of sound governance to the military sector itself". (8) In other words, the idea and practice of security sector governance is indebted to two near-global trends: the professionalization of the military and the democratization of polities. (9)
Clearly, analysts studying developing regions are not unaware that security and development are, to paraphrase the title of a book, "merged". (10) But other than the lateness at which most students of Western security sector governance have arrived at this conclusion, what concerns their counterparts who study non-Western security is the apparent unsoundness of the dominant model of security sector governance and reform for apprehending the patterns and experiences of the militaries and societies of developing regions, whose security and developmental approaches may not be congruent with Western approaches. For example, the dominant security sector paradigm relies on assumptions that better reflect the experiences of Western democracies, not least the radical separation of civil and military actors and institutions, and the principal role of the military in defending the state against external threats. (11) Clearly, this model does not square with extant realities regarding the security sector in most Southeast Asian states, although particular aspects of Singaporean security sector governance seem to reflect some Western assumptions while sharing commonalities with its regional counterparts.
Security Sector Governance in Southeast Asia
In contrast to the dominant model's presupposition of civil-military separation, extant studies of Southeast Asia's security sectors tend to emphasize the post-colonial evolution and emergence of civil-military "collusion" (or, as others put it, "concordance"), where civilian and military elites comprise part of a dominant political and technocratic elite that governs respective Southeast Asian countries and their security sectors. The shared reliance on elite-oriented technocracies and performance-based legitimacies is arguably an Asia-wide phenomenon. (12) According to Muthiah Alagappa, this consensual arrangement between civilian and military elites, which conforms to neither the dominant model (direct civilian rule over the military) nor its diametric opposite (praetorian rule), arose in post-colonial Southeast Asia due to the relative weakness of its national civilian political institutions. In contrast, the military sector's material assets and institutional capacities enabled most Southeast Asian armed forces to cultivate a developmental role in non-military sectors (political, economic, social and so forth). (13) In other words, the so-called "new professionalism" of Southeast Asian security sector elements--where security actors actively engage in economic and commercial pursuits--which arose in response to particular conditions and challenges confronting post-colonial Southeast Asia, ensured the adoption of highly politicized, organic and internal roles by the region's militaries. (14) Most Southeast Asian governments thereby view security sector governance as a primarily domestic consideration in view of the longstanding regional preoccupation with state sovereignty and non-interference in one another's internal affairs. (15)
As such, two broad observations can be made in response to the dominant Western model or paradigm of security sector governance. First, where security is concerned, the regional endorsement of "comprehensive security" as the central concept informing national security practice among regional states--as articulated, for example, in official documents of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the sole security forum servicing the entire Asia-Pacific region (16)--could, in a crucial sense, indicate the inveterate appreciation of Southeast Asian governments for the holistic nature of security with respect to their respective national contexts. (17) This is exemplified by the Indonesian concept of "national resilience" (ketahanan nasional) and the various formulations of that adopted by the original...
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