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Article Excerpt
MUCH HAS BEEN WRITTEN ABOUT THE IRAQ WAR, EMPHASIZING NOT only the failure of US policies but also the internecine fighting among the varied groups, including Al Qaeda and Shia and Sunni militias, all
of which have contributed to the carnage in a country with deep historical Islamic roots. Iraq's important place in Islamic history as the birthplace of fitna (anarchy) has important implications and consequences to the conflict today. (1) According to Islamic doctrine, the word "fitna" has been translated as chaos, "time of temptation," war, as well as anarchy. A scholar of religious history, Karen Armstrong, further notes that the concept of fitna is "symbolic"; thus, battles between Muslims today have compelled some Muslims to seek a return to early Islam during the time of Prophet Muhammad (570 to 680 AD) (Armstrong, 2000: 37).
Furthermore, fitna originated from the early struggles Muslims faced after the Prophet Muhammad died in 680 AD, leaving a political vacuum for the newly established Muslim community. After his death, four caliphs were selected to lead the Islamic community, which then soon spread across different countries to include Iraq, Egypt, and Syria. In Iraq, the fourth imam and caliph, Ali ibn Talib, established his kingdom. There, he was poisoned by a dissenting party known as the Kharijites.
Iraq is famously known by both Sunni and Shia Muslims as the location where Ali's son, Imam Hussein, was brutally killed by a Sunni caliph, Muawiyyah, in a place called Karbala, known as "a battlefield among battlefields." The murder of Imam Hussein is viewed as one of the most important martyrdoms in Islamic history.
Unlike his brother Hassan, Hussein refused to accept the rule of the new Muslim leader based in Syria. His refusal to give him allegiance resulted in Hussein's murder. Enraged over the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, Muslims in Kufa, Iraq formed their own party, which became the "Partisans of Ali" or Shia. Today, Shias reenact the martyrdom of Imam Hussein on the day when he was killed, known as the Day of Ashura (the tenth day of the first month of the Islamic calendar, Muharram). Thus, for Shias, the meaning of shahadat (martyrdom) is understood in the context of the school of thought that embodies the struggle and death (that is, martyrdom) of Imam Hussein (Shari'ati, 1986:154).
It was only after the fall of the secular Baathist Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein, that Shias were permitted to openly display their grief over the loss of Ali's family on the streets of Baghdad; it is an event in which men, women, and children actively take part in rituals of mourning, remembrance, and curses hurled at key Islamic figures who either opposed Ali at the time of his rule or did not seek vengeance for the death of his predecessor, the third caliph, Imam Uthman. (2) The disagreements that arose from the Muslim communities over their deaths spawned the first revolt and wars among Muslims for political power and determining the "rightful" ruler to lead the umma (global Muslim community).
Imam Ali's martyrdom has important religious consequences for the Islamic religion. The religious establishment in the Muslim world today continues to debate the core issues within Islam: What kind of man should lead the ummah? How could Muslims who had justified the killing of other Muslims surrender to God's will? These historically based questions give rise to another question that is a major focus of this paper: Can the history of the martyrs of early Islam be uncritically extrapolated to become the basis of emerging definitions of "martyrdom" and narratives of identity?
As it relates to the Iraq war, the issue of coexistence and tolerance of different sects, ethnicities, and belief systems has been increasingly absent from Iraqi society. Taking advantage of the diverse religious and ethnic landscape, militant leaders and clerics have defined Iraq as the new battlefield. These individuals are classified as Salafi-Jihadis, an extreme offshoot of the Salafi doctrine, which practices Islam according to the "pious predecessors" or early Muslims. The Salafi-Jihadis espouse the use of violence to achieve their political ends and justify this under the umbrella of Islamic doctrine. Hence, the writings and recorded sayings of the Salafi-Jihadi leaders and clerics, if broadly accepted, would transform the political map of the Middle East by encouraging perpetual conflict with the West and other perceived enemies (including Sunnis and Shias, rival states, and Muslim leaders). The Salafl-Jihadis are in conflict with the traditional leaders and clerics in the Muslim world, opposing them as legitimate rulers and interpreters of Islamic law.
While several challenges remain for Islamic mobilization, moderate or "mainstream" Muslims search for an Islamic system that defines their pluralism, protects their Islamic identity, and provides an avenue for Islamic mobilization and religious activism. Unlike militants, the majority of Muslims are able to organize and participate in their local politics and shape societies through nonviolent methods. Militant Islamists, however, opt to preserve their Muslim identity through violent means to achieve their goals, of which a political end is almost always an integral part.
Groups fighting in Iraq today seeking an established political system to protect their specific communities and interests have the support of an influential, powerful religious establishment, mostly from the Muslim Arab world. Their provocations and published works provide an impetus to continue the violent jihad, capitalizing on a long tradition of martyrdom, to justify suicide attacks in Iraq and elsewhere. An understanding of the clerical debate as it relates to Iraq requires an overview of martyrdom in Islam, its original intent, purpose, and meaning, in order to project how, over time, the concept of martyrdom has been employed to justify modern suicide bombing campaigns.
Through the use of suicide as a tactic, it is clear that Al Qaeda and affiliated terror groups have changed the landscape and the culture of war in the Muslim world. This paper is a two-part study that focuses on the feelings of discontent exhibited in the extremists' understanding of "jihad"--a sacred word in Islam, misinterpreted, in the view of the extremists, by liberals and nonviolent individuals and groups--and its relationship to martyrdom. The extremists' focus on a particular vision of Islam has given rise to a battle of belief against unbelief and sparked a war of words in which various groups and individuals are now reasserting their right to claim the true meaning of "jihad." To promote a particular form of jihad, extremists claim to be fighting for the unrelieved agony of the Muslim umma--a point with some credibility even to moderate Muslims--but choose to satisfy their anger with narratives driven by revolutionary change in the society in which they reside. Related to the sacred narrative of jihad is martyrdom as described by the early ideologues and adapted by contemporary Islamic clerics, terrorist leaders, and operators. While jihad can exist without martyrdom, the inverse is not true. Therefore, this paper stresses the all-powerful narrative of war through the ideals of justice, glory, and redemption for the long-suffering of the Muslim people at the hands of perceived Western enemies.
The viability of a jihad-style war by which martyrs are made (that is, successful suicide bombings) increases their chances of victory and forces an equally relevant question that guides this paper. The second part of this study offers a comprehensive plan to delegitimize the radical representatives of Islam by first understanding the terrorists and insurgents' use and abuse of martyrdom narratives to recruit new members and bless their operations through the use of religious overtones and symbolic ideals based on secular, national goals (that is, the defense of a territory or homeland). While Islam is not the only religion where martyrdom is represented, this paper provides an analytical framework from which to explain suicide bombing, using an historical, ideological approach that can be found in classical and contemporary literature that rationalizes self-sacrifice and describes the role of the "martyr" in current conflicts, both in, Iraq and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
THE MAKING OF A SHAHID
Reviving the Muslim umma (the global Muslim community) requires participation in jihad, which is considered ibadat or acts of adoration. (3) As an act of worship, the basic root of jihad is derived from the Arabic verb jahada, which means "effort and striving" (Abualrub, 2002: 78-79). While there are many forms of jihad, all of which are defined by a set of rules, jihad is best described as self-defense: defense against temptation, defense against Satan, defense against the unjust, and, as is most commonly known in the West, defense against religious persecution. It should be noted that jihad is "well defined and explained by a set of rules and regulations" (Abualrub, 2002: 78). The senior adviser of the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) in Washington, D.C., Maher Hathout says, "Historically, fighting back against aggressors [the pagan Arabian Quraysh tribe] was prohibited during the thirteen years of the Meccan period.... After the migration to Medina and the establishment of the Islamic state, Muslims were concerned with how to defend themselves against aggression from their enemies."
Contrary to popular Western understanding, jihad has a broad semantic content, and is different from qittal (fighting). Both terms, jihad and qittal, have "significantly different meanings and uses in the Qur'an" (Fatoohi, 2002: 67). "The latter word involves killing and bloodshed, and is "only one aspect of armed jihad" (67). Therefore, the translation of jihad as holy war is inaccurate. For the larger Muslim world, jihad is simply an everyday living, breathing concept. The so-called greater jihad refers to struggle or persistence in leading a life free of evil. The jihad of the heart specifically embodies having a heart free of evil thoughts and desires, whereas the jihad of the tongue refers to giving voice to and leading a pious life according to the words of the Prophet, and the jihad of the deed refers to carrying out deeds to assist the umma, to assist Muslims who are suffering. These embody the greater jihad. The lesser jihad, the jihad of the sword, refers to the obligation to take up the sword in defense of the umma in defense of believing Muslims who have had the sword taken up against them. It is accordingly a defensive jihad.
It was only after 13 years of persecution and living in exile that the permission to fight was incorporated in the form of religious verses. According to Muslim theologians, the revelation for defensive jihad was delivered by God in response to a specific set of circumstances, and was "motivated by the fact that the Muslims suffered injustice and were forced to emigrate ... without justifcation." Among the first Qur'ani verses for fighting is no. 22: "Leave is given to those who fought because they were wronged--surely God is able to help them--who were expelled from their habitations without right, except that they say 'Our Lord is God.'" The more popularly cited verse, "And fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but transgress not the limits. Truly Allah likes not the transgressors" (3) permitted jihad within certain perimeters for self-defense. The first verses of fighting "are very clear ... and do not contain even the slightest evidence of religious compulsion." The aim of fighting was threefold: "to stop aggression, to protect the mission of Islam, and to defend religious freedom." It is through participation in jihad that the early Muslims on the battlefield hoped to achieve martyrdom or shahadat. Through jihad, a believer also hoped to enter paradise, "which God has opened for His chosen friends [and] a garment of piety" (Mutahhari, 1986: 125).
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