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Afghanistan's security: political process, state-building and narcotics.

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Interest in the security of Afghanistan is largely dominated by fear that the country's instability will trigger conflicts in neighboring regions from Kashmir to Chechnya. It is often argued that the key to providing security is to fortify the U.S.-led international troop positions in Afghanistan and increase the number of Afghan security personnel. In a similar vein, it is estimated that 200,000-250,000 national and international security personnel would be needed. Considering the U.S. military involvement in the Iraqi quagmire, the deployment of such a large number of troops is neither realistic nor possible. Even in a scenario that assumes these troops would be deployed in Afghanistan, it is highly questionable that the security problem would be resolved. Therefore, a change in the security paradigm is needed.

The current situation in the state-building process, based on the guidelines set forth in the Bonn Agreement, requires the precondition of sustained stability, followed by sustained security. In this article, we argue that a new security paradigm, based on the gradual establishment of a political process, state-building and opposition to narcotics, would have the potential to address the Afghan security situation. This new security understanding needs to tolerate a certain degree of insecurity to achieve progress in state-building and to appropriate an inclusive and integrative approach to the reconciliation of both human security and state security. Progress in the political process, mobilization of the masses behind state-building, and prioritization of human security are all required for rethinking Afghanistan's security.

Establishing political authority and constructing a state instrument would increase trust, which would contribute to stability. (1) The lack of political institutions necessary for stability encourages the interference of individuals and groups with "special" interests, at both the state and societal levels. (2) Stability is not only a prerequisite for the development of the political process and security within the country; it is also a risk to security, as it would require the involvement of groups and factors in the political process that might hinder security itself. Solving the security-stability dilemma becomes a precondition for human and state security, despite the difficulties presented in conflict-laden Afghanistan.

First, we deal with the complications encountered during the formation of the state and its political institutions, as well as with the narcotics problem. Second, we explore the possibilities of building security and stability in Afghanistan. We hold the view that Afghan security could be provided by establishing state institutions, advancing the political process and addressing the narcotics problem. Our proposal for managing progress in these processes through the critical thresholds between security and stability will open new horizons in rethinking Afghanistan's security.

THE BONN FRAMEWORK

The Bonn Agreement has determined the political roadmap of Afghanistan since the removal of the Taliban from government in 2001. The Bonn initiative aimed for reconciliation on temporary regulations until permanent government institutions could be established. (3) The meeting was conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, but the resulting agreement has mostly been shaped by the influence of the United States. The Bonn Agreement first laid out a political authority that would determine a transitional government. The primary task of this government was to hold the general elections that would form the assembly and the government within two and a half years. (4)

The Bonn Agreement is not a peace treaty between the parties to the civil war in Afghanistan: the Taliban and the American-backed Northern Alliance. Rather, it has been a convention embraced by the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the parties that won the war against the Taliban. In fact, the victorious parties that participated in the meeting had been fighting each other in a kind of civil war since 1989. The Bonn Agreement did not recognize the Taliban government, nor did it invite reformist groups within the Taliban to the meeting. Additionally, the Bonn process did not have an agenda for the reconciliation of the differences among various adversaries. (5)

The agreement sets out a time schedule for the establishment of political institutions; yet there are ambiguities regarding how steps are to be taken within the schedule. The attempts by Afghan groups and external powers to establish a political authority in a new country are definitely positive. However, the Bonn Agreement delegates the task of installing the institutions to a limited group, and the groups participating in the Bonn process would not be sufficient to confer legitimacy on the political authority. Former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, the representative of former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, emphasized the link between representation and the decisions taken in the meeting--in other words, the legitimacy issue inherent in the Bonn process. Brahimi stated that, upon the founding of a legitimate and representative government in Afghanistan at the Bonn meeting, nobody would question whether the Bonn Agreement represented the actual Afghan people or even remember the participants in the meeting. (6) With this most optimistic appraisal, the nine-day meeting was certified as the arena for resolution of a conflict that had been going on for 23 years.

The Bonn Agreement is a state-dominated roadmap for providing security in Afghanistan. (7) Security in this context refers to solving political, economic and security problems and sustaining peace through a state-centric approach. Security was postponed until the aftermath of state-building, when the newly established political authority would deal with it in a systematic manner. In this sense, governing during the transition period has been hard for Hamid Kharzai. (8) A Qandahari Pashtun from an influential family, he returned to Afghanistan with the support of the United States to unite the country against the Taliban regime. In the Kharzai-led transition period, three important portfolios were allocated to the most powerful group within the Northern Alliance's Shura-yi Nazar (Supervisory Council of the North): defense to Yunus Qanuni, internal affairs to Gen. Mohammed Fahim and foreign affairs to Abdalla Abdalla.

The Bonn process attempted to expand representation as much as possible. In due course, an emergency assembly--Loya Jirga--was founded, and Kharzai became the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan for two years. It was only after long negotiations, on June 19, 2002, that Kharzai was able to form a cabinet. Many members of the assembly criticized it for being ineffective in selecting the new administrative officers. What's more, the newly founded ruling elite was not inclusive. (9) The presumption that its legitimacy problems would be...

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