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Article Excerpt
The status of constructivism as an open and accommodating intellectual approach is at odds with its aim of becoming the most appropriate site for a theory-practice synthesis. As an exemplar of the social concern that forms the ontology of constructivism, human rights is well placed to provide the context of a critique. More often than not, human rights are taken to be an unreliable variable within differently conceived international political schema. It is now an appropriate time to look again at the opportunities that human rights offers in establishing the cohesion of constructivism. Challenging the limitations of preconceived notions of social knowledge, the focus of the article will be on the human-rights side of the equation; namely, its features as a universal and its manifestation as a power, and what they tell us about the requirements for "becoming theory." Keywords: international theory, constructivism, human rights, universalism, power, change
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The holist principles of constructivism have not endeared it to all corners of the international relations (IR) academy. Some not unrealistically would have it on a confrontational footing with "establishment" or orthodox systems. Imagining how it might develop in order to gain credence in a theoretical sense (or for a wider base of scholars to talk with confidence about this prospect) is a useful exercise in probing the limits and functionality of what we call IR theory. Taking this idea as a place to begin, the next step is to assume that constructivism must surpass its current divisiveness, as the process of becoming theory is marked most notably by a coherent methodology required for a subsequently clearer and defensible position a historically consistent template throughout general paradigm shifts, (1) regardless of which a disciplinary strand or strands gain majority support in the future. (2)
Constructivism is an intellectual approach that finds its most purposive associative meaning embodied by a type of emancipatory norm. Human rights, understood as the apogee of that norm in both academic and popular consciousness, is "unquestionably the dominant and most broadly accepted language of morality in the international system" (3) and corresponds with the social and inclusive agenda of constructivism.
Human rights in international theory is an enigmatic concept. Attempts to account for its effects within international politics have been variously successful. In selecting the hemisphere of theory that is critical or constructivist, this task of proper and effective affiliation becomes less onerous and more focused, but it is still by no means an explanatory exercise. The aim of this article is to set out how human rights can be used to benefit constructivism, which is essentially divided regarding the relative importance of key ontological and epistemological features of our world, by providing the theory-practice linkage needed in order to focus this broadly conceived approach.
Giving constructivism primacy and allocating human rights the role of variable will sharpen the boundaries of the intellectual space(s) that characterize the problematic interconnectedness and disparities that still persist within this rapidly expanding area of thought. The intended outcome is to clarify exactly which aspects of the human-rights discourse impinge upon and affect constructivism so as to delineate the tensions and requirements for a "whole." With these signal features of the discourse to hand, the article uses them in conclusion to map out suggestions for further research within a broader synthesis remit.
The article proceeds along the following lines. Throughout, there is an overarching theme of why it is that constructivism and human rights occupy the same intellectual space from apparently the same or similar humanist origin. This is done in two broad stages; first, by analyzing the qualities and implications of universalism for "building" present and future constructivism. This includes a brief look at one key intellectual origin of today's theorists--Kant and the legacy of Kantian thinking--which still has a dominant role in this area of theory. This is followed by an assessment of the value of two key types of universalism, what each means for constructivism, and which is most appropriate for furthering the debate. The second half of the article then focuses on a critical analysis of how constructivism, presently and potentially, fits the politics of the rights discourse with reference to the key aspect of power and how we should imagine rights as power. The article concludes with some recommendations for further research.
Does International Theory Still Exist?
In his Concepts and Categories, (4) Isaiah Berlin asks a question based on a set of assumptions. The question is whether or not political theory still exists, assuming the criteria of investigation that (1) it did once exist and that this can be shown to be so; and (2), if it presently does or does not exist, that the standards of judgment themselves stand up to scrutiny.
While Berlin is keen to elucidate the problem, he is not driven to offer anything so vulgar as an answer. What he does is read the advancement of human knowledge, by empirical and formal means, as an exercise having the cumulative effect that "philosophy in one state of development may turn into a science in the next." (5) Where questions of philosophy and the philosophic engines themselves apparently stall when confronted by the exactitudes of science, there must be a recognizable hierarchy of potential candidates for this "switching of codes" that have inherent characteristics able to become scientific in the traditional, natural sense. To quote Berlin at length:
There are some subjects which clearly are near the point of taking flight and divorcing themselves from the main body in which they were born, much as physics and mathematics and chemistry and biology have done in their day. One of these is semantics; another is psychology; with one foot, however reluctantly, they are still sunk in philosophical soil; but they show signs of a tendency to tear themselves loose and emancipate themselves, with only historical memories to tell them of their earlier, more confused, if in some respects richer, years. (6)
The "science" of the social sciences or humanities is still a fiercely contested debate, and rightly so. The purpose of this article is to revisit the theoretical or conceptual splitting of the social atom from a fresh perspective, albeit one with well-established roots. We can take one of two avenues of progress from the type of philosophy-of-science approach offered by Berlin. We could either engage in an analysis of constructivism using the tools made available to us by modern scientific thought and auditing techniques, which would necessitate perhaps several other articles and without question a more specialist guide, or we can take the second option; that is, to take on board the perspective that constructivism, as a part of the analysis of international relations, consists of feature that might just be malleable enough to one day constitute something recognizably scientific. And this, it must be remembered, need not be the science of nature, which is cloaked in its own conception of purity. A mustering as "social science" is sufficient for the fulfilment of the criterion of recognition and for perpetuation thereafter. If this can't be done, then it should at least be theoretically competent.
The Paradox of Reason: Kant and the Kantian Legacy
For simple reasons--limited space, and the dangers of a consuming deviation--a detailed, exhaustive history of natural human rights will not benefit this article. With human rights as variable, the analysis must be chiefly concerned with the inner workings of constructivism itself. However, to do this in the most rounded fashion possible, it would be remiss to overlook the intellectual origins of present international theorists, both in terms of appreciating the traditional theoretical background for universal rights and recognizing the entrenched approach that contemporary thinkers must face--the cast that, it seems, must be broken. We have already been given more learned accounts than this of the importance of interpreting the Kantian legacy for the benefit of critical perspectives. (7) Suffice it to say that, before progressing onto matters that have become, in a sense, the folklore of our canon of knowledge, a brief reminder is required of one key historical source of contemporary thinking that will act as a reminder of the origin of "perspectives" or "positions."
Kant's presence in discussions about matters cosmopolitan or universal (or, naturally, both) is very nearly ubiquitous. There is rarely a modern scholarly contribution to the field that fails to refer to or even spring from his work. For the purpose of this article, it is important to look at both Kant's actual writings and their translation into the analysis of international relations and how and why they particularly have become so enshrined.
Although it is the ethos of Perpetual Peace that seems to have most resonance for critical/emancipatory theorists, it is worth briefly examining some wider aspects of Kant's varied canon to shed light on the second part of the remit mentioned above. In Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, his aim is twofold, no less than "the search for and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." (8) At first glance these aims seem conflated, but they are separately imagined in Kant's analysis.
The "supreme principle" is such by its comprehensive manifestation in our collective conscious. It is the singular aspect of our rational being--the gene of reason. So in Kant's terminology seeking is not a synonym for discovery but is rather an archaeological exercise in uncovering or "revealing" that which is already present in us all. "Establishing" this principle is achieved by affording it...
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