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Article Excerpt
SURVIVOR'S NOTE. Gordon Campbell Watkins was my friend for forty years. He freed me, as the Scots poet says, from many a blunder and foolish notion. We joined forces twenty years ago, when the basic data on hydrocarbon scarcity were starting to disappear. (Adelman and Watkins, 1996). A revised updated version was given in 2002 at an IAEE session in Prague. The last paper of our last effort follows, delayed by his death and my ailments.
We are indebted to the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research at MIT for continuing aid. Without Therese Henderson and Jeanette Ehrman, the work could not have been completed. Errors in this final revision are mine alone.
M. A. Adelman
1. MINERAL VALUES AND LIMITED RESOURCES
Many recent books and articles predict a looming decline and end to oil production, and ever-rising prices. Typically, half the original endowment has already been produced; annual production "must" soon decline. (E. g., the head of the Institute of Petroleum (London) in Oil & Gas Journal, March 3, 2003, p. 28)
We have heard this often since 1875. (Chernow, 1998, pp. 102,197). The production of oil has since grown a thousand fold. Estimated reserves and resources have massively increased. But the theory of oil exhaustion is unchanged: the Earth is finite. Hence any subset, including any mineral, is also finite. At any rate of consumption it must finally disappear. Moreover, once production begins, pressure falls and production with it. Pennsylvania output peaked in 1890, Texas in 1970, and so on.
Doomsday forecasts were popular in the 1970s, and even more so today. Simply subtract forecast production/consumption from estimated resources. Whether the latter are "pessimistic" or "cornucopian" makes only a small difference in the remaining time to catastrophe.
Because of panic over oil exhaustion in 1970-80, public money was wasted to provide oil alternatives. The price of oil, inflation-adjusted, is now (start 2006) about the same as 1980, but the panic seems greater, and probably the waste will be.
Worldwide oil prices are said to have risen since 1973 because of an excess of demand over supply. Yet OPEC output, which is cheapest, (1) has been unchanged since 1973, and OPEC exports have fallen. In 1999-2006, there were repeated downward OPEC quota revisions. Crude oil in their judgment was (and is) too plentiful. Output had to be cut lest prices suffer.
Non-OPEC countries are competitors, who never have excess capacity, but produce all they can. Over time, they have kept increasing capacity and output, some tailing off as others grow. But OPEC, with far lower investment and operating costs, has actually reduced exports. Thus in the world industry for over 30 years water has kept flowing uphill: contraction in lower-cost areas, expansion in higher-cost countries. Only a profit-maximizing cartel of low-cost producers can explain the fact. (2)
The OPEC nations, like sensible monopolies with incomplete information, must feel their way into the market. Their announced target price was at first $18-$21, then successively higher, up to the current (mid-2005) $60-odd. It will go higher, if they think it advantageous. Despite excess capacity, no member will offer more oil at a lower price. It would benefit the individual seller, but not the group; solidarity demands the price-cost signal not be heeded.
The price will cease to rise when OPEC finds it unprofitable to keep raising, or when it becomes too difficult for OPEC to keep its output equal to the amount demanded at the current price. We offer no guess when this will happen. But the current price level has no relation to excess demand, nor to alleged or assumed resource inadequacy, of which there is no evidence.
Our own theory of resource scarcity is simple: "There is an endless tug-of-war between diminishing returns and increasing knowledge." (Adelman, 1990, p.1). Neither in 1875 nor today can anyone estimate ultimate mineral resources, nor the amount of oil nor the time of remaining production.
The Jevons Coal Study
In his pioneer if incomplete study of British coal, W.S. Jevons (reprint, 1965) analyzed flows not stocks. Scarcity in any market was expressed by the price, at the meeting point of the schedules of supply and demand. The supply curve at any point was the cost of more output. A mineral industry then as now faced an upward sloping curve. As the cheapest portion of the resource is used up first, the leftmost section of the curve disappears, and marginal cost increases. British coal, in Jevons' view, was exploiting ever more costly seams, requiring ever-higher prices. Those prices not exhaustion would eventually choke off greater use and output.
British coal output did indeed fall, after 1913. What little coal persists in Europe today is largely subsidized. But there was never any resource exhaustion. Billions of tons remain in ground to this day, untouched because current investment and extraction costs are too far above the price, set by natural gas, nuclear power, and foreign coal and oil. Jevons' forecast omitted something that happened over time. We seek it now.
Hotelling and Depletable Resource Theory
Economists have long recognized that future events cast their shadows into the present. Any future value must be discounted down to the present in order to be comparable to any current price. But a "depletable" resource stock, limited by nature and doomed to decline, is special. Even a low rate of consumption would constantly reduce the amount, and raise the value, of what is left in the ground. The theory of this special case was worked out in the classic paper of Hotelling (1931). He proved that in a competitive industry, each unit of the stock must at any moment have the same present value as any other unit. Arbitrage would erase any difference. Therefore the value of any unit of the stock must increase at the rate of return earned on the whole stock. Moreover, the present value of any particular unit is independent of how soon that unit is brought up and sold.
Three testable hypotheses were implied. H1: At any moment, the value of a unit in-ground equals its gross field price less the current outlays needed to lift it from below-ground to the surface. H2: This in-ground net unit value must increase at a rate equal to the return to holding other assets of similar risk. H3: At any given moment, the rate at which a given deposit is exhausted has no effect on its unit value. The price allows for this by rising at the economy-wide rate of discount.
In 1931, there were no empirical data to confirm...
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