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Article Excerpt
The view that democracies do not go to war with each other is widely held in international relations. This study draws distinction between mature stable constitutionally liberal democratic republics and illiberal democracies. The study supports the democratic peace postulate only regarding the former.
The key conclusion of this study is that regimes in transition to democracy and illiberal democracies, including electoral democracies characterized by contested institutions or contested sectarian and identity groups, are highly predisposed to external conflict and diversionary war with both other democracies and non-democratic regimes.
INTRODUCTION
The proposition that democracies do not go to war with each other was first put forth by Immanuel Kant. He argued that constitutional republics will not fight each other because the majority of people would not want war. Since popular sovereignty reigns, the spread of constitutional republics is the only guarantee for "perpetual peace." (1) In the American tradition of foreign policy, marked by constant tension between the classical liberal desire to promote political liberty abroad and the realist impulse to preserve national security, presidents of both parties have expressed support for the democratic peace theory. President Woodrow Wilson stressed the connection between democracy and peace. (2) President Harry Truman emphasized the linkage between totalitarianism and international conflict. (3) President Bill Clinton noted that "democracies do not attack each other." (4) President George W. Bush stated that "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." (5)
Democratization was premised on the strategic logic that democracies did not go to war with one another. In addition, after the U.S. failed to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, Bush highlighted democratization as the primary rationale for invading Iraq and the key to stability in the broader Middle East. The idea of mutual democratic pacifism, or dyadic peace, is also widespread in international relations. (6)
The proposition that mature, stable "constitutionally liberal" democratic republics do not go to war with each other is compelling. This type of democracy implies "constitutional liberalism," which, as Fareed Zakaria has aptly stated, refers to "the tradition, deep in Western history, that seeks to protect an individual's autonomy and dignity against coercion, whatever the source--state, church, or society." (7) A glance at Western democracies in North America and Western Europe today would have one readily conclude that mature "constitutional liberal" democracies are highly unlikely to initiate war with each other.
The overwhelming majority of democracies today, however, can be characterized as young democracies, in most instances even as proto-democratic regimes, semi-democracies, or "illiberal democracies." (8) This essay offers preliminary observations on the importance of the profound analytical and evidentiary divide between the mature "liberal constitutional" democracy and the other types. While war between liberal democracies is rare or less likely, electoral democracy does not necessarily lead to "liberal constitutionalism," and therefore it does not follow that these are as unlikely to engage in conflict with other democratic regimes. Without paying due attention to this divide, there is the danger that the rich body of empirical research may become a justification rather than an explanation for the mutual democratic pacifism thesis.
This essay highlights the theoretical basis of democratic peace theory and the evidence offered to support the causal logic. Accordingly, the next section will reflect on the key normative and institutional explanations in support of this theory and present selective samples of empirical findings that buttress the causal link. Next, this article underscores some of the shortcomings of democratic peace and examine the challenges to the theory, including that posed by the realist critique. Thereafter, the study draws attention to several interpretive examples to illuminate the aforementioned propositions. The ultimate goal is to generate overall hypotheses that take into account the different types of democracies referenced above and thus present opportunity for additional systematic studies.
THE DYADIC PATHWAY TO DEMOCRATIC PEACE
There are two widely-offered explanations regarding the causal logic for democratic war behavior and democratic peace. The normative explanation stresses the role of democratic political culture and shared democratic values and norms. Accordingly, common values, including respect for individual freedom, human rights, civil liberties, due process, and related broader shared beliefs about representative government are vital for explaining known facts regarding democratic behavior. According to William Dixon, one vital shared norm is the "normative guideline of bounded competition," that is, political leaders recognize the legitimacy of competing values and interests and are experienced in its exercise when international disputes involve democracies. "In situations where both parties to a dispute are democracies, not only do both sides subscribe to these norms, the leaders of both are fully cognizant that bounded competition is the norm, both for themselves and for their opponents." (9)
Several authors, noted scholar Bruce Russet among them, emphasize the role of pacific settlement of disputes, reliance on negotiation, arriving at mutually acceptable compromise, and other elements of the democratic political culture. These attributes shape approaches to political dispute resolution amongst democratic states. (10) Russet in particular notes the relevance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution amongst democracies. This is a nineteenth century social norm that found application and confirmation in the World War II and Cold War alliances among Western democracies. (11) Finally, a modern version of the classical Kantian formulation argues that a combination of factors such as the commitment of democratic governments to human rights, citizens' abhorrence of violence, the fact that citizens bear the cost of war, and the ability of citizens to constrain political leaders, together make it difficult for democratic governments to engage in war with other democracies. (12)
To be sure, none of these scholars argue that democracies are, in general, peaceful, nor do they argue that the citizenry of democracies always abhor violence. They do not assert that democracies will exhibit the same moderation vis-a-vis non-democratic governments. To the contrary, Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russet point out that, in the confrontation between a democratic state and a non-democratic one, the former "may be forced to adapt to the norms of international conflict of the latter lest it be exploited or eliminated by the non-democratic state that takes advantage of the inherent moderation of democracies." (13) The key shortcoming of the norm-based explanation is that it borders on tautology. These norms are valid because in practice democracies have not engaged in war with one another; and because these norms exist, democracies have not engaged in war and democratic peace prevails. Norms are extrapolated from patterns of observed behavior. The question remains, will democracies' commitment to these norms persist if their survival is threatened? This issue is conveniently ignored.
It is obvious, for example, that democracies interfere in other democratic nations' internal politics with impunity. Witness American covert operations in Italy's domestic politics during the Cold War. Therefore, do norms apply to certain types and levels of international behavior and conflict? What of the multitude of behaviors of democratic states in conflict with the norms and values? Do these suggest that only in interstate warfare do norms come into play? If norms and shared values cannot prevent democratic states from engaging in low-intensity foreign conflict behavior, how could democratic norms prevent external conflicts of greater magnitude?
The history of Western democracies during the colonial era presents another challenge to norm-based arguments. That era is replete with subjugation of colonized people by grand Western democracies in circumstances where the colonized people absolutely did not pose any threat to the survival of the colonial power. Why was commitment to democratic norms insufficient to prevent foreign intervention in circumstances when the other party was not a state, authoritarian or otherwise, nor did it pose any threat? It is accepted that colonial territories were not democratic states, and therefore the relevance of shared values and norms presupposes dyadic peace (peace amongst democracies). This still leaves the question of how one would explain intense competition and foreign conflict behavior amongst democracies for control of territories, markets, natural resources, and investment opportunities in Asia, Africa, and Latin America throughout the colonial period.
An alternative frame of reference in support of democratic peace finds the...
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