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Article Excerpt
Kant and Novels
In Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798), (1) Kant cautions that "reading novels, in addition to causing many other mental discords [Verstimmungen des Gemuts], also ... makes distraction habitual" (7: 208), noting further that this habitual distraction leads to a type of forgetfulness "where the head, no matter how often it is filled, still remains empty like a barrel full of holes," and that it "especially seizes women who are accustomed to reading novels" (7: 185). And in his Lectures on Pedagogy (1803), (2) after asserting again that "reading novels weakens the memory," Kant goes on to recommend that "all novels should be taken out of the hands of children"--in part because of the possibility that they will "go into raptures" (herumschwarmen) (3) while reading them (9: 473).
Given his repeated warnings about the dangers posed by the new genre of novels, the strategy of appealing to a character in a novel to illustrate Kantian positions in ethics might seem particularly problematic. At the same time, Kant seems not to have heeded his own warnings about the perils of novels. In several versions of his anthropology lectures he points to novels as one of the most important aids (Hilfsmittel) for acquiring anthropological knowledge (Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 7: 121; see also Pillau 25: 734, Menschenkunde 25: 857-58, Mrongovius 25: 1213). (4) The main goal of Kant's anthropology is to acquire a reflective understanding of the human condition--a sense of the problems and challenges that all human beings in all times and places share with one another. And Kant is certainly not alone in thinking that we are more likely to acquire this kind of knowledge of human nature from the work of an accomplished novelist than we are from the typical anthropological fieldwork--which by design is focused exclusively on particular groups in particular times and places. (5)
Jane Austen's first novel was not published until 1811, (6) and Mansfield Park did not appear until 1814--ten years after Kant's death. But in his Anthropology, Kant repeatedly cites with great approval the earlier canonic English novelists Henry Fielding (1707-54) and Samuel Richardson (1689-1761). (7) Given Kant's documented interest in English novels, I think the odds are quite good that he would have welcomed Austen's Mansfield Park as a valuable source of insight into human nature--even if, in the course of reading it, we are liable to become forgetful or go into raptures.
Grenberg/Humility/Courage
In her recent book, Kant and the Ethics of Humility (2005), Jeanine Grenberg argues that there is "a Kantian virtue theory to be explored and appreciated"; a virtue theory "in which humility plays a central role." (8) In my own critical response to her hook, I argued, among other things, that it is not humility that plays the lead role in Kant's theory of virtue but rather courage--courage understood not in the traditional sense of overcoming fear on the battlefield but rather in Kant's sense of strength of will in one's commitment and adherence to moral principle--a trait needed by soldier and civilian alike. (9) Virtue, as he remarks succinctly in the Anthropology, "is moral strength in adherence to one's duty" (7: 147; see also The Metaphysics of Morals 6: 392, 405, Collins 27: 465, Vigilantius 27: 492, 570).
In her new essay, "Courageous Humility in Jane Austen's Mansfield Park," Grenberg argues, among other things, "that courage is in fact an aspect of humility." (10) While I welcome this new emphasis (11) on the place of courage within Kant's virtue theory, I wish now to focus on the following two specific sets of questions: (12) (1) Is courage, as understood by Kant, in fact an aspect of humility? What should be made of the hybrid virtue, "courageous humility"? (2) Is Fanny Price "a courageously humble person in the Kantian sense"? (13) More generally, is Fanny a morally virtuous person according to Kant's ethics?
Courageous Humility?
Is Kantian courage necessarily connected to Kantian humility? By "courage," again, Kant means not the traditional military virtue of overcoming fear on the battlefield, but "moral strength of will"--a cultivated commitment and demonstrated capacity to live and act according to moral principle, and to consistently withstand temptations against so living and acting. And this capacity of moral strength or courage is also precisely what Kant means by "virtue." For instance, in a section entitled "Of Virtue in General" in The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), he states:
Virtue signifies a moral strength of will ... Virtue is ... the moral strength of a human being's will in fulfilling his duo,, which is moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason ... This moral strength, as courage [Tapferkeit] (fortitudo moralis), also constitutes the greatest and only true military honor of the human being. (6: 405; see also 380)
Similarly, in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), he remarks that "virtue ... designates bravery and courage [Mut und Tapferkeit] (in Greek as well as in Latin)" (6: 57). (14)
Humility, on the other hand, signifies for Kant the proper curbing of self-conceit that occurs when moral agents compare themselves to the moral law. As he notes in The Metaphysics of Morals: "True humility must follow unavoidably from our sincere and exact comparison of ourselves with the moral law" (6: 436; see also Collins 27: 349-50). False humility, he implies, occurs when we compare ourselves to other moral agents--be they human beings, seraphs, "the Holy One of the Gospel," or even God (6: 435-36, Groundwork 4: 408-9). At the same time, Kantian moral humility...
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