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...which live, and their right to self-determination through a free and fair referendum, as stipulated in all UN resolutions, have been forgotten as well. The conflict attracts attention sporadically not because of Sahrawis' legitimate rights but mainly because of the national, geopolitical and economic interests of other actors inside and outside the region. Despite the misrepresentation of occupied Western Sahara as an empty desert, the territory does in fact boast rich resources and a 700-kilometer Atlantic coast of strategic importance. The territory also has among the richest fishing waters in the world, which today Morocco and members of the European Union exploit illegally. The Western Sahara possesses huge deposits of phosphates; these reserves could make it one of the largest exporters of phosphates in the world. Other valuable minerals such as iron ore, titanium oxide, vanadium, iron and, possibly, oil abound throughout the territory. Of course, the prospects of oil and natural-gas discoveries in recent years have further complicated the resolution of the conflict. (1)
The case of Western Sahara highlights the UN failure--or, rather, the disinclination of its most powerful members in the Security Council--to implement what should have been a straightforward case of decolonization. The conflict emerged in 1975, at the height of the Cold War, when Morocco was unequivocally anchored in the Western camp and Algeria, though resolutely nonaligned, was perceived as an ally of the former Soviet Union. (2) Furthermore, Morocco, which played a proxy role for France and the United States in defeating nationalist and anticommunist forces in Africa, benefited from strong political, economic and military support from its allies, which also included the wealthy Gulf monarchies. In fact, the United States was instrumental in making it possible for Morocco to seize the Western Sahara. (3)
Despite the illegality of the occupation and the legitimatcy of Sahrawi rights, geopolitical considerations--power politics--have overridden international legality. The consequences are many: lasting tension in Algerian-Moroccan relations; the lack of feasibility of Maghrebi integration; a freeze of the Arab Maghreb Union; recurrent tensions in Franco-Algerian relations; periodic frictions in Moroccan-Spanish and Algerian-Spanish relations; the potential for a regional war; Algeria's and Morocco's arms purchases at the expense of much-needed socioeconomic development; and cyclical uprisings in the occupied territory and the concomitant violations of the human rights of Sahrawis. The other assertion in this article is that outside powers, namely, France and the United States and, to a lesser degree, Great Britain, all three members of the UN Security Council, have prevented the resolution of this dispute in order to reward Morocco, a longtime friend that has rendered services both the war against communism and in today's "Global War on Terror."
Prior to analyzing the geopolitical considerations that surround the dispute, it is important to restate a number of points that are often glossed over. While today it has become fashionable to speak about a "political solution that is mutually acceptable," many often overlook the fact that the self-determination of Western Sahara, a non-autonomous territory, rests on international law and UN resolutions, internationally agreed upon principles. The right to self-determination is inscribed in the Declaration of the Granting of Independence of Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of December 14, 1960. In 1963, the United Nations recognized the Sahrawis' right to self-determination, and it has restated that right in every resolution since. In fact, on February 11, 2004, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan declared at the Special Committee Session of the Fourth Committee on Decolonization:
"In the twenty-first century, colonialism is an anachronism. I therefore hope that, in the year ahead, all administering Powers will work with the Special Committee, and with people in the territories under their administration [which includes Western Sahara], to find ways to further the decolonization process. After all, decolonization is a United Nations success story, but it is a story that is not yet finished." (14)
While American and British troops invaded Iraq in March 2003 under the pretext that Iraq did not comply with UN resolutions, the United States and France have shown no such concern for the violations Morocco has committed since its invasion of the former Spanish colony. The other point is that no country in the world, not even Morocco's closest friends and allies, recognizes Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara, which is still de jure under Spanish administrative control. The transfer of that administrative power to Morocco under the Madrid Accords has no legal validity, and indeed the UN has never recognized the Madrid Accords of November 14, 1975. The third point is that, though he meant it only as a "referendum of confirmation," King Hassan II declared to the world in 1983, and in 1981 to the African nations, that he was favorable to the holding of a referendum on self-determination in Western Sahara. Furthermore, Morocco accepted the UN 1991 Settlement Plan, which included the holding of a referendum. As shall be seen, the powerful members of the Security Council, particularly France and the United States, seek to propose solutions to the conflict that ignore these points. They do so by demanding that Sahrawis make concessions to Morocco, the occupying power.
In order to understand the impasse that has prevailed since the early 1990s, one needs to analyze the respective roles of the key players in this conflict and to understand the position and interests of each. Analysis shows that when the conflict is brought to light, it usually means that the interests of one or several of the players have also shifted; an underlying motive typically determines the renewed attention. In the 1990s, the Algerian state was on the brink of collapse, so the status quo best served the interests of all (except the Sahrawis, of course). More recently, resolution of the conflict in favor of Morocco would serve the interests of the latter and its traditional supporters.
THE ROLES OF ALGERIA AND MOROCCO
Since the inception of the dispute, neither Morocco nor Algeria has altered its position on Western Sahara in any fundamental way, even though Algerian personalities such as Maj. Gen. Khaled Nezzar and President Mohamed Boudiaf (January-June 1992) have expressed differences of views. Algeria has also proposed the division of the territory between Sahrawis and Moroccans as a way out of the stalemate. Moroccans argue that Algerians created an artificial conflict over Western Sahara to weaken Morocco and thwart the recovery of its "southern provinces." Moroccan scholar Abdelkhaleq Berramdane has even argued that "Algeria dug up a people," i.e., the Sahrawis, from the sands to spoil Morocco's claims. (5) The other debatable accusation is that Algeria's determination for an independent Western Sahara rests on an ulterior strategic motive: free access to the Atlantic.
There are historical, geopolitical, ideological and psychological reasons that have strained Algerian-Moroccan relations since Algeria's independence in 1962. (6) Although a struggle for regional hegemony does exist between the two countries, (7) Moroccan irredentism is a weightier factor in the Western Sahara equation. It began in the 1950s, when Mohammed Allal Al-Fassi (1910-74), leader of the nationalist Istiqlal party, developed the idea of "Greater Morocco." As far back as 1956, Al-Fassi spread the idea that Moroccans must lead a struggle to liberate Tangier, the Sahara from Colomb-Bechar to Tindouf (both in Algeria), the Touat, Kenadza, Mauritania (which Morocco did not recognize until 1969, eight years after independence), and of course Spanish Sahara, until their unification with Morocco. Thus, Morocco's borders would extend to the borders in the south of Saint-Louis in Senegal. While this idea contributed greatly to Moroccan nationalism, it also instilled fear among the leaders of the Algerian nationalist movement of a hostile neighbor intent on amputating parts of the territory it had fought to liberate through a fierce war against French colonialism.
The differences between the two countries during the colonial era were transformed into ideologies after independence. Obviously, Moroccan irredentism, though progressively watered down, did nonetheless result in border conflicts with its eastern neighbor. If the border was more or less settled in the 1970s, the conflict in Western Sahara, albeit not the only concern, became the main bone of contention in Algerian-Moroccan relations. The parliament agreed in 1992 (Algeria had ratified the agreement in 1973). This change of heart seemed designed to put pressure on Algeria, but also to indicate that Morocco would not relinquish the territory but rather would incorporate it into the kingdom. The ratification of the treaty, however, did not mean the end of Moroccan irredentism. The most recent, albeit minor, manifestation was the call from the Front de liberation de l'Algerie marocain (FLAM), which in March 2006 called for the liberation of southwest Algeria and its return to Morocco. (8)
From the standpoint of Algerian leaders, preventing Morocco from establishing a fait accompli in the Western Sahara and legitimizing its occupation has served as an instrument for warding off Moroccan irredentist aspirations against Algeria itself. Irrespective of the Western Sahara conflict, additional factors relate to the rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, not only in the Maghreb itself, but also in the rest of the African continent. While the support Algeria...
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More articles from Middle East Policy
Time for a solution in the Western Sahara conflict., December 22, 2007
A History of Modern Libya.(Book review), December 22, 2007
History and the Culture of Nationalism in Algeria.(Book review), December 22, 2007
Memory and Violence in the Middle East and North Africa.(Book review), December 22, 2007
Women in the Middle East, Past and Present.(Book review), December 22, 2007
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