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Article Excerpt
Introduction
Over the years diplomacy has gradually taken on a more multilateral character and few nation-states handle their relations with other countries and/or groups of countries outside a multilateral framework. This augurs a new ball game not only for diplomacy, but also for defining, pursuing and safeguarding national interests. For European countries as for countries in Southeast Asia, the regional organization of the European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) fulfills the role of a vehicle for participation in global politics and economics. A multi-tiered system spanning global, multilateral, regional and bilateral ties has developed as explained by Ruland (1996, 1999a, 1999b). The relationship between the EU and ASEAN is thus not only an academic issue, but is also of vital interest for the two regions. In a wider context, this relationship is an interesting case study of how two regions, each having built an institutional framework to suit their purposes, approach and tries to understand each other. It illustrates how much effort is needed to gauge what exactly the other party thinks--especially when operating outside the well known national box and looking across the table at a number of nation-states choosing to act in common instead of individually. The EU and ASEAN are well placed for an analysis focusing on how difficult it actually is to bring about mutual understanding because history, experience and traditions open the door for easy reciprocal understanding and yet it has proved difficult to move from talk to substance.
Despite the fact that, broadly speaking, the EU and ASEAN share a common outlook on global politics and economics, tangible and visible cooperation has been lacking. This article offers the thesis that this is due to a lack of understanding of each other's position arising from the EU's inability to comprehend the three dimensional stability and security sought by ASEAN, a certain degree of disunity among EU countries, and the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996 that has had the effect of taking some of the wind out of the EU-ASEAN sail.
Endeavours to Shape Genuine Cooperation
ASEAN and the EU have had ministerial consultations since 1978. Informal relations between the two organizations go back to 1972, and 1977 is generally regarded as the year when relations really started. The first EU-ASEAN agreement was concluded in 1980 with a cooperation agreement. (1) The agreement was useful as a political signal to highlight the interest both parties had in deepening economic cooperation and trade relations. It limited itself, however, to a declaration of principles and a statement of good and positive intentions, without putting much flesh on the skeleton. During the 1980s, the agreement gradually led to a political dialogue, which until the Myanmar issue arose, actually produced some tangible results, among other things concerning the plight of Indochinese refugees (Ruland 2001).
However, the political will on both sides was not strong enough to bridge the gap in perceptions. During the 1980s and 1990s, the dialogue was kept going, but it did not lead either side to prioritize closer and deeper relations. The EU was satisfied with the agreement and did not see any need to upgrade relations with Southeast Asian countries. The latter may have wanted to do so, but strong and vibrant economic development made them less dependent upon the EU. Both parties were caught in a kind of "steady as she goes" mentality, pronouncing themselves in favour of doing more without really putting in the effort to achieve it. This gave rise to a fundamental question: why do we need each other and what are the common objectives, ideas, and goals, which should be pursued. No appropriate answer was found, and as long as that was the case the 1980 agreement continued to function. And so it did without much dissatisfaction from either party.
In the mid-1990s, however, a strange kind of vacuum emerged making both parties feel that the relationship needed a boost. A group of eminent persons was asked to table a report mapping out how cooperation could be strengthened and deepened. (2) The following rationale was cited for the group's work: first, that the end of East-West confrontation had brought radical changes to political and economic relations; second, there had been a decade of unprecedented economic and political development in the ASEAN countries; and third, the on going changes in the EU. The main recommendations included, inter alia:
* Pursue the liberalization of their own markets and support the World Trade Organization (WTO);
* Alert business and industry to the potential of trade and investment;
* Deepen the substance of discussion in various existing forums about political and security matters;
* Encourage greater contact and exchange concerning the cultural dimension.
These recommendations sounded very much in line with existing arrangements and while useful, they were certainly not path breaking. In any case it all came to nothing for two reasons: the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis and, simultaneously, the emergence of the Myanmar issue on the EU-ASEAN agenda, called for a new approach.
The next attempt to kick start the relationship came at the turn of the new century, when the most severe effects of the financial crisis had subsided. In 2001 and 2003 the European Commission (EC) published a policy document (3) classifying ASEAN (4) as key economic and political partner for the EU. The EU mapped out six strategic priorities for its relations with Southeast Asia:
* Supporting regional stability and the fight against terrorism;
* Promote human rights, democratic principles and good governance in all aspects of EC policy dialogue and development cooperation;
* Dialogue incorporating issues such as migration, trafficking in humans, money laundering, piracy, organized crime and drugs;
* Invest dynamism by launching a trade action plan called Transregional EU-ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI);
* Support the development of less prosperous countries;
* Intensify dialogue in specific policy areas.
All of these points are useful and gives the EU a platform in Southeast Asia. At the same time it reveals one of the weaknesses of the EU in its relations with the outside world: the lack of a strategic vision of the long-term relations between EU and its partners. This cooperation conveys the impression either of a piecemeal approach or an attempt...
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