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Article Excerpt
Abstract
This methodological article explores issues related to having the ontological ground for phenomenological empirical research present throughout the research process. We discuss how ontology needs to be taken into consideration regarding the phenomena to be studied and how ontological aspects of phenomena need to be highlighted during various data collection and analysis procedures. Here, we discuss how philosophical works can be used in the context of specific research projects. In illustrating our statements, we present four empirical examples connected to the themes of life changes and learning processes with the purpose of exemplifying and discussing how general lifeworld ontology can be integrated as an active resource in empirical phenomenological research.
Keywords
methodology, lifeworld ontology, empirical phenomenological studies
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But if we rediscover time beneath the subject, and if we relate to the paradox of time those of the body, the world, the thing, and others, we shall understand that beyond these there is nothing to understand. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 365)
Central in phenomenological empirical research is the manner in which ontology can be present throughout the research process. This question deals with how to think phenomenologically while doing phenomenology. As guidance for researchers to facilitate research processes in the interest of conducting phenomenological studies, a series of methodological procedures have been put forward by, among others, van Kaam (1966), Colaizzi (1978), Giorgi (1985, 1997) and Karlsson (1995). Others, in line with the Utrecht school have emphasized focusing on studying experiences as they are lived using open and sensitive methods (Bollnow, 1989; Kockelmans, 1987; Langeveld, 1984). In this article, we will elucidate and discuss the necessity of reflecting upon and integrating general ontology and philosophical works with empirical phenomenological studies when researching experiences as they are lived.
Recent methodological studies in the field of empirical phenomenology have spanned across problems concerning how to deal with pre-understanding in the research process (LeVasseur, 2003), appropriate application of empirical phenomenological methods (Giorgi, 2000), phases of the interpretive phenomenological process (Crist & Tanner, 2003), issues of validity (Giorgi, 2002), and accessibility of empirical phenomenological texts (Halling, 2002). Further, the utilization of lifeworld ontological concepts in the phenomenological research process has been developed (Ashworth, 2003a, 2003b; van Manen, 1990). Ashworth (2003a) delineated specific intertwined lifeworld constructs, labelled "fractions" (p. 147), such as embodiment, temporality and sociality, which are then applied as structures in the process of phenomenological analysis (Ashworth & Ashworth, 2003; Finlay, 2003). However, the applicability of general life-world phenomenological constructs is not further spelled out for relevance to the uniqueness of various phenomena in diverse fields under study and here we intend to contribute to this discussion.
Within empirical phenomenological research, general phenomenological ontology may tend to be too extensive in scope and perhaps too complicated to carry into one's reflections throughout the research process. Accordingly, our goal is to reiterate an unquestioned phenomenological assertion; the significance of thinking phenomenologically while doing phenomenology. For the purpose of this article, we interpret this claim in order to elaborate upon the significance of reflexively applying phenomenological ontology throughout the research process to ontic or empirical phenomena; thus, general ontology would be placed in a particular empirical field of psychological study. Here in the Heideggerian tradition of existential phenomenology, we assume the distinction between the "ontological" as the dimension of Being, and the "ontic" as the dimension of entities present to us in our natural attitude toward the world. First, we will give a brief description of our understanding of general phenomenological, lifeworld ontology. Second, we will discuss applications of phenomenological ontology in the research process. Third, we will present four examples from our own research in which we have applied phenomenological thinking while carrying out phenomenological studies.
Our efforts to explicate and reflect upon the applicability of general ontology in the research process have largely been fostered in the specific research community of which we are part. We--all four authors, are part of an interdisciplinary group, which has contributed to the development of a lifeworld phenomenological research approach in western Sweden (Bengtsson, 2005), building on continuity between phenomenology and hermeneutics, which is seen as part of the phenomenological movement. This endeavour has been carried out in a context where phenomenology has largely been regarded as part of the qualitative research tradition, rather than as a specific approach to research into lifeworld phenomena. In this context, we have been challenged to explicate the significance of "bothering" about such philosophical issues as ontology. With this in mind, we highlight the above stated claim with the intention of concurring with the phenomenological methodological discussion. Here, phenomenological methodology is regarded as a research processes where methodological patterns are characterized by openness and flexibility (Bengtsson, 2005; Benner, 1994; Dahlberg, Drew & Nystrom, 2001; van Manen, 1990) and not restricted to following a strict step-by-step method.
General Lifeworld Ontology
Ontology addresses questions about existence. In everyday language, the name for everything that exists is reality. In this article, we will concentrate on ontological aspects relevant to a phenomenological lifeworld approach. The concept "lifeworld" is central in many of the "phenomenologies" developed over the years. Husserl (1970/1954) introduced central themes of the lifeworld to the European audience at the beginning of the 20th century. Heidegger (1993/1927) talked about "in-der-Welt-sein" (being-in-the-world) and Merleau-Ponty (1962/1945) used the expression "etre au monde" (being-in-the-world), while Schutz (1972/1932) wrote about "the everyday lifeworld". Building on Husserl's works, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and others claimed that it is not possible for anyone to transcend the lifeworld. In the following presentation, we articulate assumptions pertaining to general lifeworld ontology based primarily on Heidegger's (1993), Merleau-Ponty's (1962) and Schutz' (1972) philosophy.
The lifeworld, as we understand it, is in its ontological sense the pre-reflective ground for our being in the world, which is given to us in the natural attitude and is taken for granted in everyday life. The natural attitude as, in this respect, related to ordinary life, is originally and most often taken for granted. However, the natural attitude can be reflected upon and made visible. One of the challenges, among others, for a lifeworld approach, is to reveal and reflect upon everyday life and the foundations on which it rests.
The lifeworld, regarded here as an integrative complexity where we live, act and have experiences, can neither be reduced to a single quality nor transcended. It includes a pluralistic complex reality consisting of a large number of different qualities (Bengtsson, 2005). Thus, the ontology of the lifeworld can neither be diminished to a monism (e.g. materialism or idealism), nor to dualism (with separation of material and mental qualities). It is an integration of life and world, object and subject, inner and outer, mind and body, individual and society, etc. At the core of lifeworld ontology is insight into the interdependence between life and world, a complex and ambiguous conscious-and-unconscious basis of our experiences and actions. Thus, life and world are mutually dependent on each other, and through this interdependency, the lifeworld is personal as well as shared. The world, as it is united with a human being, stands out as an open world, always tangible in special situations. Central lifeworld dimensions such as time and space are also related to human beings. Time, for example, cannot be said to be either objective or subjective; instead, it is experienced by human beings as lived time. Similar statements can be made about lived space....
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