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Article Excerpt
It is widely accepted in Vietnam that the government's decision to join the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was both timely and wise (Nguyen Phuong Binh and Luan Thuy Duong 2001, p. 192). (1) In the absence of a detailed understanding of the organization's working procedures in Hanoi, and despite ASEAN's lack of robust institutional arrangements to promote regional cooperation (Nguyen Vu Tung 2007), the Vietnamese decision to join ASEAN in the mid-1990s reflected "the political will" of Vietnam to further commit itself to the region. What then was the nature of this political will and to what extent was it guided by material and ideational considerations? Further, what aspects of membership have been most valued by Vietnam? By posing these questions, this article focuses on the ideational logic related to the question of ASEAN membership. The central argument is that in addition to fulfilling certain material considerations, ASEAN membership also helped Vietnam overcome an identity crisis engendered by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Moreover, this rationale still holds for Vietnamese foreign policy in the post-1995 period.
Vietnam's Decision to Join ASEAN
With the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia in September 1989, and the conclusion of the Paris Peace Accords in October 1991, the normalization of relations between ASEAN and Vietnam could proceed. Detecting genuine changes in Hanoi's domestic and international priorities, ASEAN became more proactive in engaging Vietnam with a view to admitting the country into the ranks of the organization. In 1991, for example, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad stated that differences in socio-political systems between Vietnam and the ASEAN states would not prevent it from joining the Association. (2) ASEAN countries thought that it was necessary to bring Vietnam into the organization in due course, for a number of reasons. First, with the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it seemed an appropriate time to reach out to its erstwhile opponent and end the ideological divisions engendered by the Cold War. Second, as ASEAN was eager to enlarge the organization to enable it to speak for the whole of Southeast Asia, Vietnam seemed to provide a good starting point for the subsequent entry of Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia. And as a result, ASEAN would play a pivotal role in ensuring peace, stability and, to a lesser extent, prosperity in Southeast Asia and a larger role in the Asia-Pacific region. In short, Vietnam's membership of ASEAN seemed natural given the end of the Cold War and the resolution of the Cambodian problem. By July 1994, a consensus had been reached among ASEAN foreign ministers that Vietnam should be inducted into the organization as its sixth member before the organization's summit in late 1995.
For its part, Vietnam had readily expressed its desire to join ASEAN soon after the Cambodian issue had been resolved. Conscious of the fact that it might take between five and ten years for Vietnam to familiarize itself with the "ASEAN Way" of doing business, and thus effectively participate in the organization's economic and political affairs, Vietnam acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1992. In February 1993 Hanoi announced that that it was desirous of joining ASEAN "at an appropriate time". Fourteen months later the Vietnamese Government expressed its intention to seek "early membership". Then in July 1994 Vietnam formally took the decision to join ASEAN (Nguyen Vu Tung, 2007, pp. 53-56). Vietnam officially joined the Association in July 1995.
Since the late 1990s observers of Vietnamese foreign policy have offered several explanations concerning Vietnam's motivations for joining ASEAN. One explanation is that membership of the organization was a means of implementing the overall objective of having "more friends and fewer enemies" the task laid down in the 13th Communist Party of Vietnam's (CPV) Politburo Resolution adopted in May 1988, (3) and subsequently in the country's foreign policy as "being a friend of all countries", which was adopted by the VII CPV National Congress in June 1991. (4) Further, as ASEAN had established friendly and cooperative relations with the United States, Japan, the European Union (EU) and, more recently, China, ASEAN membership would facilitate Vietnam's efforts to improve relations with the Great Powers. As a direct result, by acceding to the TAC and joining ASEAN, Vietnam would be able to reduce defence spending and strengthen national security by having peace and stability in its immediate neighbourhood, thus allowing Hanoi to focus on economic reconstruction. Moreover, Hanoi believed it could improve its economic development by pursuing closer relations with the more advanced ASEAN economies. More importantly perhaps, as ASEAN cooperation is based on the free will of all its members, membership would in no way negatively affect Vietnam's independence and sovereignty (Thayer and Wurfel in Thayer 1999; Zagoria in Morley 1997, pp. 154-72). The case for Vietnam improving relations with its erstwhile opponents in Southeast Asia and joining ASEAN is an example of a foreign policy designed to better serve national economic and security interests in the post-Cold War context. Therefore, in light of these considerations, Vietnam has reaped a great deal of benefit from ASEAN membership. In his speech delivered at the 40th Anniversary of the Establishment of ASEAN, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung said, "Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995 in order to ensure an environment in the region favourable for the sake of national development and prosperity. The record of membership over the last 12 years has confirmed that the decision by the Party and Government to join ASEAN is an entirely correct one" (Vu Duong Ninh 2005). (5)
The material approach to understanding Vietnam's membership of ASEAN is not, however, sufficient for several reasons. In the first place, the projected benefits of membership had already been gained through the process of improved ASEAN-Vietnam relations, started in the late 1980s and continued into the first half of the 1990s. Hanoi's withdrawal of troops from Cambodia in 1989, the UN-sponsored political solution to the Cambodian problem in 1991, the accession of Vietnam and Laos to the TAC in 1992, and Vietnam's improved relations with the Major Powers had removed the obstacles to the improvement of Vietnam-ASEAN relations. In fact, relations between Vietnam and individual ASEAN members, especially Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, the Philippines and Brunei had already been normalized before 1995. In addition, from 1991 (the year the Soviet Union collapsed) to 1995 (the year Vietnam joined ASEAN), Vietnam managed to find new sources of aid, trade and investment to replace that lost from the Soviet bloc, thus facilitating a smooth transition to a market economy. Therefore, even without formal membership, Vietnam had broken out of its isolation, normalized relations with all countries in Southeast Asia, and, as a result, ASEAN was no longer considered a threat by Hanoi. In November 1994, Deputy Foreign Minister Vu Khoan wrote, "With the October 1991 Paris Agreement on the overall political solution to the Cambodia problem, the key obstacles to Vietnam-ASEAN relations over the last 10 years was [sic] removed. Relations between Vietnam and ASEAN members could thus rapidly develop bilaterally and multilaterally" (Vu Khoan 1995, p. 31). In other words, membership of ASEAN did not radically alter the dynamics of Vietnam-ASEAN cooperation.
In the wider strategic context, there is little evidence to suggest that Vietnam sought membership of ASEAN to balance against China. Similarly, there is little evidence to show that the United States wanted to take advantage of improved relations with Vietnam, or Vietnam's membership of ASEAN, to balance China. Between 1991 and 1995, Vietnam--in addition to joining ASEAN--normalized relations with both China and the United States. Therefore, Vietnam's improved relations with the United States, China, and the ASEAN countries weaken the realist argument that Vietnam's membership of ASEAN was aimed at balancing China and checking its ambitions in the area (Nguyen Vu Tung 2002, pp.106-20).
Even in economic terms, Vietnam-ASEAN relations had been stabilized before Vietnam joined the organization. In 1994, ASEAN countries accounted for 30 per cent of Vietnam's total foreign trade, and 30 per cent of foreign direct investment (FDI). (6) Indeed the level of economic interaction between Vietnam and its ASEAN partners shrank after it had joined the organization with the onset of the 1997 Asian financial...
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