Home | Business News | Browse by Publication | H | History Review

Napoleon and empire: Matthew MacLachlan asks how far Napoleon defeated himself.

Article Excerpt
[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Pivotal to any consideration of Napoleon's ultimate defeat is the fact that he did not inherit a foreign relations strategy, but developed his own. Therefore he should bear a high degree of responsibility for its failure, perhaps because of his inexperience. Yet, it is also necessary to explore the self-destructive qualities of Napoleon's character and to note the effects of such miscalculations as the Continental Blockade and the 'Spanish ulcer'.

The Opposing Argument

Many historians, notably Philip G. Dwyer and Albert Sorel, assert that Napoleon merely inherited a foreign policy not of his own making. 'Napoleon', Dwyer argues, 'inherited a situation ... and instituted solutions that were largely in keeping with previous regimes' responses'. Albert Sorel's view--that Napoleon was fighting for the long-established French aim of 'natural frontiers'--is used to corroborate this. Similarly, Francois Furet develops this argument by claiming that Napoleon's campaigns derived from the revolutionary Girondins of the 1790s. We can summarise these arguments with the view that Napoleon merely executed the will of previous French foreign policies. Presumably, therefore, he cannot be held accountable for their ultimate failure. Yet there are stark flaws with such an argument.

Firstly, to address Furet's view: the suggestion that Napoleon's policy was founded in the revolution is irrational when one considers Napoleon's ascent to power and his own personal contributions to foreign fighting. This late-revolutionary period saw him emerge not only as a highly successful general but also a non-conformist one. There are many examples which demonstrate his frank disobedience to the politicians in Paris. One is that he abandoned his troops in Egypt, in 1799, to return to France. Another is that he frequently stretched his authority beyond its limits, as by signing an armistice with the Pope over Bologna in June 1796. It is clear that the rebellious Napoleon did not want to conform with any traditional policies but delighted in constructing his own. Even whilst acting within a traditional foreign 'situation', Napoleon was able to manipulate it to establish his own foreign policy.

If we also look at the years after Napoleon gained power, it becomes obvious that his dictatorship allows no room for anything but his own personal foreign strategy. After establishing the Empire in 1804 he governed via appointed officials who were mere puppets to his will. Even those advisors closest to him--Talleyrand and Fouche--were largely 'dutiful technocrats' enforcing their Emperor's command. It is indisputable, therefore, that Napoleon's own actions were the primary cause of war after 1803. Similarly, there was no premeditated system which would rule in the Emperor's absence. This fact helps explain the Empire's downfall and...

View this article FREE - Now for a Limited Time, try Goliath Business News
Free for 3 Days!