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...University Michigan. These papers were discussed:
Benjamin Olken, Harvard University and NBER, and Patrick Barron, World Bank, "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh" (NBER Working Paper No. 13145)
Discussants: Justin Wolfers, University of Pennsylvania and NBER, and David Abrams, University of Chicago Law School
Mark Duggan, University of Maryland and NBER; Randi Hjalmarsson, University of Maryland; and Brian A. Jacob, University of Michigan and NBER, "The Effect of Gun Shows on Gun Violence, Gun Suicides, and Accidental Gun Deaths"
Discussants: Ilyana Kuziemko, Princeton University and NBER, and David Hemenway, Harvard University
Jonah E. Rockoff, Columbia University and NBER, and JJ Prescott, University of Michigan, "Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?"
Discussants: Anne Piehl, Rutgers University and NBER, and Justin McCrary
Rucker Johnson and Steven Raphael, University of California at Berkeley, "How Much Crime Reduction Does the Marginal Prisoner Buy?"
Discussants: Thomas Miles, University of Chicago Law School, and Radha Iyengar, Harvard University
Manolis Galenianos, Pennsylvania State University; Rosalia Liccardo Pacula, RAND and NBER; and Nicola Persico, New York University and NBER, "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs"
Discussants: Dan Silverman, University of Michigan, and Jeffrey A. Miron, Harvard University and NBER
Steven D. Levitt, University of Chicago and NBER, and Sudhir A. Venkatesh, Columbia University, "The Economics of Street Prostitution"
Discussants: Peter Reuter, University of Maryland, and Lawrence Katz, Harvard University and NBER
Olken and Barron test whether the behavior of corrupt officials is consistent with standard industrial organization theory. They designed a study in which surveyors accompanied truck drivers on 304 trips along their regular routes in two Indonesian provinces and they directly observed over 6,000 illegal payments to traffic police, military officers, and attendants at weigh stations. Using plausibly exogenous changes in the number of police and military checkpoints, they show that market structure affects the level of illegal payments, finding evidence consistent with double-marginalization and hold-up along a chain of vertical monopolies. Furthermore, they document that the illegal nature of these payments does not prevent corrupt officials from extracting additional revenue using complex pricing schemes, including third-degree price discrimination and a menu of two-part tariffs. Their findings illustrate the importance of considering the market structure for bribes when designing anti-corruption policy.
Thousands of gun shows take place in the United States each year. Gun control advocates argue that because sales at gun shows are much less regulated than other sales, such shows make it casier for potential criminals to...
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