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Article Excerpt
Turkish democracy continues to fluctuate between contending poles. This includes conflict between republicanism and democracy, majoritarian and consensual democracy, French and American versions of secularism, and civic and ethnic nationalism. (2) The conflict is over not only the principles of the Turkish Republic, but also two competing definitions of nation, state, secularism and democracy. Indeed, this conflict of political norms, values and symbols has the potential to stop the consolidation of Turkish democracy. Although there is a powerful class dimension to the current crisis, the politics of lifestyle (or cultural confrontation) has become the main axis of the conflict; and this, in turn, prevents the analysis of intraclass conflict within each cultural sector of society. Even though the Islamic movement under the political leadership of the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi, Justice and Development party (AKP), presents itself as the champion of the poor and needy, its leadership shares more with the secular bourgeoisie's pattern of consumerism. (3)
The main problem in Turkey is the radical polarization of society, which is an outcome of Turkey's political ethos of creating a secular and national society through the means of the state. This ethos was established over the last century, and any potential drift towards a more religious state (or society) causes waves of concern throughout the secular establishment. The presidential election process once more has revealed these deep-seated fears and ethno-religious cleavages. One may call the secular establishment's fears exaggerated; however, the AKP government must take them seriously and deal with them. If the Turkish experience of democratic evolution into a moderate Islamic movement fails, it will be a setback for modern Islamic movements in the whole Middle East region. Moreover, Turkish experiments in secularism, democracy, nation building and the transformation of Islamic movements are becoming globalized. (4)
Thus, the case of Turkey is very significant; Europe and the United States view it as the model Muslim country, where the separation of mosque and state goes hand-in-hand with secular Islam. (5) Turkey is supposed to represent a bastion of democracy and the potential for the coexistence of secular and religious values in the Middle East. To continue to be rejected by major European players such as France and Germany will not help the cause of Turkish democracy but feed into the hands of more radical religious and nationalistic players, who will see this as another example of Western bias against the Turks. At the same time, Western military interference in the region has also had a negative effect on democracy in Turkey. The U.S. occupation of Iraq since 2003 has ostensibly aimed at creating a new wave of democratization in the Middle East. The occupation, however, not only planted the seeds of a genocidal civil war in Iraq, but also weakened the consolidation of Turkish democracy by providing a security shield for PKK activities in Northern Iraq. As PKK attacks have increased, so has the role of the military in the political sphere, along with the sweeping new anti-terror laws.
This paper seeks to examine the sociopolitical causes, actors and consequences of the April 2007 political crisis and its impact on the July 2007 national election results in Turkey. The actors in the current crisis are the AKP leadership, an assertive secular sector of civil society that organized a series of Republic Meetings, a secularist judiciary, and the guardians of the Kemalist system--the military. There are a number of complex causes of the current crisis. We would like to rank them according to their significance. Although the crisis erupted during the presidential election in April 2007, we treat the "nomination and election" process as the site of a power showdown between two diametrically different visions of what Turkey was and should become. There are three important causes of this sudden eruption. The first is a conflict between the AKP and the Kemalist sector over the meaning and role of such foundational principles as secularism and nationalism. The Kemalists regard secularism and a homogeneous ethnonationalism as the cardinal principles of Turkish modernization and national identity. Thus, almost all criticism of the Kemalist version of secularism and nationalism are treated as "hostile voices" of religious fanaticism (irtica) or Kurdish separatism. Two opposing views on secularism and nationalism shape the confrontation over the role of Islam in politics and the approaches to the Kurdish problem.
The second source of the current crisis is a double fear inside the Turkish military. The military is afraid that the emergence of an independent Kurdish state that encompasses the oil-rich region of Kirkuk in Iraq would undermine national unity and the territorial integrity of Turkey. The military thinks that the AKP government is either not aware of the long-term threat or wants to solve the Kurdish issue so as to transform the regime (nation-state) in Turkey. The military also fears losing its autonomy over recruitment, promotion and budget, in addition to being penetrated by ideological divisions through the Copenhagen criteria, which are required for membership. (6) Moreover, the military is wary of attempts to curtail the social and economic privileges its members have enjoyed for decades. With the appointment of Yasar Buyukanit as the chief of the General Staff, the military has become more assertive in protecting its privileges and political role. Finally, the independence and assertiveness of some Islamic groups, especially the Fethullah Gulen community, within the bureaucracy and business is another major source of fear among secularists. The crisis emerged at the end of the seven-year term of President Sezer. According to the Kemalist circles, Sezer has been the main obstacle to the Islamization of the state, whereas the AKP leadership regards Sezer as the main obstacle to the appointment of key bureaucrats, the decentralization of power, and the further democratization and liberalization of the system. Many Kemalists feared that the nomination of Abdullah Gill to the presidency would lead to the Islamization of the state through recruitment of Islamic-oriented bureaucrats into the higher echelons of the state.
AKP DEMOCRACY: MAJORITARIAN AND LEADER-BASED
The AKP introduced revolutionary legal changes, creating more transparency and the rule of law. However, many of these changes have not been implemented, and the party failed to adequately expand political space and democratize the state structure. Erdogan's leadership style within the party became a model for the governance of the state. He made himself the supreme leader and prevented the emergence of a second man by appointing "loyal" followers as the deputy chairmen of the AKP. This, in effect, prevented the institutionalization of the party. Criticism has been expressed of his autocratic style] however, this is a common problem for the Turkish party structure. Not only Erdogan, but most Turkish party leaders tend to behave as the supreme leader.
With little consultation inside or outside his party, in spring 2007, Prime Minister Erdogan, as the leader of the AKP, single-handedly nominated Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul to become the next president of the country, 24 hours before voting was to take place in Parliament. The secularists, the generals, the universities and the courts mobilized to stop the process. When the center-right parties (DYP, the True Path party of Mehmet Agar and ANAP, the Motherland party of Erkan Mumcu) and the secular leftist opposition party (CHP: The Republican People's party of Deniz Baykal) boycotted the poll for president on April 26, the generals issued a powerful statement on the official website of the Turkish Armed Forces on April 27 that threatened to overthrow the government if necessary to protect the secular nature of the Republic: (8)
The problem that [has] emerged in the presidential election process is focused on arguments over secularism. Turkish armed forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. It has been observed that some circles have been carrying out endless efforts to disturb fundamental values of the Republic of Turkey, especially secularism, and have increased their efforts recently. Those activities include requests for redefinition of fundamental values of the Republic and attempts to organize alternative celebrations instead of our national festivals symbolizing the unity and solidarity of our nation. Those who carry out the mentioned activities, which turned into an open challenge against the state, do not refrain from exploiting holy religious feelings of our people, and they try to hide their real goals under the guise of religion.... Those who are opposed to the Great Leader Mustafa Kemal Atatark's understanding 'How happy is the one who says I am a Turk,' are enemies of the Republic of Turkey and will remain so. The Turkish Armed Forces maintain their sound determination to carry out their duties stemming from laws to protect the unchangeable characteristics of the Republic of Turkey. Their loyalty to this determination is absolute.
The main opposition party took the first poll to the Constitutional Court on April 28. The Constitutional Court, under the influence of the April 27 military statement and the major mass rallies in Ankara and Istanbul, annulled Parliament's vote for Gal on the technical grounds that it lacked a two-thirds...
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