|
Article Excerpt
The Official Records of the War of the Rebellion identifies thirty-two "principal places for the confinement of Union prisoners held by Confederate authorities." Of that number, sixteen camps were located in the three Deep South states of Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina. (1) In many of these camps, Union prisoners of war (POWs) encountered great hardships as they faced incarceration without adequate supplies of food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment. Those who survived looked constantly to the possibility of being paroled or exchanged. For most, that dream occurred only after months of captivity and toward the literal end of the war.
This article will examine the Union prisoner-of-war experience in the Confederate prison camps in Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina and will focus on how Union POWs understood the prisoner-exchange issue, who they blamed for their continued internment, and what coping mechanisms they employed to survive their ordeal. Interestingly, Union POWs of the enlisted ranks blamed Northerners more than Southerners for their continued incarceration. They criticized the administration of President Abraham Lincoln for its inaction, and concluded that the Federal government had allowed racial politics to impede and to delay a large-scale prisoner release. They also faulted the Northern home front for failing to express an appropriate degree of outrage over their plight and for failing to apply adequate pressure on the Lincoln-led government. Finally, the evidence indicates that during the later stages of the war some Union POWs took matters into their own hands and became "Galvanized Rebels." This extraordinary step contemplated by a band of desperate men entailed abandoning their oaths to the United States and pledging their allegiance to the Confederacy as a means of escaping the horrors of prison life.
The exchange question has held an important place within Civil War prison historiography. In those studies, however, the focus has been on how civilian and military leaders constructed and implemented prison policy and the consequences of those decisions. This top-down approach, which is essential, concentrates on the deliberate and systematic objectives of the decision makers, but it ignores the reaction to the cessation of the exchanges within the camps themselves. (2) Thus, a bottom-up approach is necessary to improve the overall analysis of the exchange question. In addition, studies of camp life in general as well as specific studies of Southern prisons tend to examine living conditions, resource allocation, and death and survival rates. (3) Far too little attention has been devoted to such areas as the inmates' political affiliation and their changing ideology during incarceration, the mock 1864 presidential elections held in many camps, or the response and reaction to the Galvanized Rebel recruiting process. Ultimately this article uncovers a set of beliefs within the prison community that helps us better understand the Union POW experience.
To appreciate fully the exchange issue, it is necessary first to examine the attitudes and policies of the Federal and Confederate governments regarding repatriation. When the war started, neither the North nor the South had made any substantive preparations for handling war captives. When the Battle of Manassas (July 21, 1861) confirmed the likelihood of a prolonged conflict, the warring parties were forced to respond to the POW problem. Initially, they followed precedents established during the American Revolution and the War of 1812. During those two conflicts, prisoners were exchanged man for man, rank for rank. Many of the early exchanges during the Civil War have been termed "special exchanges," because battlefield commanders conducted this type of exchange with practically no interference from civilian governments. The Lincoln government in particular endorsed the practice of special exchanges as a way to avoid conferring official recognition to the Confederate government. (4)
During the first half of 1862, the number of POWs held by both sides increased dramatically, especially in the aftermath of Shiloh (April 6-7, 1862), the fall of New Orleans (April 29, 1862) and Memphis (June 6, 1862), and the Seven Days' battles in Virginia (June 25-July 1, 1862). As a result, the Lincoln government finally relented and the two sides began to negotiate a comprehensive exchange policy. Their labors produced the Dix-Hill Cartel, which was signed on July 22, 1862. This document, which governed the exchange program for the remainder of the war, specified the terms and equivalencies of exchange as well as the locations for exchanges and paroles. The agreement stated that exchanges would be made man for man, rank for rank, and when this was not possible exchange rates were established such that "a general commanding in chief or an admiral shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or for sixty privates or common seamen," or "a lieutenant or a master in the Navy or a captain in the Army or marines shall be exchanged for officers of equal rank, or six privates or common seamen." (5)
Although an agreement on prisoner exchanges had been reached, Union military leaders in particular discovered and encountered problems with the exchange and parole program. Unlike exchanged POWs, who could return to their units and the field of battle, paroled prisoners took an oath that they would not bear arms against their captors, would not aid their captors' enemy in any way, and would remain in specifically designated areas. The U.S. government established three "camps of instruction": one at Annapolis, Maryland, another near Camp Chase in Columbus, Ohio, and a third at Benton Barracks, Missouri, to house paroled prisoners. At these facilities Northern parolees often lacked essential equipment or provisions, were denied furloughs, and were forced to drill. Despite these unpleasant conditions, a number of Union leaders, both civilian and military, believed that some soldiers allowed themselves to be captured and then paroled in order to avoid the risks of combat. (6)
Such suspicions appeared in the correspondence between Governor David Tod of Kentucky and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton in early September 1862, shortly after the signing of the Dix-Hill Cartel. On August 30, Confederate forces under the command of Gen. Edmund Kirby Smith captured four thousand Union soldiers at Richmond, Kentucky. Tod believed that if the Union prisoners had not been paroled so quickly, Smith would have been burdened with the responsibility of controlling and caring for a sizable number of POWs, which would have significantly hampered the general's ability to wage war in the Bluegrass state. Tod advised Stanton: "The freedom in giving pardons by our troops in Kentucky is very prejudicial to the service and should be stopped." Stanton replied on the same day: "The evil you mention is one of the most dangerous that has appeared in our army and it is difficult to see what remedy can be applied. There is reason to fear that many voluntarily surrender for the sake of getting home." Sensing Stanton's ardent agreement, Tod recommended: "If the Indian troubles in Minnesota are serious and the paroled Union prisoners are not soon to be exchanged would it not be well to send them to Minnesota?" The secretary of war accepted the governor's counsel and informed Tod, "Your suggestion as to the paroled prisoners being sent to the Indian borders is excellent and will be immediately acted upon." (7)
No doubt Tod and Stanton were satisfied with their solution. The problem, however, was by no means solved. First, the former prisoners maintained that their deployment to Minnesota would violate the terms of their parole. They also intimated that discipline would break down and that desertions would be commonplace. Second, Northern governors, principally Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, began to demand that the parolees be returned to their respective home states, where they could be closer to family and friends and could avoid frontier duty. Confusion reigned momentarily, but disaster was averted by several timely decisions. Some former prisoners were reclassified as exchanged and were ordered to rejoin their units in the field, others were given furloughs based on the premise that they had been promised leave before their capture, and others simply remained in the parole camps. Ultimately, Gen. John Pope quieted the Indian resistance using other available troops. Although unique and somewhat obscure, the Minnesota Indian incident is important because it exposes, very early in the war, certain prejudices and suspicions concerning war captives. In short, there was a preconception that too many soldiers were allowing themselves to be captured in order to avoid fighting. (8)
These problems aside, the fact remains that "the war prisons were almost empty by the fall of 1862." (9) However, the frequency and regularity of paroles and exchanges deteriorated radically after President Abraham Lincoln announced the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in late September 1862, an order he later signed into law on January 1, 1863. The proclamation, among other things, provided for the enlistment of blacks as Union soldiers, which in turn had a direct impact on the exchange program. Indeed, the Southern response was predictable, and the Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, expressed the region's collective outrage in an address before the Confederate Congress in January 1863. Davis charged that Lincoln's measure would inspire the slaves "to a general assassination of their masters," and called it "the most execrable measure recorded in...
|
