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...military force. this paper defend a standard, more permissive version of just war theory against his revisions.
As McMahan points out, the just cause condition is absolutely central to just war theory. It is, first, one of six or so conditions that all must be satisfied before a war can be just; without a just cause, the resort to military force is wrong. (2) But it also has priority over many other conditions, since it figures essentially in their definitions. For a war to be fought with a right intention, for example, those who initiate it must be motivated by a desire for its just causes, and there is a similar dependence in the proportionality and last resort conditions. (3) The proportionality condition permits war only if the harm it will cause is not out of proportion to the relevant goods it will achieve. But not all goods are relevant here. Imagine that fighting a war will boost our nation's economy, as World War II ended the depression of the 1930s. Though undeniably good, this type of effect cannot count toward a war's justification; an otherwise disproportionate conflict cannot become proportionate because it will boost GDP. Nor is it relevant if a war will give pleasure to soldiers eager for real action or will stimulate more profound art. As McMahan says, the goods relevant to the proportionality condition are only those in the war's just causes, and the same holds for the last resort condition. It permits a war only when there is no less destructive way of achieving its relevant goods, or if its balance of relevant goods over evils caused is preferable to that of any alternative. Again, however, only goods in the war's just causes count--war cannot be preferable to diplomacy because of economic or artistic effects. So both these key conditions presuppose a specification of relevant just causes.
McMahan's account of the just cause condition is centered on the concept of liability, so there is a just cause for war when and only when a group of people has made itself liable to the use of military force by being responsible for a serious wrong to others. As he puts it, "There is a just cause for war when one group of people--often a state, but possibly a nation or other organized collective--is morally responsible for action that threatens to wrong or has already wronged other people in certain ways, and that makes the perpetrators liable to military attack as a means of preventing the threatened wrong or redressing or correcting the wrong that has already been done." He proceeds to derive from this claim a fairly standard list of substantive just causes, including resisting aggression and preventing major humanitarian crimes by a government against its citizens. But what places a cause on the list is the above claim about liability.
At the most general level, McMahan's appeal to liability is in line with the broad tradition of just war theorizing. Both classical theorists, such as Aquinas and Grotius, and many present-day ones agree that a just cause requires that a serious wrong be either committed or in prospect. But McMahan's claim adds two more restrictive elements to this idea. First, he applies the concept of liability not just to the resort to war as a whole but to each individual goal of war, so one is permitted to use force against group X in pursuit of goal Y only if X have made themselves specifically liable to the use of such force for that purpose, by being responsible for a wrong specifically connected to Y. This restriction is implicit in his claim that responsibility for a wrong permits military force only as a means of "preventing ... or redressing or correcting the wrong." As I will argue below, this significantly reduces the role that such considerations as disarming an aggressor and deterring aggression can play in justifying war. Second, he applies the concept of liability not just to an enemy group X as a whole but to each individual member of X, so one is permitted to use force against a given person only if he himself shares in the responsibility for the relevant wrong. This radically changes the moral status of soldiers, especially on the just side of a war, and forbids much killing of soldiers by soldiers that would otherwise be permitted.
It is in these two ways--by reducing the role of such considerations as disarmament and deterrence and changing the moral status of soldiers--that McMahan's account makes just war theory less permissive. Let me consider them in turn.
CONDITIONAL JUST CAUSES
In an earlier article McMahan and Robert McKim clarified an important aspect of traditional just war theory by distinguishing between what McMahan now calls "independent" and "conditional" just causes. (4) An independent just cause can by itself satisfy the just cause condition, and, when present, is always relevant to justifying war; thus, resisting aggression is an independent just cause. By contrast, a merely conditional just cause cannot help satisfy the just cause condition; if one has only conditional just causes, one is not permitted to fight. But once another, independent just cause is present, a conditional cause can become a legitimate goal of war and can contribute to its justification--for example, by helping to make it proportionate and a last resort. Three main conditional just causes have been recognized: forcibly disarming an aggressor, deterring future aggression, and preventing humanitarian crimes that, while serious, do not mount to the level of an independent just cause.
On most versions of just war theory, the mere fact that a state has weapons it may or even is likely to use aggressively at some time in the future is no justification for war against it now; pace the Bush doctrine, merely preventive war is wrong. But once a state has committed aggression, forcibly disarming it and thereby incapacitating it for future aggression becomes on most views a legitimate goal of war. If the process of reversing a state's aggression will destroy much of its military hardware, leaving it less able to attempt future aggression, the resulting prevention of aggression is on this view a relevant good produced by war. More strongly, disarmament can sometimes permit continuing a war after its independent just causes have been achieved. Many hold that in World War II the Allies were permitted to disarm Germany and Japan even after their aggressions had been reversed and the territories they had occupied had been liberated. Similarly, many hold that in 1991 it was permissible for the UN coalition to send troops into Iraq after liberating Kuwait in order to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. This is why, when the coalition chose not to do so, they were permitted to write conditions about disarmament into a cease-fire agreement that they backed with the threat to resume force if its terms were not complied with. On most views, then, though not on its own a sufficient justification for war, disarmament can become a legitimate goal given some other, independent just cause.
A similar point applies to deterrence. The mere fact that war against a given state will deter future aggressors cannot justify war; deterrence is not an independent just cause. But once there is another, independent just cause, deterrence becomes a relevant good of war and can play a vital role in its justification. Consider the 1982 Falklands War. While Argentina's occupation of the islands provided an independent just cause for war, their remoteness and sparse population may have made that cause insufficient to outweigh the harms of war in a proportionality calculation. But when British prime minister Margaret Thatcher justified the war she did not appeal only to that just cause; she also cited the need to resist aggression wherever it occurs, which was in effect an appeal to deterrence. And deterrence may have done more to make the war proportionate than its initial just cause did.
Something similar is possible for the last resort condition. In the lead-up...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos
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