...August, Carter had a substantial lead. Granted, the 1976 election was not as close as the 1960 election, but still it was close. Carter only won by a margin of 2 percent of the popular vote (Leip 2003). The reasons the 1976 debates were unique, though, are twofold. First, this was the first time an incumbent debated. Gerald Ford was finishing out Nixon's term and was technically an incumbent, yet Ford had never won a national election. Second, a change in the interpretation of broadcast law led to a change in those involved with the debates in 1976. In 1960, the suspension of Section 315(a), the equal-time provision of the Federal Communications Act, allowed the debates to be coordinated between the networks and each candidate. The 1959 Lar Daly case led the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to adopt four amendments to Section 315(a) in order to encourage coverage of political candidates (The Presidential Campaign 1976 1979). These amendments are categories of exemption from Section 315(a). They are:

1. bona fide newscast;

2. bona fide news interview;

3. bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary); or

4. on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited to political conventions and activities incidental thereto). (The Presidential Campaign 1976 1979, 14)

These amendments were first challenged by the 1962 Michigan and California gubernatorial campaign debates (The Presidential Campaign 1976 1979). The FCC ruled that these debates were not bona fide news events as detailed in Section 315(a)(4). As a result, these rulings effectively killed the broadcasting of candidate debates.

The Aspen Institute, in its desire to reverse the FCC's 1962 rulings, filed a petition with the FCC on April 22, 1975. In that petition, the Aspen Institute argued that the commission had read Section 315(a)(4) too narrowly and that, if the commission's 1962 rulings were allowed to stand, they would effectively nullify the other three amendments of Section 315(a) (The Presidential Campaign 1976 1979). On September 30, 1975, the FCC announced its 1962 ruling and that if it "were confronted again with the situation presented in the two 1962 cases, its rulings would be different" (The Presidential Campaign 1976 1979, 17). This reinterpretation of Section 315(a) brought in a new third-party sponsor to presidential debates. Thus, the League of Women Voters (LWV) pushed forward to sponsor debates during the 1976 presidential campaign. The lasting effect of the new interpretation of Section 315(a) has been that presidential debates have been sponsored by nonpartisan organizations ever since.

April through July 1976

The history of the 1976 debates began in September 1975. That month, the LWV hired Jim Karayn to produce several primary election voter education forums that would be televised on the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). It was at this time that the LWV started to think seriously about producing general election debates between the presidential candidates (Seltz and Yoakam 1979). About seven months later, on April 26, 1976, LWV executives met with TV network executives to talk about the legal, political, and logistical features of producing debates between presidential candidates. According to Seltz and Yoakam, the "dialogue was strained" (1979, 110). The sourness of that meeting did not dampen the LWV's plans, though, because on May 5 of that year, at their convention in New York, Ruth Clusen, the LWV's president, declared the LWV's intention to sponsor presidential debates in the upcoming election (Seltz and Yoakam 1979).

The Ford staff knew the campaign would be an uphill fight early on. Ford's advisors expected to be behind Carter by 20 points after their convention in August (Duval n.d.; emphasis added). The 1976 Ford campaign plan never mentioned the president participating in debates anywhere in the 120 pages of text (Duval n.d.). In fact, early on in the organizing stages of the campaign, one of Ford's advisors, Bob Mead, wrote a memo advising that the campaign should be mass media centered, but should avoid debates (Mead 1975). Mead then explained:

I am not suggesting that President Ford debate his opponent in the coming campaign. There are pros and cons to debating, particularly for a President.... I personally feel that the President should not have to debate another candidate. However, I would like to see him debate newsmen utilizing the one-on-one/two or three on-one forum--a forum where he excels. These interviews are conversational self-portraits. (Mead 1975)

In the early stages of the campaign, Ford had no intention of debating Carter, even with the belief that Carter could be up by 20 points after the Republican convention. That attitude, however, would change.

August 1976

An early sign that the Ford campaign would change its mind on debates came in a memo from Charles Walker on August 12, 1976, one week before Ford would challenge Carter to debate. Walker, who was a member of the LWV's steering committee to establish a series of general election debates, opened the memo by saying:

I strongly recommend that in your acceptance speech Thursday evening you "challenge" Carter to a series of television "debates" during the campaign.... The idea of announcing it in your acceptance speech, which was referred to in this morning's New York Times, strikes me as a very good way of providing some initiative for you at the outset. (Duval 1976a)

Obviously, there had been some discussion of participating in debates prior to this memo; however, the president was not yet convinced. This was clear in the last paragraph when Walker stated:

And I can guarantee that the set-up will be fair. The Steering Committee is determined that control of the events will be solely in the Committee (with ground rules agreed to by the candidates). In other words, the networks will have to cover them as a bona fide news event .... Most important, the networks will have nothing to say about format or questioners. We would select the latter and make certain that all important issues are thoroughly covered. (Duval 1976a)

At this point no formal decision had been made, at least publicly, and Walker was giving Ford the hard sell to get him to participate.

On the morning of August 19, 1976, the LWV sent telegrams to both Ford and Carter, asking them to participate in debates. The telegram to Ford read:

In the spirit of free and open political discussions--discussions of issues vital to the future of the country--the '76 Presidential Debates, a project of the League of Women Voters Education Fund, is honored to invite you to participate in three appearances with Gov. Carter. We are suggesting the first appearance take place Tuesday, September 28th at the Chase Park Plaza in St. Louis. The remaining two appearances are tentatively planned during the weeks of October 11th and October 25th in different regions of the nation. We are also suggesting an additional, or fourth, debate be scheduled the week of October 18th between the two Vice Presidential candidates. Each of the four events is planned for one hour in the evening. We will invite radio and television networks to carry these events. Several of the networks have already expressed interest. (LWV 1976a)

Not coincidentally, Ford issued his debate challenge to Carter that night in his acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention. The challenge was not a result of the LWV telegram, but rather careful discussion among Ford's campaign staff. Dick Cheney, Ford's chief of staff, was reported to have said that the decision to debate had been made "two or three weeks" prior to the convention (Claiborne 1976). It was believed that, by challenging Carter to debate, Ford would bring some momentum to his struggling campaign because advance copies of the speech did not contain the challenge, thus making it a complete surprise (Bitzer and Reuter 1980; Claiborne 1976).

The Carter campaign had originally intended to challenge Ford to debate the morning after the convention. However, hearing that Ford had challenged him during his acceptance speech, Carter was forced to respond that night. As a result, Carter released a statement to the press immediately after Ford's...

NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.



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