...attack. Carried all types of combat operations at sea by the antiaircraft assets of warships and embarked fighters, and at naval bases by the antiaircraft assets of the naval base and warships in coordination with the air defense assets of the other branches of service. Includes: reconnaissance to detect hostile aircraft, warning, destruction of aircraft, cruise missiles and other air targets, tactical camouflage, concealment, and deception, and anti-air maneuvering of warships." (1)

In accordance with the Navy's current official enforceable legal documents, air defense is one of the most important types of naval combat support in all sea and oceanic areas of operation by warships and fleet forces, at naval bases, civilian ports, and points of standing at anchor (dispersed basing facilities).

Air defense of naval bases (civilian ports) with naval assets is carried out within the general organization of a concrete territorial air defense system where the main task and role in ensuring air defense is assigned to naval shore (ground based) systems of radar detection of air enemy forces, antiaircraft assets of air defense missile forces and fighter aviation of the Air Force. In this case, embarked antiaircraft assets are incorporated into the general air defense system of a base (port) and operated on the orders (target designation or allocation) of a senior shore air defense commander ("antiaircraft chief").

In naval operations in maritime (oceanic) sectors, warships are covered by ground based fighter aviation of the Air Force and the Navy within their effective range. The main method of cover provided by fighter aviation in peacetime, as well as during the period of threat preceding outbreak of war, is "alert duty at air base" by an assigned group of fighters. In this event, fighter aviation is sent to the protection area at a signal (call) from the command post of a fleet force or the main command post of one warship. In this scenario, fighter aviation is constantly in the air above the area of naval operations (this method requires the allocation of considerable fighter aviation assets for protection). But in all cases and instances of air defense of fleet forces and warships in base, basing areas (standing at anchor), ports and areas of naval operations at sea, it should be ensured (and is ensured) without relying solely on naval shore assets, primarily with embarked air defense assets within their effective range and capabilities--detection and air space surveillance radars, antiaircraft missiles and artillery, and electronic warfare (EW) active and passive jamming systems and complexes.

In sea and oceanic areas, outside the effective range of naval shore based fighter aviation, the air defense of a fleet force (ship) is naturally ensured only by embarked assets. Because our Navy still does not have aircraft carriers, air defense of surface ships has always been (and will continue to be in the future) a very acute problem for shore service fleet forces (ships) operating in remote parts of the world's oceans amid the superior naval forces, embarked and naval shore strike (assault) aviation assets of the possible adversary, let alone in combat conditions (the country's sole heavy aircraft carrying cruiser, Admiral Kuznetsov, will be able in the future to fulfill air defense tasks, specifically providing fighter coverage for fleet ships only as part of an active fleet force).

It was in exactly these conditions that the Fifth Squadron of the USSR Navy (known informally as the Mediterranean Squadron), the most powerful and battle-worthy fleet force in those years, operated in the Mediterranean Sea for 25 years (1967 through 1992). But in its combat service history there was a brief, two and a half year period (February 1970 through July 1972) when the air defense of squadron ships at some naval bases in the Arab Republic of Egypt and in the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea was ensured and carried out not only with embarked assets but also with the antiaircraft assets of missile troops and fighter aviation of the Soviet forces deployed in Egypt. It was the sole case not only in the history of the 5th Squadron but in the history of our entire Navy when antiaircraft missile and fighter aviation coverage of our ships at foreign bases and in a remote sea area was provided by the country's Air Defense forces deployed on foreign territory.

Because the print and electronic media reported only scanty, scrappy information about the situation in the region of the Asian-African triangle (Syria-Israel-Egypt) in the eastern part of the Mediterranean after the Six Day War (1967) between Israel, Egypt and Syria and before the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, including about the presence of Soviet Air Defense forces in Egypt, and because this information is still not entirely understandable to the majority of our military and civilian readers, before passing over to a detailed description of the organization of the air defense system of the Fifth Squadron during that period and its interaction with Soviet antiaircraft and fighter aviation assets, the present author would like to offer his readers a brief background into the events of that time in Egypt and the Mediterranean. Later it will be explained what kind of force the Fifth (Mediterranean) Squadron was. I suppose that this will be interesting to our readers.

The Six Day War (1967), in which Egypt and Syria suffered a defeat, did not end at that. The countries' military capability was not destroyed. At the request of President Nasser, starting in June 1967, Soviet military advisers were sent to the Egyptian Ground Forces, Air Force and Navy--from battalion to supreme command level--with the task of rebuilding the Egyptian Armed Forces on a new basis (the advisers played a major role in preparing the Egyptian Armed Forces for the 1973 Arab-Israeli War which started successfully for Egypt and Syria, but then all of those successes were recklessly lost).

After apparently stabilizing along the front lines (in Egypt, the Suez Canal and the northern part of the western coast of the Red Sea; in Syria, the Golan Heights), hostilities, nevertheless, continued in the form of systematic air strikes, mostly by Israeli aviation against front line installations, air defense assets and population centers, as well as in the form of fierce antiaircraft attacks and air engagements. Thus, the intensity of Israeli air strikes against...

NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.



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