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Article Excerpt
Leaders use specific types of behaviour to exercise influence. Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980) reduced 370 influence tactics to a small number of categories: assertiveness, rationality, ingratiation, exchange, coalition, upward appeal, blocking and, finally, the use of sanctions. Other researchers arrived at a similar system (see, for example, Blickle, 2000; Schriesheim & Hinkin, 1990; Yuld & Falbe, 1990; Yuld & Tracey, 1992). Some new categories were added to the list by Yukl and Falbe, namely, inspirational appeals and consultation.
Many studies of influence tactics focus on descriptive research questions: identification and categorization of the most frequently used tactics, sometimes including the identification of the consequences of these tactics. Recently, researchers also developed an interest in the determinants of the use of influence tactics. It has been found, for example, that the use of influence tactics covaries with the direction of the influence attempt (Deluga & Perry, 1991; Kipnis et al., 1980; Yukl & Falbe, 1990; Yukl & Tracey, 1992). Personality factors (e.g. Machiavellianism) also seem to be important (Grams & Rogers, 1990). In addition, it has been found that the use of influence tactics is related to factors such as self-esteem (Raven, 1992), status (Stahelski & Paynton, 1995), leadership style (Deluga & Souza, 1991), one-to-one or group situations (Guerin, 1995), organizational culture (Steensma, Jansen, & Vonk, 2003), expectation of future interaction (Van Knippenberg & Steensma, 2003) and the various objectives of influence attempts (Yukl, Guinan, & Sottolano, 1995).
Several studies demonstrate that variables covary with influence tactics used by people. The point has been reached now at which it becomes important to explain the 'why' of the influencing behaviour. Which tactic will be used and why?
The current research was conducted to answer this explanatory question. The study is building on preliminary models proposed by Yukl and Tracey (1992) and on the general expected utility model (Edwards, 1955). Yukl and Tracey assumed that managers would prefer to use tactics that are not costly in relation to likely benefits. This cost-benefit explanation is the central tenet of the so-called expected utility model of preferences and behaviours. The expected utility model is widely used in social sciences (see, for example, Edwards, 1955; Feather, 1959). The core assumption of this model is that a person who has to make a choice, will prefer that alternative which has the highest subjective expected utility, i.e. the alternative which is likely to lead to the most favorable outcomes. Alternatives may refer to behavioural intentions, to actual behavior or to objects.
The subjective expected utility of a given alternative can be defined as:
SEU = [[summation].sup.n.sub.i=1][SP.sub.i][U.sub.i]
where SEU is the subjective expected utility associated with a given alternative; [SP.sub.i], the subjective probability that the choice of the alternative will lead to outcome i; [U.sub.i], subjective value (= utility) of outcome i; and n, the number of relevant outcomes (Edwards, 1955).
For SEU,...
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