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Article Excerpt
Moral gender differences have been discussed in terms of Kohlbergian stages and content of orientations and taken to correspond to universal stable male and female features. The present study instead focuses on moral motivation and explains differences in terms of role expectations. We assessed moral motivation in 203 adolescents by a newly developed rating procedure based on participants' open-ended responses to hypothetical moral conflicts and validated this measurement by two self-reports and one experiment. We used independent measures for the content of gender stereotypes and gender identification. Male stereotypes comprise mostly negative and morally unfavorable traits, female stereotypes mostly positive and morally favorable traits. A marginally significant relationship is found between high gender identification and low moral motivation in boys, not in girls. We take gender differences in moral motivation to result from an interaction between individually differing degrees of gender identification and content of culturally shared gender stereotypes.
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Moral gender differences have largely been discussed in terms of Kohlbergian stages and content of moral orientation and taken to correspond to universal stable male and female features. The present study instead focuses on moral motivation and explains differences in terms of role expectations. In Study 1, a new measure for assessing strength of moral motivation is developed and validated that, more than previous measures, aims at tapping action dispositions. In Study 2, collectively shared gender stereotypes and individually differing degrees of gender identification are assessed independently and related to gender differences in strength of moral motivation.
Over the past thirty years, research on morality has focussed mainly on moral reasoning following Kohlberg's (1981, 1984) original assumption of a cognitive-affective parallelism in moral functioning. Theoretical analyses (Blasi, 1980, 1983; Rest, 1986, 1999) and more recent empirical work (Colby & Damon, 1992; Nunner-Winkler 1998; Thoma, 1986; Walker, 1999; Walker, de Vries, & Trevethan, 1987), however, suggest that moral reasoning and moral motivation are partially independent dimensions. In consequence, researchers today explicitly address the "relative neglect of moral character and virtues" in Kohlberg's model (Walker & Pitts, 1998, p. 403) and consider the study of moral motivation an "important complement and extension" of work on moral reasoning (Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Alisat, 2003, p. 582). Our study follows up on this interest and ties it in with the widely debated issue of moral gender differences. Against Gilligan's (1982, 1986, 1987) claims, empirical research has shown that men and women do not differ in stages of moral reasoning (Pratt, Diessner, Hunsberger, Pancer, & Savoy, 1991; Walker et al., 1987; Wark & Krebs, 1996), in type of moral orientation (Jaffee & Hyde, 2000), or in style of norm application, that is, rigidity versus flexibility (Dobert & Nunner-Winkler, 1986). Studies on gender differences in moral motivation, however, are scarce and do not provide unequivocal results. In explaining moral gender differences, most authors refer to differences in early relational experiences or socialization styles. Little is known about the influence of gender differences in role expectations and stereotypes on moral understanding.
In this essay we discuss problems of the theoretical conceptualization and empirical operationalization of moral motivation, gender stereotypes, and gender identification. In the first part we describe our newly developed measurement for moral motivation and provide evidence for its validity. In the second part we test gender differences in moral motivation and attempt to explain such differences in terms of gender stereotypes and gender identification.
Moral Motivation
People may do what they know to be right for various concerns. They may be motivated by concerns about the welfare of others. They may be interested in avoiding punishment or winning rewards for themselves. They may do what they know to be right because of a habitualized need disposition for conformity (Parsons, 1964), because of an internalized superego (Freud), because they wish to maintain their personal integrity, or from respect for moral rules (Kant). Not all of these concerns qualify as moral. From an everyday understanding (Strawson, 1962), exclusively self-serving interests concerning personal benefits or costs are excluded from the class of moral motives. In the following, a motive is defined as moral only if an individual's judgment contains an understanding of the obligatory character of the moral ought and the concern motivating the imperative behavior is intrinsically oriented to this understanding.
Thus, moral motivation is conceptualized as agents' willingness to do even at personal costs what they, to the best of their knowledge, judge to be right. This definition is in line with Kohlberg's cognitivist emphasis and also agrees with everyday moral understanding; "concern about doing the right" was given the highest prototypicality rating as a descriptor for a moral person (Walker & Pitts, 1998).
People differ in strength of moral motivation. Colby and Damon's (1992) moral exemplars mark one pole of this dimension. Their moral desires are strong and unconflicted and so identified with their own identities that moral action follows from a kind of spontaneous necessity. The other end is exemplified by people with purely opportunistic attitudes. People in the intermediate range tend to respect and follow moral rules they are aware of as long as the costs incurred are not too high.
For assessing moral motivation we developed a new instrument, the MoMo Rating Scale, a rating procedure based on participants' action decisions and emotion attributions in moral conflicts. In Part 1 we describe this newly devised instrument and report results of validation procedures. We used three measures: (a) a self-report concerning the expected likelihood of experiencing guilt and regret versus indifference and relief after having done wrong (Moral Concerns Test, MCT), (b) a self-report concerning the subjective importance attributed to moral versus nonmoral values (Importance of Moral Values Test, IMVT), and (c) real-life behavior involving the choice between sharing or maximizing personal profit (a modified version of the Prisoner Dilemma Game, PDG).
Gender Differences in Moral Motivation, Gender Stereotypes, and Gender Identification
It is unclear whether men and women differ in their strength of moral motivation. Gilligan's description of moral gender differences seems to have motivational implications. By integrating emotions such as compassion, women are more responsive to the plight of others, whereas men's moral understanding more resembles the reflective equilibrium of an impartial observer (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987). Empirical evidence is mixed and, moreover, is based on different indicators: on negative emotions after transgression, on the importance attributed to moral values, on moral behavior. Thus, on the one hand, Tangney and Dearing (2002) found that in response to transgressions, females experience more shame and guilt than men. Arnold (1993) reports that female adolescents give higher importance to moral values than their male peers. Similarly, Barriga, Morrison, Liau, and Gibbs (2001) found significantly higher values on the moral self-relevance test for women. On the other hand, Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, and Alisat (2003) report that the slight differences favoring women in a sample of adolescents committed to community work were not significant. Oliner and Oliner (1988) found no gender differences among rescuers or among participants in the control groups on scales measuring social responsibility, social commitment, and community helping. This agrees with Geras (1995), who from a detailed review of existing literature on rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe concluded that sex was not a good predictor of this type of altruistic behavior.
In Part 2 we first examine whether there are gender differences in moral motivation. In a second step we explore one possible explanation if such differences exist: the influence of cultural ideology as crystalized in collectively shared gender stereotypes. This factor has been largely neglected in the debate on moral gender differences. Narvaez, Gest, Rest, and Thoma (1999), however, have shown that cultural ideology figures as an independent factor in explaining moral views inasmuch as members are influenced by the value interpretations prevalent in their groups. We borrow on this argument in expecting that cultural ideology, in our case gender stereotypes, could have an impact on moral motivation, since moral motivation entails weighing moral against nonmoral values.
Gender stereotypes can be seen to reflect as well as to legitimize the institutionalized division of labor between the sexes (Eagly & Steffen, 1984; Hoffman & Hurst, 1990). Today, men are still held responsible mainly for breadwinning, women for family care. Men's tasks are more likely to collide with moral imperatives, since (even ruthless) assertiveness is considered essential for succeeding in competitive markets and in hierarchically structured organizations. Indeed, there is concurring evidence of an implicit hierarchy gender stereotype--in other words, men prefer inequality in status and power and are motivated to lead in hierarchical organizations (Eagly, Karau, Minor, & Johnson, 1994; Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997; Schmid-Mast, 2004)--whereas women are more egalitarian in their orientation and in line with their caretaking responsibilities are more affectionate and sensitive to the needs of others (Eagly, Wood, & Diekman, 2000).
Although gender stereotypes are already acquired in childhood (Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978; Williams & Best, 1982) they might exert a special impact in adolescence. During this phase young people in modern societies have to define their identity in terms of roles, life goals, or values that they want to pursue (Erikson, 1950). In this situation boys and girls face different role expectations, which are conveyed in gender-specific stereotypes. To the extent that adolescents identify with cultural definitions of what it means to be a male or a female, the compatibility of these expectations with morality might affect the importance they give to moral values.
To briefly sum up, in the research to be presented we seek to test the assumption that gender stereotypes may have an effect on the strength of moral motivation to the extent that adolescents identify with their own gender. The findings will be presented in two parts. In the first part we describe and validate a new measurement of moral motivation; in the second part we focus on gender stereotyping and gender identification and their relations to moral motivation.
Method
Participants
Two hundred three German students (96 girls and 107 boys) participated in this study. They averaged 15.9 years of age (SD = 0.65, between 14 and 18 years of age). About half of the sample was recruited from schools of the higher educational track (Gymnasium), the other half from schools of the lower educational track (Haupt-/Sekundarschule).
Procedures
Data were gathered in the...
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