...Sources Soviet Conduct," which offered what would soon become the basis for U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The policy offered was that containment, which would remain fundamental for the duration of the Cold War. The author of that now famous memo, George Kennan, opposed what he deemed at that time to be a continuing American appeasement of the Soviets. Kennan's prescription was one of firm opposition to further expansion of communist power, through collective, flexible and adjustable strategies of containment. As he reflected,

The political personality of Soviet power as we know it today is the product of ideology and circumstances: ideology inherited by the present Soviet leaders from the movement in which they had their political origin, and circumstances of the power which they now have exercised for nearly three decades in Russia. There can be few tasks of psychological analysis more difficult than to try to trace the interaction of these two forces and the relative role of each in the determination of official Soviet conduct. Yet the attempt must be made if that conduct is to be understood and effectively countered. (2)

The puzzle of international affairs was not necessarily unique to American-Soviet relations, and certainly, Kennan's strategic prescriptions for solving those puzzles were not all that novel. One only has to go back to the works of the fabled Sun Tzu 2,500 years ago to identify the right path:

Therefore I say: Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril. Such people are "mad bandits." What can they expect if not defeat? (3)

What was unique and noteworthy about Kennan's "long telegram" was how he tailored this age-old treatment to address the chronic struggle between conflict and cooperation that the United States was facing at the time, a struggle that held the quality of life--if not life itself--of the country in its balance. His characterization of the problem of Soviet conduct, the sources of that conduct and the potential countermeasures the United States could take against it presented a possible remedy to this conflict. Kennan's triage and recommended treatment remain a textbook example of grand strategymaking, what I would describe as the development of a nation's comprehensive plan of action that coordinates and directs all political, economic and military means and their associated factors in order to attain large ends.

What Kennan's "long telegram" gave us was nothing less than (a) a psychological assessment of the adversary--the Soviet--and (b) an overarching blueprint to guide future U.S. interaction with that adversary. The strategy of containment offered U.S. policymakers and strategists the seed-corn they needed from which to grow a crop of strategies of containment--harvests slightly different year-to-year and era-to-era but nonetheless offering a consistent nourishment of the body politic.

Each strategy reflected the particular realities of the time period and demonstrated a "process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources." (4) It also sought to answer the three questions Kennan deemed essential to understanding and countering the Soviet:

1. Why do the Soviets behave the way they do?

2. What will the future of Soviet behavior likely turn out to be?

3. How should the United States respond?

Devised at the dawn of the Cold War, these questions were built upon both empirical facts about the nature of the Soviet as well as upon assumptions made regarding future potential trends and tendencies in Soviet behavior. To Kennan's first question, empirical and historically-validated evidence allowed us to identify the logic behind Soviet behavior. With regard to the second question on Soviet behavior and potential threat, Kennan's analysis largely rested on the assumption that "the wellsprings of Soviet behavior were unlikely to change." (5) That being the assumption, it was to follow that in determining the likely actions of the Soviet in the future, one should respond accordingly: "The main thing is that there should always be pressure, unceasing constant pressure, toward the desired goal." This logic, combined with this assumption of future Soviet intentions, led Kennan to prescribe the following approach for future U.S. action: "In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." (6)

THIS LONG WAR CALLS FOR A LONG TELEGRAM OF ITS OWN

Others have looked to Kennan's "Sources of Soviet Conduct" as a potential guide to future puzzles of international security affairs. One such effort was put forward in a speech by Robert Hutchings, then chairman of the National Intelligence Council, on 19 March 2004, at the University of Virginia. His talk, entitled "The Sources of Terrorist Conduct," used Kennan's prescriptions as a framework for examining parallels between the Cold War-Soviet threat and the threats at the center of the current War on Terror as a means to better understand the conundrum of global terrorism. (7) Based on the differences in threat posed by the Soviet--a state-based threat that adhered to the traditional rule-set of state-based sovereignty--and the asymmetrical threat of new terrorism, Hutchings concluded that the Kennan model of containment was not likely to prove as adequate today, which is also an attitude espoused by the current U.S. administration. Yet Hutchings and others have also noted that Kennan's approach to dealing with the Soviet challenge in 1947 may offer a key lesson for arriving at an effective solution to the challenges of our own times by highlighting the importance of focusing on the root causes of grievance. (8) As Hutchings put it, "Indeed, what does apply from Kennan's strategic thought is precisely the imperative to go beyond manifestations of a problem and get at its sources, to go from consequences to causes." (9) Focusing on the sources of grievance, such as real and perceived relative deprivation, does not justify threatening behavior, but it does add a vitally important appreciation for and understanding of what motivates it, which is instrumental in formulating solutions. The same may hold true in the case of Iran--rediscovering containment could offer a...

NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.



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