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Article Excerpt
This paper explores the nexus between epistemic culture and academic conceptions of the generic skill of critical thinking. Although generic skills are seen as being of great importance in higher education, there has been little examination into the ways in which the knowledge culture of each specific discipline influences the academic staff's conception of generic skills. This paper investigates the ways in which critical thinking is understood by academic staff in two related but distinct disciplines, history and economics. It finds that while there are some similarities, critical thinking in economics is defined primarily as the use of economic tools whereas critical thinking in history is described from a range of perspectives. Thus the epistemic culture of the discipline appears to influence conceptions of critical thinking. This has implications for the ways in which generic skills are framed within the broader university community and indeed has implications for policy at both the university and the political level.
Introduction
This paper examines the ways in which the disciplinary cultures of economics and history shape the understanding of one generic skill, critical thinking. It is a discussion of data gathered as part of a larger study on generic skills across five disciplines. The central aim of this paper is to explore the ways in which contrasting epistemic cultures shape the teaching and learning of critical thinking. It considers a central and contemporary idea in higher education, the notion of generic skills, with a view to examining the ways in which they operate in a disciplinary context.
That generic skills have become of increasing importance in a changing educational environment is clear (Assiter, 1995; Barnett, 1990; Bligh, 1990; Clanchy & Ballard, 1995; Scott, 1995); however, the nature of generic skills is unclear, as is the relationship between generic skills and the disciplinary context in which the skills are learnt. There is an implicit assumption that generic skills are independent of disciplinary contexts even though they are taught within them. This leads to a more overt expectation that generic skills will be transferable between disciplines and beyond the university into the workforce.
This paper argues that there is a need to explore how one skill, critical thinking, is defined or conceptualised by teaching staff in higher education and to explore the ways in which that conceptualisation is shaped by the epistemic culture of academic disciplines. Through examining the two related but distinct disciplinary cultures of economics and history, this paper argues that the knowledge cultures of these disciplines have a profound impact on notions of critical thinking. Further, it suggests that although critical thinking is valued across the disciplines, what constitutes this skill is shaped by the epistemic culture.
The skills landscape
Although generic skills are of great importance in higher education, there is a lack of clarity as to their characteristics. Changes in the relationship between higher education and employers reflect the considerable interest at political and educational levels in the skills which graduates take into the workforce (AC Nielsen Research Services, 1998, 2000; Association of Graduate Recruiters, 1995; Australian Council for Educational Research, 2001; Conference Board of Canada, 2000; Dearing, 1997; Gibbs, 1994; Secretary's Commission on Achieving Necessary Skills, 2000; Stanton, 1995). Generic skills are seen as meeting the needs of employers because they are thought to be flexible, transferable and applicable to a rapidly-changing and increasingly service-focused market requiring skills such as critical thinking, problem solving and communication (Bennett, Dunne, & Carre, 1999; Candy, Crebert, & O'Leary, 1994; Drummond, Nixon, & Wiltshire, 1998). The idea of generic skills, however, is based upon the assumption that there exists a set of skills which can be learned in the context of disciplinary knowledge and yet function independently of that knowledge.
It is arguable that universities have always been concerned to foster generic skills and that what has changed is that universities are now making these skills explicit (Bowden, Hart, King, Trigwell, & Watts, 2000). While generic skills are clearly central to university education there is uncertainty as to precisely which skills can be identified as generic and even more uncertainty as to how to define those skills (Bennett et al., 1999; Marginson, 1993). Furthermore, there is confusion between notions of generic and transferable skills. Because these terms are frequently used interchangeably there is an assumption that generic skills can be transferred between disciplines or from a university setting to the workplace; however, the evidence for this transferability seems limited (Bennett et al., 1999; Golding, Marginson, & Pascoe, 1996; Marginson, 1993; Perkins & Salomon, 1994). This clearly points to the need to consider the relationship between the disciplinary context and generic skills.
At present there is little reported research into any possible relationship between generic skills and the disciplines in which they are situated. Recent projects (Battle, 2004; Bowden et al., 2000) identify the graduate attributes in a number of disciplines at a range of higher education institutions and discuss practical steps toward implementation of such programs. A number of studies have considered ways in which generic skills can be taught in the context of the academic disciplines: accounting, business studies (Boyce, Williams, Kelly, & Yee, 2001; De La Harpe, Radloff, & Wyber, 2000; Humphreys, Greenan, & McIlveen, 1997; Monks, 1995), geography (Brown, 1999; Dyas & Bradley, 1999), multimedia (Oliver & McLoughlin, 2001), social science (Havard, Hughes, & Clarke, 1998), mathematics (Nyman & Berry, 2002) and biological science (Johnson, Herd, & Tisdall, 2002). These studies, however, do not consider the relationship between generic skills and the discipline in question but rather consider a set of externally devised skills which must be imposed upon the discipline.
Critical thinking
One of the widely-emphasised beliefs about a university education is the importance of critical thinking (Fox, 1994; Marton, Hounsell, & Entwistle, 1997; Ramsden, 1992; van der Wal, 1999); however, what critical thinking actually entails is much less clearly defined (Johnson, 1992). Much of the literature defines critical thinking as a set of practical cognitive skills, yet this Pails to acknowledge it as part of the culturally-established structures of meaning that constitute a discipline (Jones, 2004). This definition also fails to acknowledge the role of critical thinking in examining these structures (Barnett, 1997).
Much has been written on the nature of critical thinking. In most of this literature it is understood as a cognitive skill equating to problem solving and logic (Ennis, 1987; Facione, 1996; Halpern, 1996; Kurfiss, 1988; McPeck, 1981; Paul, 1989; Siegel, 1988). Barnett (1997) expands this definition by outlining a three-tiered model of critical thinking in higher education. The first dimension is 'critical thinking' which is a set of cognitive skills usually involving problem solving. The second dimension is 'critical thought' and comprises the interchanges, debates and standards within an intellectual field, embedded within the discipline itself. The third dimension is 'critique' as metacriticism. This has a wider perspective and can operate outside the rules of the discipline itself and has a dimension of interdisciplinarity.
Disciplinary cultures
One of the central ways of understanding epistemic cultures is to consider disciplinary differences. Much of the work on disciplinary differences in higher education can be traced back to Biglan (1973a, 1973b), Lodahl & Gordon (1972) and Kolb (1985).These studies categorised the disciplines as to whether they were hard or soft (that is, the degree to which a paradigm exists within a field on the basis of consensus regarding theory, methodology, techniques and problems) and whether they were pure or applied disciplines. This model, however, may very well be an oversimplification. As Becher (1989; Becher & Trowler, 2001) pointed out, the boundaries between hard and soft, pure and applied cannot be located with much precision. Despite this, Becher concluded that the epistemic nature of a discipline has a profound effect upon the academic culture. This has implications for investigations into generic skills. If the epistemology of a discipline affects the culture of the discipline in terms of scholarship, research and teaching as well as more tacit cultural mores, then it may well also affect the understandings surrounding generic skills.
This paper considers the ways in which the disciplinary culture and its underpinning epistemology affect the teaching and assessment practices in the disciplines. Generic skills are constituted in teaching, assessment and learning. Consequently, it is necessary to explore the ways in which the epistemic culture shapes teaching practice, and then to examine how the generic skills (with a particular focus on critical thinking) fit into that teaching practice and the ways in which this teaching practice is influenced by the disciplinary epistemology.
The differences in teaching and assessment practices are influenced by the knowledge structures in the disciplines. These knowledge structures in turn affect the cognitive purposes. Some disciplines can be understood as linear and hierarchical and, hence, knowledge is built up sequentially. This means that teaching (at least in the undergraduate years) focuses on logical reasoning and the learning of facts or concepts, 'established facts and demonstrable theories, rather than uncertainties and relativities' (Neuman et al., 2002, p. 407)....
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