Publication: FA Journal
Publication Date: 01-JAN-07
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Author: Ott, David E.
Article Excerpt
Editor's Note: This is a reprint of the article "FA Assistance Programs" in the September-October 1976 edition of the Field Artillery Journal. It is one in a series of 14 published by then Major General David E. Ott about the role of Field Artillery in Vietnam. The article discusses US Field Artillery assistance to make South Vietnamese Field Artillerymen more self-sufficient and effective in military operations, part of the "Vietnamization" process to enable US forces to redeploy.
Although the Iraqi Army has no Field Artillery, the Afghan Army will have Soviet-made artillery, and our forces are providing transition training and mentoring to help the Afghans take responsibility for securing and protecting their nation and to allow US forces to redeploy.
General Ott's Introduction to the Series. This monograph illuminates some of the more important activities--with attendant problems, shortcomings and achievements--of the US Army Field Artillery in Vietnam. The wide variations in terrain, supported forces, density of cannons, friendly population and enemy activity that prevailed throughout South Vietnam tend to make every action and every locale singular.
Although based largely upon documents of a historical nature and organized in a generally chronological manner, this study does not purport to provide the precise details of history. Its purpose is to present an objective review of the near past in order to assure current awareness of the lessons we should have learned and to foster the positive consideration of those lessons in the formulation of appropriate operational concepts. My hope is that this monograph will give the reader an insight into the immense complexity of our operations in Vietnam. I believe it cannot help but also reflect the unsurpassed professionalism of the junior officers and NCOs of the Field Artillery and the outstanding morale and esprit de corps of the young citizen-soldiers with whom they served.
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In November 1969, then President Richard M. Nixon officially established the goal of the American effort in the Vietnam conflict: enable the South Vietnamese forces to assume full responsibility for the security of their country. Although "Vietnamization" was a new word, the concept was, in fact, a return to an earlier policy--one that had all but disappeared in the feverish escalation from aid and advice to combat support to active participation.
As early as the summer of 1967, the first tentative steps toward Vietnamization were being taken. Concerned about the effectiveness of the Army of Vietnam (ARVN), Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF) units, General William C. Westmoreland [Commander of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, known as MACV] directed that a conference be held to air views, consider proposals and make recommendations through which assistance could be provided the Vietnamese military in order to mold it into an aggressive and responsible fighting force.
FA Assistance Programs. Senior American commanders met at Pleiku on 12 August 1967, and on the basis of their conclusions, the Commanding General, I Field Force (IFF), Vietnam, directed that the Commanding General, IFF Artillery, "... establish liaison with Vietnamese units and ... isolate problems to be alleviated through US training support."
The IFF Artillery immediately assigned a liaison officer to II Corps (Vietnamese) Artillery to "provide a channel for the request of supporting US artillery for ARVN operations in II CTZ [Corps Tactical Zone]." This officer was recalled when the necessary procedures had been established, and his duties were assumed by the Artillery officer of II Corps Advisory Group. To provide further assistance, an "on-call" liaison officer from the 52nd Artillery Group was designated.
Even as this coordination was being established, a decentralized assistance program was developing. On 28 September 1967, Brigadier General William O. Quirey directed that all field force Artillery battalions establish forward observer (FO) teams specifically to train RF and PF units in the techniques of fire adjustment. Further, battalions were to provide any assistance necessary to help ARVN Artillery units to achieve maximum technical proficiency.
This guidance, however, proved to be too general. Field force battalions provided only sporadic aid in the II Corps area, and effectiveness depended on the willingness of the Vietnamese participants in the program and the ability of the US units to do the job.
Four-Month Study. Meanwhile, the IFF Artillery had initiated a four-month study of ARVN Artillery operations to evaluate the effectiveness of their support. Total assets in II Corps were 103 105-mm howitzers and 42 155-mm howitzers. Of these, six 155-mm and 15 105-mm tubes were committed to support training centers. Although all school support weapons had the secondary mission of local area support, their primary function of school support prevented their effective utilization in support of operations. In addition 18 105-mm pieces were positioned in platoons at Special Forces and Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) camps.
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The remaining guns--55 105-mm and 30 155-mm pieces--had primary responsibility for supporting ARVN, RF and PF maneuver elements. Because this artillery also had to provide fire support for road security and the various political headquarters throughout II Corps, platoon and split-battery configurations were the prevalent formations. The size of II CTZ, some 30,000 square miles, and the magnitude of the mission proved the artillery incapable of providing even marginal fire support to maneuver forces during offensive operations.
The study examined 10 long-term operations and 72 short-term operations. Long-term operations were defined as those performed within the framework of the normal mission of the maneuver force and short-term operations as those in response to specific and immediate needs, such as those based on special intelligence. Findings showed that Artillery supported slightly less than half of the short-term operations. Of those operations listed as being supported by Artillery, each maneuver battalion was shown to have received Artillery support which averaged slightly more than...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.
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