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Article Excerpt
INTRODUCTION
I. REPUGNANCY AND CORPORATIONS A. Corporations and Bylaws B. Limits on Bylaws C. Constitutional Limits on Corporate Bylaws II. REPUGNANCY, COLONIAL LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION A. The Colonial Constitution and Repugnancy B. American Constitutions and Repugnancy C. The United States Constitution and Repugnancy III. THE PRACTICE OF REPUGNANCY CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
This Article traces a new historical account of the origins of judicial review. It argues that judicial review arose from a longstanding English corporate practice under which a corporation's ordinances were reviewed for repugnancy to the laws of England. This English corporation law subsequently became a transatlantic constitution binding American colonial law by a similar standard of not being repugnant to the laws of England. After the Revolution, this practice of bounded legislation slid inexorably into a constitutional practice, as "the Constitution" replaced "the laws of England." With the Constitution understood to embody the supreme authority of the people, the judiciary would void ordinary legislation repugnant to this supreme law. Over a century later, this practice gained a new name: judicial review. The widespread acceptance of this name eventually obscured the degree to which the origins of the practice lay in older practices regarding the delegated nature of corporate and colonial authorities, rather than in a new constitutional theory of judicial power.
Only on rare occasions do we now think now about judicial review in terms of repugnancy. The word mainly appears in quotations of older court opinions. In 2005, Justice John Paul Stevens declared that "[b]ecause the statute itself is not repugnant to the Constitution ..., the Court does not have the constitutional authority to invalidate it." (1) A recent opinion piece in the New York Times on judicial activism described judicial review as "an act 'of great delicacy, and only to be performed where the repugnancy is clear.'" (2)
Despite the contemporary infrequency of the word, what we think of as "judicial review" was once routinely described in terms of repugnancy. Kent's Commentaries used the heading "Laws repugnant to the constitution void" to discuss judicial review. (3) In 1889, almost a century of cases involving judicial review appeared in the U.S. Reports under the caption "Cases in Which Statutes or Ordinances Have Been Held To Be Repugnant to the Constitution or Laws of the United States." (4) Before judicial review had a name, the practice was understood in terms of review under a repugnancy standard. (5)
Explanations of the origins of judicial review have not paid much attention to the word or to the idea of repugnancy. (6) In fundamental law accounts, judicial review is legitimized by English constitutional and common law, often Dr. Bonham's Case in particular, and codified as constitutional doctrine in Marbury v. Madison. (7) In structuralist accounts, judicial review reflects the unique structures of American politics--for example, the invention of a written constitution, responses to federalism, belief in the people's or popular sovereignty, concerns about state legislative power, ideas about the separation of powers, distinctions of law and politics, the aspirations of an independent national judiciary, or even the post-Civil War power of the federal government. (8)
Even when the word has been noticed, its genealogy has been of little interest. In a 2004 essay, Noah Feldman remarked on the fact that "repugnant" appears in both Dr. Bonham's Case and Marbury. (9) He commented, "I hope you will accept on faith, without demonstration, that the word 'repugnant' is a relatively rare word in legal discourse." "Repugnant," however, was not always a rare word in legal discourse. The history of its recurrence in both cases provides the crucial clue to the origins of judicial review.
This history resolves three central concerns in the scholarship surrounding the origins of judicial review. These three issues can be phrased as whether the Framing generation intended judicial review to be part of the constitutional scheme; why the Framing generation presumed that judicial review was to exist; and how the Framing generation thought judicial review should be practiced.
Whether or not the Framers intended judicial review has been a longstanding debate. In the mid-nineteenth century, lawyers and historians began to investigate the precedents for judicial review. Since then the debate has been endless. William Crosskey famously argued that the Framers never intended judicial review. (11) In the last few decades, although opinion has run in favor of some intent for judicial review, scholars have disagreed over the clarity of such intent. Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo have argued for a clear intent to authorize judicial review, (12) while Larry Kramer has suggested that the practice of judicial review was confused and contested. (13)
This Article adopts a different stance by abandoning an intent-focused inquiry. Judicial review was neither created anew nor caught in a mist of confusion. Supporting scholarship by Maeva Marcus, William Treanor, and others who have demonstrated significant post-Revolutionary comfort with the practice of judicial review, (14) this Article demonstrates that judicial review was initially taken for granted and presumed to exist. Many members of the Framing generation presumed that courts would void legislation that was repugnant or contrary to a constitution.
Why judicial review was taken for granted has also remained a matter of controversy. As Marcus has written, the "mystery lies in why and how" the Founding generation "came to think" that the judiciary possessed this power. (15) Fundamentalist accounts of the origins of judicial review attribute the idea to a belief in a fundamental, higher, or natural law that binds ordinary law--an argument that often relies heavily on Dr. Bonham's Case. Yet as Kramer concluded, there is "little evidence" to support the idea that Dr. Bonham's Case was important to American judicial review. (16) He dismissed alternative colonial precedents, however: "[I]t is misleading to describe these antecedent [colonial and imperial] practices as a nascent or immature form of constitutional review...." (17) Others have shared this belief that colonial American practices are largely irrelevant because they were not "constitutional"--i.e., based on a written constitution. (18)
This Article argues that the colonial American practice of bounded legislation under a repugnancy standard is causally responsible for the existence of American judicial review. This claim expands on suggestions made most recently by Barbara Black and Philip Hamburger about corporate practices (19) and bolsters contentions long found in the scholarship of the British empire about a possible link between imperial review practices and judicial review. (20) The Founding generation presumed a practice of constitutional judicial review as an outgrowth of the experience of constraining corporate and colonial legislation by the laws of the nation. Continuity in the practice of constitutionally constraining legislation resulted in discontinuity in the relationship of legislature and judiciary.
This claim is about past practices, not precedents. Conceptualized as an intellectual precedent, post-Revolutionary judicial review was not the same as colonial and corporate repugnancy review; understood as a practice, it was. Modern constitutional scholars have defined the search for the origins as a search for prior examples of coordinate review because they are most troubled by Supreme Court review of congressional acts--that is, by one branch of government reviewing the acts of another coordinate branch. Such an inquiry asks a question about judicial review based on a belief that the emerging strict theory of separation of powers consistently motivated the decisions of the Framing generation. (21)
Experience, however, rather than logic, explains the history of judicial review. Coordinate judicial review was presumed because of an earlier practice that most frequently involved hierarchical authorities. The new conception of separation of powers was a theoretical critique--and, of course, there were a few who voiced it. Yet interestingly the practice of constraining legislation by a constitutional repugnancy standard was so well accepted that it initially blunted this potential concern. Over the nineteenth century this critique developed strength, until it became hard to think about judicial review in any other way. Nonetheless, the emergence of the critique should not obscure the causal explanation for the practice. Judicial review initially had no name because it was not an intellectual invention.
The shift in focus from a genealogy of judicial power to a history of constrained legislation implicitly emphasizes the importance of understandings of delegated authority in the development of judicial review. This delegation theme places the story of early American judicial review in closer alignment with the accounts of the development of judicial review in other postcolonial nations. (22) Throughout the British Empire, the practice of constraining colonial legislatures under a standard of repugnancy arose from "the constitutional relationship between the Imperial Parliament and the subordinate colonial legislatures." (23) The origins of judicial review in Canada and Australia have been thought to lie in this same imperial practice of a repugnancy standard. (24) The longer duration of the imperial relationship in these countries produced different patterns in the practice of judicial review. (25)
This question of how judicial review should be practiced motivates many investigations of its origins. (26) This Article claims that because judicial review was a shifting cultural practice, not a new intellectual doctrine, the how question cannot be as convincingly answered based on the early history as the whether and why questions. (27) Many authors have pointed to the fact that the Framing generation thought about the practice of judicial review differently than we do today. (28) The corporate, colonial, and constitutional repugnancy practice suggests new boundaries with respect to what history can tell us about how the modern practice of judicial review should operate.
This account diminishes support for certain modern claims about the scope of review. The practice presumed by the Founders emphasized the bounded nature of legislation limited by the laws of the nation. This history casts doubt on arguments that general "natural law" was regularly accepted as a legitimate basis for review. (29) There are strains of English and American legal thought that relate to a tradition regarding laws of nature (although the degree to which this idea is identical to current "natural law" ideology might be questioned); however, these strains were not perceived as the dominant constraints on legislation. The laws of the realm, the laws of the nation, and the Constitution--not free-floating natural law--limited ordinary legislation. (30)
This history helps to explain the pattern of post-constitutional judicial review practice. (31) Courts embraced vertical review (federal review of state courts) relatively early because of its similarity to earlier hierarchical review. (32) State courts practiced judicial review of state legislation in states that viewed their constitution, not their legislature, as the supreme authority. (33) Although horizontal federal review was assumed and initially practiced, (34) the implications of such review were not well contemplated. The reasons for the absence of the practice in the nineteenth century deserve more attention. The growing strength of the rhetorics of separation of powers and popular sovereignty, the changing views of the legitimacy of the Constitution as the will of the people, the dominance of admiralty issues on the early Supreme Court docket, and the ways in which litigation and disputes over congressional legislation were framed may have contributed to the apparent disappearance of the issue for decades.
Equally importantly, this account suggests that other modern concerns about judicial review may be hard to resolve by looking to the history of the Founding era. The dominance of the "repugnancy" rubric helps to explain why early judicial review did not articulate a precise standard for review or define the appropriate level of scrutiny. While the commitment to avoiding repugnancies was clearly articulated, the conception of what represented a repugnancy was not. The simultaneous ambiguity and certainty of the phrase "repugnant to the Constitution" meant that judges did not initially have to confront whether they were engaged in what we would call narrow or broad constructions of the Constitution. Early cases may--or may not--support both expansive and restrictive approaches to review. (35)
Similarly, because judicial review arose out of a prior practice rather than an idea about separation of powers, there may not have been a coherent or accepted understanding of whether the judiciary alone was the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution--the modern issues of judicial supremacy and departmentalism. (36) The practice of repugnancy made it easy to assume that the judiciary would have such power but said far less with respect to other conceivable constitutional arbiters. The belief in a constitutionally constrained legislative power coexisted with an aspiration to separation of powers. After the ratification of the Constitution, as separation of powers became increasingly accepted as the highest constitutional principle, these questions came into focus. While the Founding history can provide a guide to some concerns about judicial review, others we must wrestle with unaided.
I. REPUGNANCY AND CORPORATIONS
This history of judicial review begins with "repugnancy." Repugnant was a relatively common word in early English law. It appeared in the thirteenth century in Bracton, (37) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the Year Books, (38) and in the sixteenth century in the works of Edward Coke. (39) The usage of the word did not carry the modern connotation of unpleasantness or repulsiveness. "Repugnant" meant "inconsistent" or "self-contradictory." It often appeared in conjunction or was used interchangeably with "contrary." (40) Lord Ellesmere thus noted, "If the words of a statute be contraryant or repugnant, what is there then to be said?" (41) "Repugnant" frequently described a problematic relationship between texts, for example, provisions in statutes, grants, deeds, wills, writs, counts, and judgments. Francis Bacon discussed situations in which there was a "direct contrariety and repugnancy" between two statutes. (42) "Repugnant" or "contrary" also came to designate the boundaries of proper hierarchical relationship between bodies of law. (43) Under Henry VIII, this hierarchical use of "repugnancy" became increasingly prevalent and came to regulate the relationship between English law and ecclesiastical law, (44) as well as English law and Welsh law. (45)
"Repugnancy" also appeared in the law of corporations. Corporate treatises declared that corporate bylaws could not be repugnant to the laws of the nation. In 1659, the first English treatise on corporations discussed "What Ordinances a Corporation may make." (46) Ordinances were not to be "repugnant to the Lawes of the Nation, against the publick and common good of the people within or without the same City." (47) The same rule appeared in later treatises on corporations, with "contrary" at times replacing "repugnant." In 1712, a corporate treatise stated that it was "usual" to include a clause in a corporate charter that bylaws "be not repugnant to the Laws of the Nation nor against the publick and common Good of the People." (48) In 1765, William Blackstone explained that corporations had power to make bylaws "unless contrary to the laws of the land, and then they are void." (49) In 1850, James Grant declared that courts could not uphold any bylaw "which is repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the laws of the land." (50)
A. Corporations and Bylaws
This principle that corporate ordinances or bylaws were bounded by the laws of the nation had a long history arising from understandings of delegated jurisdictions. As late-eighteenth-century commentators noted, a similar rule was found in the Twelve Tables in Roman law. (51) Within English law, under Edward I, such jurisdictions were conceptualized as instances in which the King had delegated liberties. (52) As a matter of history, not all delegated jurisdictions had arisen from actual acts of royal delegation; some had independent origins arising from the Conquest or other ancient practices. Gradually, however, these franchises or privileges came to be understood as "all exercises of the king's rights by private persons." (53) As Bracton explained, in a "delegated jurisdiction," the "ordinances and edicts [must] be in accordance with the law and the approved customs and with the common welfare." (54) Franchises were thus limited by national law, and failure to comply with the standard could bring a quo warranto suit and possible forfeiture of the franchise. (55)
Corporations were a particular type of delegated jurisdiction within the "King's exclusive prerogative." (56) Most corporations arose when the Crown granted franchises, liberties, rights, powers, privileges, immunities, or property to a group by letters patent. A corporation thus held delegated authority as a body politic. (57) The specific meaning of "corporation" developed over centuries. The use of the term "corporate" in English law as referring to what we would today call a corporate entity appeared by 1410 in the Year Books. (58) Formal legal discussions of the capacities of the corporation, however, belonged to the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries when incorporations increased. (59) In 1573, Robert Brooke's published abridgment summarized cases under the heading "corporations & capacities." (60) A decade later, A Discourse of Corporations listed the types: municipal corporations (cities, boroughs, and towns), ecclesiastical bodies, universities and colleges, guilds and fraternities, and livery and trading companies. (61) In 1628, Edward Coke's Institutes discussed the legal modes of establishment: royal letters patent, act of Parliament, or prescription. (62) In 1659, this legal exploration culminated in William Shepheard's entire treatise on the corporation, a "Body Politick that indureth in perpetuall sucession." (63)
The authority to issue bylaws was understood as one of the five legal incidents of the corporation. (64) The precise origins of bylaw authority are somewhat unclear. The roots likely lay in Roman law and early English law. (65) Martin Weinbaum concluded that in the 1300s, "the privilege of issuing bylaws ... as an explicit point of a charter ... remained to be secured for the mass of boroughs." (66) By the sixteenth century, however, corporations and bylaw authority were synonymous. The corporation was the "unitinge of a Societie ... into one bodie by the Prince or Soueraigne, havinge aucthoritie to make lawes and ordinances." (67)
B. Limits on Bylaws
The bylaw authority of boroughs and town corporations appears to have been constrained by national law and the royal prerogative from a relatively early period. Weinbaum described a charter in 1263 in which powers were given to make ordinances and agreements, along with "a clause 'saving our prerogative."' (68) Frederic William Maitland discussed a dispute over a London ordinance in the reign of Edward II prohibiting retail fish sales on the wharf in which the King's counsel argued that "it is not lawful" for an ordinance to be made "without consulting the king." (69) In the fourteenth century, Richard II's charter to London authorized the city to alter its customs by ordinance if "such ordinance shall be profitable to us and our people and consonant with good faith and reason." (70) William Holdsworth declared that even early bylaws "were always liable to be called in question before the king's courts." (71) The bylaw authority of the corporation of London was particularly controversial because London long claimed that it arose in part from immemorial custom rather than newly delegated authority from the Crown. (72)
Incorporated guilds and livery companies, which took their name from the particular livery their members were authorized to wear, also held constrained bylaw authority. By the fifteenth century, twelve great London livery companies held letters patent from the Crown: the mercers, grocers, drapers, fishmongers, goldsmiths, skinners, merchant tailors, haberdashers, salters, ironmongers, vintners, and clothworkers. (73) The companies "effectively controlled" London's economy throughout the sixteenth century (74)--by the middle of which, historian Steve Rappaport estimated, "approximately three-quarters of London's men were citizens and members of livery companies." (75) The companies' charters permitted them to govern particular trades. (76) They dominated political power because most important city officials were associated with a company. (77) In addition, they served as a source of significant financial revenues for city and Crown, and they administered charitable trusts, schools, almshouses, churches, and relief for the poor. (78)
Since the early 1400s, these companies were "bodies corporate and politic" with the power to "make good and reasonable bye-laws and ordinances." (79) The ordinances regulated those within and without the company. Companies had the power to pass their own bylaws and were given the power of "search," the ability to enter and search for illegal goods and to fine the offenders. (80) For example, the fishmongers had the "oversight and rejection of fish brought to London." (81) Companies regulated apprenticeship and forbade the disclosure of trade secrets. (82) The company courts also heard many disputes arising under their ordinances. (83) By the sixteenth century, "[n]early one hundred companies and other types of occupational associations regulated virtually all of London's crafts and trades ..., devising and enforcing ordinances which shaped the very nature of men's work." (84)
The bylaws and ordinances of these companies had been subject to constraints since the fourteenth century. In 1388, Richard II ordered the Mayor of London to require the guilds and fraternities to deliver copies of their rules and ordinances or else lose their charters. (85) The returns revealed awareness of bylaw constraints. The Gild of St. Christopher in Norwich barred ordinances in prejudice of the common law. The Peltiers' Gild stated that ordinances were not to be against the King's right or "his lawe." The Carpenters' Gild stated that ordinances were not to be against the "kyngis right ne the comoun lawe, ne no prejudice don to no maner man." (86)
In 2437, parliamentary legislation placed an enforceable limit on corporate bylaw authority. A petition to Henry VI had complained that guilds, fraternities, and other "companies incorporate" had made "unlawful and unreasonable ordinances" that diminished the King's prerogative and resulted in "common damage to the people." Companies should therefore "make [or] use no ordinance which shall be to the disherison or diminution of the King's franchises, or of other, nor against the common profit of the people." (87) The resulting act limited corporate ordinances and placed greater control in municipal authorities. Company ordinances had to be "first discussed and approved" by the justices of the peace or the governors of cities; if found to be "not lawful or not reasonable," the ordinances were to be "revoked and repealed" under penalty of the corporation's losing its authority under the letters patent and forfeiting a fine of 10 [pounds sterling] per "contrary" ordinance. (88)
For the remainder of the fifteenth century, municipal authorities in London and York reviewed corporate ordinances. In 1439, the London tailors and saddlers had their ordinances reviewed as to "whether they were contrary to the city's liberties or not." (89) In 1462, the court of aldermen told the fishmongers that they could not use their ordinances until they were submitted. (90) In 1487, company officials were not to "make Ordinances unless they are approved and ratified" by the mayor and aldermen. The companies thus "brought in their Book of Ordinances, which, not being approved of, were cancelled, and the leaves on which they were written, torn out." (91) By the late fifteenth century, "at least sixteen crafts had their ordinances enrolled in the city's Letter Book" and approved. (92)
Under Henry VII, Crown control of company ordinances began to supplant municipal control. The Crown enforced limited bylaw authority through declarations in letters patent and review requirements. The Crown gave initial authority to a company through letters patent, a grant delegating privileges and authority (sometimes referred to colloquially as a charter). Early patents might include a reasonableness requirement; (93) later patents began explicitly to limit delegated authority. In 1503, the Merchant Tailors' new letters patent authorized "statutes and ordinances" with the limitation that such laws be "not contrary to the laws and customs of our Realm of England or in prejudice of the Mayor of the city of London." (94)
This limit coincided with an act passed in 1504 constraining corporations. (95) Francis Bacon would later note that the desire was "to restrain the by-laws or ordinances of corporations, which many times were against the prerogative of the King, the common law of the realm, and the liberty of the subject, being fraternities in evil." (96) Guilds and fraternities could not make acts or ordinances "in disheritance or diminution of the prerogative of the King, nor of others, nor against the common profit of the people." (97) Ordinances were to be approved by the Chancellor, Treasurer, and Chief Justices or the justices of the assize. (98)
This review by Crown judicial officers was taken seriously. The Fishmongers' 1509 ordinances recited the Act, explained that the ordinances had been presented and subsequently reformed, and included the final certificate from Crown officers. (99) Even minor companies had their ordinances approved. (100) By the 1520s, London corporations were having ordinances "ripely examynd and perused and diligently correctid." (101) In 1529, the Goldsmiths' Company stated that its ordinances were "approved and confirmed by the lord chancellor, lord treasurer, and two chief justices, according to the laws and constitutions of the realm." (102) Review continued into the seventeenth century. The Chancellor and Chief Justices approved the Musicians' ordinances in 1606 and the Merchant Tailors' ordinances in 1613. (103) The Haberdashers' 1675 ordinances were signed by the Lord Chancellor Finch, Chief Justice of King's Bench Matthew Hale, and Chief Justice of Common Pleas Sir Francis North. (104) As late as 2712, a corporate treatise began the chapter on "the Nature and Doctrine of By-Laws" with a discussion of the 1504 Act and its review requirement. (105)
The constrained nature of corporate bylaws also arose sporadically in the context of ordinary litigation. Until the late sixteenth century, cases involving corporations arose in Star Chamber, which had "special oversight over the trades and other companies." (106) A 2507 complaint about price fixing under the Founders Fellowship's ordinance noted the 1504 Act that limited "statutes or actes." (107) A 2526 case involved the Artificers' claim that their "good and reasonable ordinances" had been confirmed by the Crown, yet the Mayor and Aldermen of Newcastle had barred them from free buying and selling. (108) The Chancellor sitting in Exchequer also may have heard such cases. In 1508, a case explained that the Founders had "made an Acte contrary to the P'lement" and hoped that the Chancellor would correct "ouer Acts and Rules" so that "the Crafte myte be harmless agenst the Kyng our Soveryng Lord." (109)
The language used to describe this limit slowly changed during the sixteenth century in favor of a consistent limit framed in terms of "repugnancy" to national laws. Similar to early limits described above, statutes approved in 1530 and 1536 regulating apprentices contained language that guilds and fraternities could not make acts or ordinances "in disinheritance or diminution of the prerogative of the King, nor of other, nor against the common profit of the people." (110) The Hospitals for the Poor Act (1597) abandoned such broad language: "rules, statutes, and ordinances" of "bodies politique or corporate" should not be "repugnant or contrary to the laws and statutes of this realm." (111)
The principle of constrained bylaw authority under this more precise "repugnancy" standard also appeared in the patents of the new trading corporations and the new charters of the livery companies. The 1505 charter of the Merchant Adventurers of Calais had limited the company's lawmaking power by the requirement that an "Act or Statute" that was "contrary" to the "Crowne, Honor, Dignity Royall or Prerogative or to the deminution of the Commonweale of our Realme" was "of no force or effect." (112) The 1564 charter of the Merchant Adventurers stated the limit as "not hurtful to any [of] the Rights of the Crowne, honour, dignity, Royall ... prerogative or the [diminution] of the Common Weale of this our Realme or contrary to any [of] our Lawes & Statutes." (113) By 1579, the charter of the Eastland Merchants provided that the governor could make such "good statutes lawes constitutcyons and ordinaunces for the good government and rule" of the fellowship as was thought "mete and convenyente" as long as they were "not repugnante or derogatorie to the lawes and statutes of this Realme of Englande" or contrary to any treaty. (114) The 1600 Levant Company charter required that "the said laws ... be reasonable and not contrary or repugnant." (115) The 1607 charter of the Drapers' Company similarly stated that "laws, statutes, ordinances, constitutions, imprisonments, fines, and amerciaments shall be reasonable, and shall not be contrary or repugnant to the laws, statutes, customs, or rights of our kingdom of England." (116) A contemporary publication of the Worshipful Company of Shipwrights included the Company's 1612 charter, which contained a repugnancy clause; the Company's acts and ordinances; and the confirmation by Thomas Ellesmere, Thomas Fleming, and Edward Coke that the ordinances had been reviewed and were lawful. (117) Repugnancy to the laws of the realm, the kingdom, eventually the nation, had become the standard.
C. Constitutional Limits on Corporate Bylaws
At the end of the sixteenth century, the common law courts began an extensive discussion of the limits on corporate bylaw authority. (118) At least six reported cases can be found addressing the issue: The Chamberlain of London's Case (1590); Doggerell v. Pokes (1595); Bab v. Clerk (1595); Wilford v. Masham (1595); Clark's Case (1596); and Davenant v. Hurdis (1599). (119) These cases were followed by others, including Dr. Bonham's Case (1608). (120) A clear principle arose from the cases: corporate bylaws could not be repugnant to the "Lawes of the Nation." (121) Although the principle was not explicitly labeled as constitutional, in substance it appeared to be. The granting authority could not authorize a bylaw or charter provision in violation of the limits. (122)
In 1605, Edward Coke's new volume of Reports included five reports under the heading "Cases of By-Laws and Ordinances." (123) Coke's interest in...
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