|
...This brief essay will make very small effort at correcting that.
My main concern will be how we use 'identity' in the context of identity politics, not how the word surfaces in discussions of metaphysics, about which philosophers have already produced flourishing and interesting literature. In politics, when we say an individual has a certain identity, we mean that he belongs to a certain type relevant to what we commonly call 'identity politics.'
For some years now, in various essays, I have tried to impose some theoretical order on the concept by distinguishing at the outset between the 'subjective' and 'objective' aspects of identity. (1) Your subjective identity is what you conceive yourself to be, whereas your objective identity is how you might be viewed independently of how you see yourself. In other words, your objective identity is who you are in light of certain biological or social facts about you.
Of course, subjective identity and objective identity are often closely related. It is neither routine nor plausible, at least in a political sense, to conceive of yourself as something you manifestly are not. Could I, born of Indian parents, think of myself as an African American? I suppose I could. One can imagine all sorts of things that go beyond reality. But since we are interested in the notion of identity in the realm of identity politics, we would be sensible to put aside self-conceptions that amount to fantasies. (2)
But while the two aspects of identity are closely linked, there can be asymmetry between them. Subjective identity--when it is not mere fantasy--presupposes some proximate objective version of that identity, but not vice versa. For instance, one might be a Jew or an Indian objectively--born to a Jewish mother or to Indian parents--but not identify subjectively as a Jew or an Indian.
It is worth spending time discussing both subjective and objective identities, since they raise very different philosophical issues and ought to be analyzed in very different ways. But before doing so let me quickly register another distinction.
On the question of political identity, one can take either a normative angle or a descriptive one. A normative perspective asks if it is good to have identity or to engage in a politics based on one's cultural, national, racial, or other forms of identity. Much writing about identity politics takes this perspective, with a view to arguing either that identities should not be left out of politics or that infecting politics with identitarian issues is dangerous and wrong.
By contrast, a descriptive treatment of the subject merely tries to analyze what it means to have an identity in the context of identity politics. Of course, a descriptive angle on identity can observe that those who have a certain subjective identity themselves often think that it is a good thing. However, the theorist of identity, in taking a descriptive approach to the subject, does not take a position either way. This distinction between the normative and the descriptive is important. Too often, an author's normative stance drives his description of identity, skewing the analysis in one direction or the other. Rather than taking a normative approach to identity politics, this brief essay merely tries to examine 'identity' descriptively.
Identity, in the subjective sense, can be important to politics. It can influence one's allegiances and the manner in which one pursues them or allows oneself to be mobilized. But not all subjective identities are relevant to politics. For instance, I am a cricket lover--and that I am one is part of my self-conception--but, for me, my love for cricket does not play any role in my politics. So politically central self-conceptions will be our focus. However, not even all of one's political self-conceptions are germane to what I mean by 'identity' for the purposes of this essay. You may conceive of yourself as a Democrat in the United States, for example, but still not have a subjective identity in the relevant sense. After all, not all politics is identity politics. (3)
These examples imply that the way one sees oneself--as this or that social, cultural, or political type--is only a necessary condition of a political identity, not a sufficient one. (4) What other conditions might one add to sufficiently characterize the kind of subjective identity important to identity politics?
One such condition might be: intensely held self-conceptions, for instance, strongly held commitments to being a Muslim, a Quebecois, etc.
But while intensity is usually typical of the subjective element of identity politics, it is not enough to describe identity in terms of intensity alone. A cocaine addict may...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos
have been removed from this article.
More articles from Daedalus
Many masks, many selves.(masquerades), September 22, 2006
The politics of identity.(Viewpoint essay), September 22, 2006
Looking for additional articles?
Search our database of over 3 million articles.
Looking for more in-depth information on this industry?
Search our complete database of Industry & Market reports by text, subject, publication
name or publication date.
About Goliath
Whether you're looking for sales prospects, competitive information, company
analysis or best practices in managing your organization,
Goliath can help you meet your business needs.
Our extensive business information databases empower business
professionals with both the breadth and depth of credible,
authoritative information they need to support their business
goals. Whether it be strategic planning, sales prospecting,
company research or defining management best practices -
Goliath is your leading source for accurate information.
|
