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...operations. concept suggests a new national objective: control of an enemy. Control is a contemporary, efficient, and humane goal. It stands in stark contrast to the traditional and perhaps dogmatic military objectives of annihilating an enemy's army or engaging in costly wars of attrition. (2)
Given the current constrained fiscal environment and limited goals as features of the most likely future conflict scenarios, this article provides a simple conceptual lens through which to plan or analyze coercive operations. Keeping the objective of control in mind, it asserts that the military instrument, and particularly joint aerospace power, is a vital tool for coercing enemy decisionmakers. Then it proposes a simple model that leaders and strategists might consider when planning coercive campaigns. This treatment is not a debate over decisiveness or Service roles and missions.
If one accepts Carl von Clausewitz's idea that war is politics, then political realities must bound the use of force. So, assuming that the United States will be forced into conflicts in coming years, the most likely disputes will be characterized by limited means and ends. Today, the air component--joint and coalition aerospace power--often provides lower-cost and lower-risk coercive action.
Difficult strategic situations require decisionmakers to use limited means to change an adversary's behavior. It is not hyperbole to state that the use of limited military force is deep-seated in contemporary American culture. Embedded reporters in Iraq and the administration's measured response after the 9/11 terrorist attacks provide compelling evidence.
The United States did not rush headlong into battle. Military and civilian leaders alike attempted to limit direct and unintended negative impact on innocents while destroying regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq. The targets were the enemy government's pillars of power, not the populace. Wholesale destruction of civil infrastructure and wanton killing of innocent civilians were avoided through careful planning, adaptive training, and precise execution. U.S.-led coalitions thus toppled two hostile rogue regimes in 2 years; then, in a uniquely American way of leading war, vast amounts of humanitarian support were provided to the people while military operations were engaged against terrorists, enemy combatants, and rogue regime leaders, often simultaneously.
This emphasis on exhaustive analysis, careful planning, and limited force is a result of tradition, American values, alliances, cooperative security responsibilities, globalization, politics, and the complexity of the current strategic environment. Fortunately, technology enables more discriminating combat power for those willing to invest in it. Regardless of technical marvels and superpower status, however, today's enemies seek nothing short of the destruction of the Western way of life--a critical planning factor when comparing will and popular support and considering useful potential strategies against enemies.
Although the stakes are high, Americans prefer limited means to achieve carefully selected objectives. However, a limited war for the United States may be a total war for an adversary. Since contemporary enemies, terrorists, and the states that support them are not constrained by concern for human life and civil rights, strikes against any American interest or ally are possible. Extremists and rogue state supporters encourage attacks against innocents in an age of rapid communication, travel, and proliferation of advanced weapons technology. A fanatical disregard for the safety of their followers or compatriots and a desire to kill innocents make today's terrorists and rogue leaders dangerous and difficult to thwart.
For American leaders and commanders, balancing risk with national interests, international political concerns, media, and other factors is ultimately trumped by the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the real potential for rapid escalation of a regional conflict. Depending on the situation and specific national interests threatened, a tailored application of limited force can contribute to efforts to coerce an adversary while actually reducing the potential for escalation. (3) In sum, a limited conflict can be a high-stakes contest because of the realities of modern global politics, economics, and power--hence the need to orchestrate the instruments of national power.
Instruments of Power Bound
Many senior U.S. Government and military leaders recognize that coercion will be achieved more effectively by coordinating a variety of instruments of national power. Each case is different, but contemporary international confrontations, at least on the Western side, are unfailingly bounded by political restraints, both domestic and coalition. Military strategies must therefore consider a variety of political factors to avoid international condemnation or long-term diplomatic and economic repercussions while recognizing the necessity to protect U.S. vital interests. The bounds of current political...
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More articles from Joint Force Quarterly
A word from the chairman., April 01, 2006 Custer and cognition.(RECALL)(George Armstrong Custer), April 01, 2006
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