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...rhetoric Turkish policymakers is clearly visible and bears considerable influence on foreign policy. In this line of thought, Turkey's reform process paved the way for number of structural changes in the domestic landscape, which also changed foreign policy attitudes toward the Middle East. What has suddenly given formerly inward-looking Turkish politicians this newfound self-assurance that they can influence regional politics? What promise does Turkey hold for the region? Did Turkey's perception of the Middle East change? What will be the priority areas in Turkey's new policy toward the Middle East? Can Turkey really contribute to EU policies of enhancing regional security and stability? Why would the EU care about Turkish positions in the Middle East?
Indeed, Turkey's new ruling elite is confident that their country can play an active peacemaking role in the Middle East. The process that we will focus on in this article is the Europeanization of Turkey's policy toward a number of Middle Eastern problems. We will analyze the emergence of a European Turkey and harmonisation of Turkish and European attitudes in the Middle East. Although Turkey's EU aspirations and progress gained momentum in the past several years, a historical analysis denotes that Turkey has been closer to EU positions on a wide range of issues, contrary to the widespread belief that Ankara follows a pro-U.S. stance in the Middle East. Within the limit and scope of an article, we chose Turkish and European attitudes toward the Palestinian question visa-vis the emerging harmonisation of Turkish and European foreign policy lines in the region. Following the historical analysis, which will focus more on developments in the recent era, we will also discuss Turkey's possible role in enhancing a more active, dynamic, timely and influential EU policy toward the Middle East.
Historical Background
In 1969, Turkey joined the Islamic Conference Organization as an observer and then right-wing Suleyman Demirel government regarded the conference as a political, not religious, meeting, concerned only with the fire at the Aqsa Mosque and the status of Jerusalem. (1) Turkey remained neutral and was able to act as a balance between opposing camps. For example, at the Rabat Conference in 1969, Turkey opposed a resolution that called for all the participants to end diplomatic relations with Israel. (2) The members of the European Community had limited progress in developing a common attitude towards the question until the Hague Summit of 1-2 December 1969. (3) On the eve of the 1967 Six-Day war, European countries were stuck in their domestic considerations. For example, the 1967 war was a turning point for French-Israeli relations, and France adopted its critical position of Israeli policies in international circles. Israel had German support vis-a-vis the French attitude of supporting an Arab, anti-Israeli line in its Middle East policy. Germany's support of Israel was largely due to the change of policy under Konrad Adenauer, who initiated a reparation plan for holocaust victims and their relatives. (4)
The resistance to pursue various positions continued among European countries, despite attempts to adopt a common position. Even during the meeting of the Heads of State in Rome, they acted in different ways. For instance, France condemned Israel and supported the Arabs at the UN; the Netherlands positioned itself in a favourable manner to Israel; Germany proclaimed its "neutrality" but strongly backed Israel; eminent Italian governing families divided into two groups--the Fanfanis (close to the Arabs) and the Saragat (close to Israel); Belgium tried to find recourse in the UN institutions. (5) The European Political Cooperation (EPC) was established during the Hague Summit in 1969 and the Middle East was one of the major interests of this unit. (6) The EPC produced three common policies on the Middle East: the Schumann report in 1971, (7) the Brussels declaration in 1973, (8) and the London declaration in June of 1977. (9)
Turkey, however, pursued balanced policies during the 1973 war. During the crisis, the ambassadors of Syria and Egypt asked for political support from Turkey. The spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that "Turkey does not approve of Arab lands being forcefully occupied by the Israelis and that it feels a lasting peace settlement is contingent upon the satisfaction of the legitimate demands of the Arab nations on this matter." (10) Later, Turkey told the U.S. government that "the military bases in Turkey may not be used to aid Israel during the current war in the Middle East." (11) At that time, the U.S. delegation to NATO blamed Turkey for allowing arms transfers from the Soviet Union to the Arab states. (12) After the war, Turkey again tried to help those countries that had suffered in the war.
Following the 1973 October war, France also tried to lead the European countries and called them to a collective response to the war. Nevertheless, during the Copenhagen Summit of December 1973, they could not agree on a common position. Possible European cooperation on the issue seemed even less promising than what was achieved during the 1967 war. (13) This failure resulted...
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