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Punctuated equilibrium in limbo: the tobacco lobby and U.S. State policymaking from 1990 to 2003.

Publication: Policy Studies Journal
Publication Date: 01-AUG-06
Format: Online
Delivery: Immediate Online Access

Article Excerpt
Introduction

During the 1990s, tobacco use came under increasingly intense political opposition by antitobacco advocates who advocated for increased tobacco taxes and stronger tobacco-use regulations (Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Studlar, 2002). The tobacco industry responded to this heightened...

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...political threat in all 50 states in the United States since the early 1990s by using its influence to politically mobilize and advocate for lower tobacco taxes and weaker tobacco regulations than those proposed by health advocates (Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar).

This article examines whether tobacco policymaking trends in all 50 states from 1990 to 2003 correspond to ideas espoused in the punctuated equilibrium theory at the federal level by Baumgartner and Jones and Worsham (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Worsham, 1998). This theory holds that policy monopolies are stable over long periods and they usually change in response to sharp, short-term exogenous shock to the policy system (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998). Worsham added to punctuated equilibrium theory by noting that competitive coalitions can challenge dominant policy coalitions or monopolies with varying effects on the degree of dominance by the policy monopoly (True & Utter, 2002; Worsham, 1998).

In the case of state tobacco policymaking, coalitions of health groups attempted to shock or punctuate the equilibrium of the tobacco policy system from 1990 to 2003 with their challenge to the state policy monopolies historically exercised by the tobacco industry. Since 1990, the states have been a major venue for tobacco policymaking with legislation proposed in the areas of youth-access legislation, clean indoor air enforcement, and tobacco excise taxes. (Derthick, 2005; Givel & Glantz, 2001a; Morley et al., 2002; Studlar, 2002). This article will determine whether this punctuated shock to the equilibrium of tobacco policy monopolies in the states from 1990 to 2003 was successful or not.

Literature Review

The specific focus of this research on state tobacco policymaking and punctuated equilibrium theory in the 1990s is on the "black box" or legislative policy formulation and enactment in a subsystem (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Easton, 1965; Jones et al., 1998; Sabatier, 1991). Punctuated equilibrium theory was borrowed from a similar theory in evolutionary biology espoused by Gould and Eldredge in 1977 (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). Gould and Eldredge argued, contrary to the predominant theory of evolution that species evolve gradually; species stay the same for long periods of geologic time; and new species can arise suddenly. They also wrote that there are empirical examples of little evolutionary change for long periods of time in the geologic record of some snail populations, followed by sharp and punctuated change, and followed again by gradual change (Gould & Eldredge, 1977). Proponents of the punctuated equilibrium theory in political science have argued by analogy that public policy in the United States usually changes gradually over long periods. However, these incremental changes are interspersed with occasional sharp bursts of policy change, resulting in fundamentally new policies (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Jones et al., 1998).

Policy Monopolies

Adherents of punctuated equilibrium theory also argue that governmental venues such as legislative policy subsystems are often characterized by long periods of policy stability in the political system because of policy monopolies favoring privileged groups like the tobacco industry. At certain points in the policymaking process, rapid policy change occurs and the powerful groups lose their dominance (Baumgartner & Jones, 1991, 1993; Jones et al., 1998; Legro, 2000; Pollock, 1994). During these short and dramatic periods of policy change, prior policies associated with dominant policy monopolies in subsystems are either replaced or substantially reformulated. Baumgartner and Jones (1993) have characterized such policy changes as coming "quickly and dramatically" and in "short periods" (pp. 17, 55). Baumgartner and Jones further clarify the time period involved for "dramatic changes" when they argued that, "At any one time, there may be little change, but periods of stability may be punctuated by fitful bursts of mobilization that change the structure of bias for decades to come" (pp. 10, 101-102).

Sources of influence typically cited by punctuated equilibrium theorists for punctuated legislative policy and issue change include changes in: public opinion, regulations, legislative oversight, market conditions, political activism, and majority ruling coalitions. Punctuated equilibrium theorists also argue that dominant policy monopolies in subsystems often are characterized by a lack of interference by other interest groups and advocates such as health advocates. Policy monopolies in subsystems rebuff the efforts of outside groups to become part of the decision making process. This is done, in part, by deferring to the expertise of existing policy experts and specialists who participate in the policy monopoly (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993). Powerful monopolies in subsystems will use resources such as lobbyists, litigation, and public relations campaigns to ward off sharp policy changes by political outsiders. Worsham refined the punctuated equilibrium theory by noting that subsystem politics can be dominant like iron triangles, transitory where members of the dominant coalition factionalize into differing interests, and competitive where a new coalition with a significantly different agenda can challenge the dominant policy monopoly of a particular group in a subsystem. (Worsham, 1998)

Equilibrium...

NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.



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