Publication: Air Power History
Publication Date: 22-JUN-06
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Author: Plunkett, W. Howard
Article Excerpt
Planning for F-111s at Takhli
On October 2 and 3, 1967, an advance party from the 4481st TFS from Nellis AFB visited the 355th TFW at Takhli to coordinate the arrival of six F-111As under "Combat Lancer." Capt. Malcolm D. Winter, an F-105 pilot from the 354th TFS who also worked as a staff officer at Takhli, had been planning the wing's reception of the F-111A since August. (108) The F-111A fighter-bomber was in operational testing at Nellis and a combat deployment was part of its test program. The planes, with their superior radar and low-level terrain navigation systems, were expected to provide a night, all-weather bombing capability over North Vietnam comparable to the Navy's A-6A and an improvement to the Commando Nail F-105Fs being flown by the 388th TFW at Korat.
Lt. Col. Edwin D. Palmgren, a former F-105B Thunderbird pilot, was the F-111A survey team chief from Nellis. Capt. Al "Mike" Michael, a Wild Weasel EWO, who with his pilot Maj. Jim Mirehouse began flying F-105F Commando Nail missions from Korat in July, recalled, "Jim Mirehouse and I [flew] into Takhli to brief Lt. Col. Palmgren.... We spent some time explaining our tactics, targets, and defenses we had encountered. He indicated that he envisioned a whole new approach to the night, single ship, low level mission. He thanked us, but made it clear that the ball was in his court now." (109) Takhli's wing history recorded a key agreement on their hosting the Air Force's most modern aircraft. "One of the operations items coordinated with this survey team involved the command and control relationship between the 355th TFW and the F-111 detachment after its arrival at Takhli. The F-111 representative expressed a desire for 'autonomous operation with only liaison as required with the 355th TFW'." Operations officers of the 355th TFW and Hq 7th AF agreed with this concept although wing Intelligence officers were to work closely with their counterparts in the F-111A detachment. The F-111s were projected to arrive at Takhli on February 1, 1968, but their arrival would be delayed by six weeks. (110)
The Fourth Commando Nail F-105F Crashes
On October 5, 1967, a Commando Nail crew (using call sign "Splendid") and their aircraft, F-105F (63- 8346), disappeared during a night attack against the Lang Con RR Bridge (JCS target 18.26) in Route Pack 5. The crew was Maj. Morris Larosco McDaniel, Jr. and his EWO Capt. William Allan Lillund. They had arrived at Korat in July with the first set of Wild Weasel crews who had trained at Yokota as replacements for the Ryan's Raider dual-pilot crews. (111)
Repeating the reaction after the second loss on May 15, this third loss to combat resulted once again in restricting F-105F Commando Nail missions to North Vietnam's lower route packs. From their first mission on April 26 to this one, Korat's Commando Nail crews had flown 415 sorties in Route Packs 1, 5, and 6A. (112) Nearly every night until the end of Rolling Thunder, the 44th TFS scheduled two to four F- 105F Commando Nail missions into the southern portion of North Vietnam to interdict the flow of supplies to North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. (113)
A Sky Spot Ground Radar Goes into Northern Laos
With Korat's Commando Nail missions no longer going to the Delta region of North Vietnam, the Air Force again needed another way to reach critical northern targets during the 1967-1968 monsoon season. As described earlier, the existing MSQ-77 Sky Spot radars in South Vietnam and Thailand allowed radar bombing up to 196 nautical miles from the stations, which limited them to targets only as far as Route Pack 3. However, this ground-radar guidance technique was proving to be a means of flying sorties despite bad weather and the Air Force came up with a new location for one of these radar stations that would enable planes to reach targets around Hanoi.
As early as November 1966, the Air Force and the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been working on establishing a Sky Spot radar station on a mountaintop in northern Laos, 12 miles from the North Vietnamese border and 125 miles from Hanoi. In a memorandum dated April 25, 1967, the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, that an MSQ-77-type radar be installed at Lima Site 85 (LS-85), the TACAN Channel 97 site on the 5,800-foot mountain called Pha Thi in Laos. The JCS contended that a Sky Spot radar at LS-85 would provide guidance during bad weather for the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign against targets in North Vietnam. Despite objections from William H. Sullivan, the U.S. Ambassador to Laos, President Lyndon B. Johnson approved the proposal. The Air Force issued a contract to Reeves Instrument Corporation to develop an air-transportable ground radar system designated TSQ-81. (114)
The PACAF briefing to CINCPAC for the period September 18-30 anticipated the benefits of using the Sky Spot radar at LS-85.
Although deteriorating weather will continue to degrade strike efforts for the next several months, operational status of Site 85 in northern Laos will allow strike forces to exert continuous pressure against important targets in NVN as well as targets in the Barrel Roll area. Site 85 is scheduled to be operational on 12 October. The present ECM and strike tactics will permit a sizeable strike force to fly formation in high threat areas during daylight hours. Maximum ECM support will be employed in conjunction with the MSQ missions. Weapons available in support of this effort include all high explosive bombs as well as CBU munitions. Bombing altitudes of 18,000 to 25,000 feet are most suitable for all targets out to 175 miles from Site 85.
The briefing listed eight targets that PACAF considered suitable for bombing using the radar at Site 85. Five of the targets were on the JCS target list. (115) The PACAF briefing concluded, "We feel that the application of air power under MSQ control during the forthcoming period of poor weather will add to the disruptive effects of the air campaign. The appearance of bombs raining through the clouds will certainly have a unique psychological effect, which will present a new problem for the enemy." (116) This comment became bitterly ironic in view of what happened on the first major bombing mission using this radar.
In mid-October, a team of forty-eight men, Air Force technicians but working under cover as employees of Lockheed Aircraft Service Company, arrived at Udorn, Thailand. Crews of nine men at a time shuttled in shifts to LS-85 to operate and maintain the TSQ-81 radar station installed at LS-85. Other technicians supported the Channel 97 TACAN equipment, which had been providing navigation signals for combat missions over North Vietnam since September 24, 1966. The Top Secret program was code-named "Heavy Green" and the TSQ-81-directed bombing missions over North Vietnam were called "Commando Club." (117)
Once the site was up and running, Seventh Air Force in Saigon tasked the 355th TFW at Takhli to fly two weeks of radar-guided bombing missions over North Vietnam to help calibrate the TSQ-81 Sky Spot radar. Col. John C. Giraudo, the wing commander, led the trial missions. The tests began over Laos and progressed to a final mission to bomb the Yen Bai railroad yards northwest of Hanoi. After completing the tests, Col. Giraudo objected to the missions as being too hazardous to his F-105 pilots who couldn't employ the successful ECM jamming pod defenses that the wing had developed. In a personal meeting with the commander of 7th Air Force, General William W. Momyer, Col. Giraudo requested that the 355th TFW be exempt from further Commando Club missions. General Momyer approved Col. Giraudo's request and assigned the first large-scale mission to the 388th TFW at Korat. (118)
First Combat Using Commando Club Radar
On November 1, 1967, the TSQ-81 radar at LS-85 in Laos was ready to support bombing missions over North Vietnam's delta region. Despite Col. Giraudo's request to exempt the 355th TFW from Commando Club missions, the wing did fly them. For example, on November 15th, pilots from the wing's 357th TFS struck the Yen Bai airfield in Route Pack 5 then returned to the same target on November 22 and again on the 1st and 23d of December. The wing history for the period commented on these missions and reported that there was "no BDA possible due to the techniques utilized (Commando Club radar bombing)." (119)
The 388th TFW, however, flew their first Commando Club mission on November 18, 1967. It was the first of seven such missions they flew in November. The mission turned into the disaster that Col. Giraudo had feared. Korat's target was the MiG-airfield at Phuc Yen (JCS Target 6), 14 nautical miles northwest of Hanoi in Route Pack 6A. Using regular daylight bombing attacks, both Korat and Takhli had hit Phuc Yen, the home of MiG-21s and IL-28 bombers, for the first time on October 24 and 25. (120)
The mission on November 18 included the large force typical of those assembled for conventional strikes against major targets in North Vietnam. Since clouds obscured the target, sixteen F-105s from Korat, flying at 18,000 feet, were to bomb the airfield shortly after 8 a.m. using the Commando Club radar. The F-105s carried a total of 27 ALQ-71 ECM pods that, when flown in a specific pod formation, had proven effective in jamming SAM radars. The force also included one flight of Wild Weasels from Korat with call sign "Waco" consisting of three F-105Fs and an F-105D. The Weasels flew 25 miles ahead of the strike force to suppress SAM sites around the airfield. Also protecting the strike force were four F-4Ds from Ubon for MiG CAP, three EC-121s with surveillance radar using call signs "Ethan Alpha" flying off the coast of North Vietnam to warn of MiGs, and five EB-66s for jamming SAM and AAA radar signals. (121) To help conceal the location of the Commando Club radar in Northern Laos, one of the EC-121s acted as a communications relay between the strike force commander and the radar controller at LS-85 who used the call sigma "Wager Control".
Col. Edward Burdett, the 388th TFW commander, led the strike force as "Garage 1". He was on his 37th mission over North Vietnam and flying F-105D 62-4221. En route to the target, he talked on his radio over the UHF strike frequency using the awkward relay to Wager Control about details of setting up the strike formation for the bomb drops. Unfortunately, their lengthy radio discussions blocked three MiG warning calls from Ethan Alpha. Suddenly, two silver-colored MiG-21s swooped down on the Wild Weasels who had failed to hear Ethan Alpha's MiG alerts. The first MiG fired a missile at Waco 4 and the second launched one at Waco 1. Both missiles hit their targets and the MiGs headed north at high speed-a hit and run tactic that was becoming all too successful. (122)
Waco 1 was F-105F 63-8295 with Major Oscar Moise Dardeau, Jr. and EWO Edward William "Tiny" Lehnhoff, Jr. from the 44th TFS. Their plane immediately began shedding parts and trailing black smoke then disappeared into the clouds below. Both men died in the crash. (123)
Waco 4 was luckier. He was Lt. Col. William N. Reed from the 469th TFS (flying F-105D 60-0497) who managed to nurse his crippled plane to Laos. He ejected near the Commando Club radar site at LS-85 where a Jolly Green HH-3 helicopter picked him up. (124)
The strike force continued toward the target but with the loss of the Wild Weasels, became more vulnerable to the SAM sites protecting Phuc Yen airfield. The F-105 pilots were even more vulnerable than they realized. In recent months, the North Vietnamese had developed a track-on-jam tactic for...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.
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