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The unraveling of Christianity in America.

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THE religious scene in America today is a picture of confusion. And it might not be too Platonic to suggest that the soul of the typical individual harbors this confusion as well. Religion has been reduced to an option, and there are just so many of them nowadays.

We can begin with the unprecedented variety of religious life in America today. It reflects the influx of adherents of non-Christian faiths as well as of Christians from non-Western lands. (Among my students in Toronto, the non-Western Christians seem decisively to outnumber those of European descent.) It's said that 200 languages are spoken in New York City today; just think how many new religious sects there must be as well. The practices of these new sectarians tend to be more fervent, traditional, and particularistic than those of most Americans. The more distinctive they are, however, the greater the pressure toward assimilation--not that of the newcomers to the broader society, but of it to them. In order to be ever more inclusive, official pieties must become ever more vapid.

Among the new denominations, Islam poses the greatest worry. Full integration of Muslims into the life of a liberal society presupposes their adoption of a liberal version of Islam. In America, however, as throughout the Sunni Muslim diaspora, much preaching and teaching are in the hands of the least tolerant of Sunni sects, the Wahabbi. We thus face a global terrorist threat while harboring many recent immigrants steeped in the very sect that inspires the fanatical vanguard of that threat. Here is a case of genuine religious diversity, but it is one that no sensible person would celebrate. Only a hardened optimist could predict its smooth resolution.

As for those Americans long established in the country, they too display a bewildering array of divisions and distinctions. American Christianity is the product of three centuries of accumulated sectarian and ethnic diversity as well as strong homogenizing tendencies. It also reflects four evangelical great awakenings and an indeterminate number of cultural revolutions (here the historians differ) culminating in the Great Non-Proletarian Cultural Revolution that began in the 1960s and has not abated since. Where there is a cultural revolution there will commonly be a culture war, a reaction (perhaps even an equal and opposite one) that will gather steam even as does the revolution itself. So we have had one of those as well, which equally proceeds without sign of abating. American religion displays the scars of all these battles.

As the term "culture wars" implies, the struggle is not religious in the usual sense of the term. It is not being waged primarily over questions of religious doctrine, nor are the battle lines primarily sectarian. Different sides of the debate may predominate within different denominations, but none is simply free of it. In fact, these disagreements have encouraged ecumenism, as both traditionalists and progressives in all denominations have reached out to their counterparts in others. Similarly, traditionalist clergy, who may identify their foe as "secular humanism," seek alliances with secularists, some of whom regard themselves as humanists. In the same manner, secular progressives, while brandishing the bogey of the supposed threat of religious tyranny, collaborate with avowed believers who are no less "progressive" than they. So this warfare crosses both sectarian lines and that between religion and secularism.

Nor should we forget that only a minority of religious Americans find themselves at either fringe of the cultural spectrum. The sociologist James Davison Hunter suggests that 20 percent of Americans cluster toward each edge, with 60 percent somewhere in the middle, although reliable statistics are hard to come by. It's true that those defining themselves as strongly religious (whatever their denomination), as well as those who attended church most regularly, were more likely to vote Republican in the 2000 presidential election. Conversely, the less fervent and the less punctual were more likely to vote Democratic. The differences were significant but not so great as to indicate political polarization along these lines. There are plenty of churchgoers who vote Democratic.

The mainline

I have called the antagonists in the current struggle "traditionalists" and "progressives." These are terms wholly bereft of meaning outside their particular contexts, and even after we have filled in all the requisite blanks they will likely prove misleading. For one thing, both parties habitually claim to represent the true traditions of America, from which they accuse their rival of departing. There are progressivist readings of American tradition, as there are traditionalist ones, and since the tradition itself has always included a powerful measure of faith in progress, both readings will always be able to claim a certain plausibility. There is by now a long history of progressivism in American religion, which is why it is the progressive churches that enjoy the designation "mainline."

Since the late nineteenth century and the emergence of the Social Gospel, the typical response of the mainline churches to the challenge of secularism has been to capitulate to it. Every one of these...

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