|
Article Excerpt
Abstract
The argumentative turn in policy theory represents an important critique of the scientific conception of policy making. It showed that uncertainty and contingency characterise policy discourse, and that policy making is argumentative and rhetorical rather than scientific. However, the scope of this recovery of rhetoric is limited because of the classical philosophical division between logic and rhetoric. This division denigrated rhetoric, which is contingent, in comparison to logic, which is demonstrative. These two domains also remain separate in contemporary theories of rhetoric, such as those used in the argumentative turn, preventing us from further incorporating rhetoric within policy theory. But Michel Meyer shows that the division between logic and rhetoric relates to the suppression of questioning in philosophy. By recovering questioning as the principle of reason, he establishes rhetoric upon a foundation of questioning, and thus provides a new way forward.
**********
The interpretative or postpositivist school of policy theory extensively questioned the validity of the scientific conception of policy making. (2) The 'argumentative turn' in policy theory formed an important element of this critique. (3) Scholars in this field pointed out that policy discourse is capable of great flexibility of meaning and that policy processes involve deliberation rather than scientific proof. When we are not able to proceed directly to a solution we must debate the pro and con of the question and seek to convince others to accept our answers. Even the rules of progress can be called into question in politics, so the scientific justification of decisions neither suffices to resolve political questions, nor does it necessarily convince an audience. In short, when reason is contingent rather than necessary, questioning and rhetoric come to the fore. But this presents its own difficulties because of the longstanding philosophical division between logic and rhetoric.
In this paper I consider the argumentative turn in policy theory as a response to the shortcomings of the policy sciences model, and ask whether the division between logic and rhetoric places conceptual limits on policy theory. (4) My aim here is not to establish norms for practical policy inquiry, but to undertake the more preliminary task of considering the scope of the philosophical underpinnings of the argumentative turn. I am to identify its limitations in order to set a new direction that might enhance and extend the argumentative turn. First, I describe the context for the turn to argumentation in policy theory. I cast this as the appearance of a generalised problematicity, or problematisation, of the scientific model of policy making. Then I discuss the classical division of logic and rhetoric and review some major contemporary theories of rhetoric in light of this division. Finally, I conclude by pointing to questioning as an alternative way to conceptualise both rhetoric and reason that addresses the fragmentation of contemporary thought and suggests a new way forward. Throughout, I draw on Michel Meyer's philosophy of questioning, problematology, to critique traditional views on rhetoric and logic.
Theorising problematicity: the 'argumentative turn' in policy theory
The argumentative turn in policy theory diverged from the scientific, rational model of policy making by focusing on language, interpretative epistemology, and plausible reason rather than demonstrative logic. While policy theorists only recently took an interest in argumentation and rhetoric, specialists in rhetoric certainly took notice of Harold Lasswell, the founder of the 'policy sciences' field. (5) Lasswell was interested in persuasion and propaganda, and the rhetorical effects of mass communication in policy making. (6) He understood that rhetoric was important for ancient Greek philosophers, and believed that the opprobrium directed towards it ever since Plato's condemnation of the Sophists represented an obstruction to proper inquiry into it. (7) Despite this attention to language and argumentation, the argumentative turn in policy studies did not arrive for some time. Even today we have not realised the full implications of rhetoric and argumentation for studying policy and politics.
The 'argumentative turn' in policy theory
The argumentative turn is part of the postpositivist scholarship in policy studies which undermined the credibility of the scientific model of policy making. What is the nature of the problematicity introduced by this critique? First, social science has been able to establish neither general laws, nor models of causation predicting the effects of policy measures. (8) If we cannot establish the effects of policy then it becomes necessary for us to argue in favour of our conclusions. (9) Reason becomes all the more argumentative when deliberating about an unknown future action. While science seeks value-free knowledge that establishes the truth by reference to the world of facts, social scientists have rejected the distinction between fact and value. (10) Since values are fluid and affect the nature of the problems themselves (11) they cannot be externalised and a causal model adapted to them, as it is with positivism. (12) Fischer points out that the purpose of reasoning where values are concerned is pragmatic, not absolute, so conflicts of values must be mediated through argumentative dialogue rather than apodictic scientific experiment. (13)
Second, the argumentative turn follows from the scholarly interest in discourse. (14) Policy theorists have examined the role of language in policy discourse, rejecting the idea that meaning is grounded in ontological truth. Political discourse is framed in ordinary language, which is capable of considerable flexibility of meaning. Policy discourse takes on different meaning in different contexts and for different audiences. Because knowledge, in particular policy knowledge, is bound within ordinary language, it is a social process and therefore argumentative. (15) Decisions do not settle the meaning of policy, which remains subject to debate, and consequently the policy process is less than the problem solving ideal proposed by Lasswell (16) and more a struggle to create meaning throughout the policy process and in different locations. (17) Policy actors attempt to persuade others to share the meaning they attribute to events. (18) Political actors employ arguments to bring others around to their position and justify themselves with respect to the public interest. (19) The joint tasks of persuasion and justification thus form the basis of the argumentative turn. (20)
Third, we need argumentation because human beings have agency. We do not necessarily respond in pre-programmed ways to events but can change our mind on the meaning of something, rethink our values, and vary the degree to which we support someone or some policy. This requires persuasion. Political actors routinely use rhetoric to secure the assent of others to their views or their cooperation. Because anyone can question a decision, policy making cannot be foreclosed scientifically. Political problems might be solved using scientific findings, but even agreeing to use scientific evidence is ultimately a matter of consent and therefore also of persuasion.
Fourth, the institutional, political, and cultural constraints within which policy analysts work mean that they cannot make decisions by rigorous scientific processes. Much of the interest in argumentation constitutes an attempt to come to grips with the political context of policy making. Stone highlights the politics of policy, noting that attributing causality to events does not just explain them but also allocates political responsibility. (21) Since policy makers do not hold unilateral power they must resort to argumentation to justify their position, (22) to communicate with others, and to persuade them of the...
|
