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...own physical body from outside, and an experience of travel to a place remote from one's actual physical location. Despite the experience of this phenomenon by a significant proportion of the population (12% in a random British sample studied by Blackmore, 1984a), mainstream psychology has largely overlooked these OBEs. However, at present there are three main psychological theories of OBEs, namely those advanced by Palmer (1978), Blackmore (1984b), and Irwin (1985, 2000).
Palmer (1978) presented a psychological theory of the out-of-body experience (OBE) that centred on the body image of the experient (OBEer). He argued that a reduction of proprioceptive information from the body resulted in changes to the 'body concept', which (in some instances) in turn 'triggered' the OBE. Drawing on Freudian theory, Palmer argued that the person's change in body concept threatened their self-concept or sense of individual identity. As a result of this threat, unconscious processes are activated in an attempt to re-establish the person's sense of individual identity. An example given by Palmer is one of 'deathbed experiences' in which he argued that an OBE is more likely to occur when the experient first has had a prolonged confinement to bed in a weakened condition (which is likely to encourage changes in body image) and (whether he/she accepts it intellectually or not) they have a psychological set of death that involves the separation of the soul from the body. With the re-establishment of the normal body concept the OBE ends. It is important to note that Palmer views changes in the body image as necessary, but not sufficient, for an OBE to occur; it is the Freudian 'primary process' attempt at reintegration that, according to Palmer, in some cases results in an OBE. Within this paper Palmer does not account for why some people appear more prone to having an OBE, apart from referring to 'psychological conditions that predispose one to OBEs' (p. 21), which appears to relate to some general conditions discussed earlier in the paper that surround the occurrence of OBEs ('such as when in sleep, on the verge of sleep, or in a relaxed state' and in a minority of cases 'under conditions of physical or psychological stress', p. 20).
A second psychological theory of OBEs is that provided by Blackmore (1984b), who proposed a cognitive explanation for the occurrence and phenomenology of OBEs. She argued that one of the key functions of the brain is the construction of models of the self within the environment. These may be short-term models (such as those created through perception) or long-term models (such as those formed through memory) and each may influence the other. One of the models that Blackmore (1984b, p. 203) identifies is that of the body image, which she states is the sum of 'somatosensory information, visual, and other sensory input and memory.'
Rather than modelling what is 'really' there, Blackmore (1984b) points out that we 'build' models of reality. Moreover, we are continually engaged in multiple model making processes: a model of the activity we are currently engaged in, a model of a remembered event, a model of an imagined state of affairs, and so on. Central to Blackmore's theory is the proposal that at any given time only one model is taken to represent 'reality'. For most people at most times this 'reality' model will be taken to be that which is most complex, stable, and coherent. This model would usually be that generated in most part through sensory input. However, at times sensory input may be reduced, as in sensory isolation experiments, resulting in impoverished sensory models. This may result in an over reliance on information from memory in order to achieve stability. Therefore, for an OBE to occur, at least two things are needed: the failure of the somatosensory input-controlled model, and the substitution of an imagery-based one built-up from memory. The required incapacitation of the input model leads Blackmore to argue that her theory explains why such experiences as sensory deprivation, relaxation, illness, and certain drugs frequently occasion OBEs.
If OBEs are in part an imaginal experience, then OBErs might be expected to have better visual imagery skills than non-experients. Certainly, Blackmore (1984b) has proposed that this is the case, although the research on this issue provides a mixed picture (Alvarado, 2000). Irwin (1980) found no evidence to suggest that OBErs were any more habitual 'visualizers' or 'imagers' than the normal population. OBErs also scored lower than the norms for that group would predict on a questionnaire assessing vividness of visual imagery. Blackmore (1983a) found no differences between OBErs and non-OBErs on a vividness of imagery scale, and no differences between a second OBE and non-OBE sample on Gordon's (1949) Control of Imagery Questionnaire. She also found no differences between OBErs and non-OBErs when combining the scores of two questionnaire items assessing vividness of visual imagery, and concluded that 'in general vividness of imagery does not seem to be a good predictor of the people who have these [OBE] experiences' (p. 242).
Some supporting evidence for Blackmore's (1984b) thesis is available. Alvarado and Zingrone (1994) did find that vividness of mental imagery was positively correlated with the OBE. Further evidence in support of better imagery skills in OBErs includes Blackmore's (1983a) finding that experients were better able to switch viewpoints in imaginary scenes, although they did not remember scenes any more frequently from above than at eye-level. Cook and Irwin (1983) found that OBErs were better at judging how an object would appear from different perspectives, but found no relationship between having an OBE and performance on the Necker Cube Fluctuation Test of imagery.
A finding by Blackmore (1983b) that OBErs report more hypnagogic imagery than non-experients is sometimes cited as evidence for better imagery
skills in experients. However, the question used to assess this ('Have you ever experienced very vivid and realistic images just before going to sleep?') addresses experiences rather than measuring any specific imagery skill. It also presents problems of interpretation as many people who have an OBE might equate that experience with the one posed in the question. Both Irwin (1986) and Blackmore (1987) have found that people who dream as though they were spectators have more OBEs though there were no differences in the waking use of different viewpoints. Hunt, Gervais, Shearing-Johns, and Travis (1992) found a relationship between the OBE and performance of block design and embedded figures tests. Blackmore (1994) cites the findings of Irwin (1986) and herself (Blackmore, 1987) as generally confirming the predictions from her psychological theory of the OBE (Blackmore, 1984b), although this glosses over the failure of an appreciable number of her own and other studies to find differences in the visual imagery skills of OBErs and non-OBErs.
Blackmore (1984b) herself outlines the similarity between her approach and that of Palmer (1978), insomuch that both posit that OBEs occur as the result of a change in the body concept. Therefore, Palmer and Blackmore would seem to have a shared understanding of what 'body image' actually is, and that this relates to a particular sensorially-obtained and cognitively-represented conceptualization: Palmer sees the proprioceptively-derived body concept as being suppressed during the occurrence on an OBE, while Blackmore sees the loss of body image based on a sensory input model of the self in the environment as beginning a chain of events that result in an OBE.
While the above two psychological theories have a strong emphasis on the role of body image in the occurrence of OBEs, other research has paid little attention to the experience of the body in relation to OBEs. However, one recent exception to this is a study by Irwin (2000), who has built upon his initial synesthetic theory of the OBE (Irwin, 1985) to examine the experience of somatic symptoms and OBEs and to develop a dissociational model (Irwin, 2000). Irwin's (1985) psychological theory...
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