Publication: Air Power History
Publication Date: 22-SEP-05
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Author: Temple, L. Parker, III
Article Excerpt
Announcing his approval of the Space Shuttle, President Richard M. Nixon said it would replace all launch vehicles except "the very largest and very smallest." U.S. space policy never explicitly committed all launches to the Shuttle without equivocation. How, then, did the U.S. commit all of its launches to the Space Shuttle and nearly extinguish its national ability to produce expendable launch vehicles?
The answer lies in an intricate web of varied organizational and individual objectives leading to de facto commitment. The United States committed all of its national security, military and civil satellites to the Space Shuttle program without ever haying a national space policy of total commitment. Such a national commitment would either have required an explicit national space policy--which never occurred, or the nation's space programs needed to be maneuvered in such a way that the end result was elimination of alternatives to the Space Shuttle coincident with elimination of political jeopardy of cancellation. The de facto commitment was achieved through a finesse of the policy process.
Getting the Idea
Studies of reusable space planes began very early in the United States' space programs' history, but this story starts with the Space Task Group (STG) study of the post-Apollo space program. Chartered by President Nixon, the STG began February 13, 1969, chaired by Vice President Spiro T. Agnew. (1) By March 22, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the Department of Defense (DoD) agreed to form a joint study of the future of space launching. (2) From the outset, NASA insisted that the Space Shuttle would be a reusable space plane as one part of the "operational" Space Transportation System (STS). The immediate questions became what requirements would drive such a system's design, and what were the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies?
Over that summer, while the STG focused on the civil space program, Secretary of the Air Force Robert C. Seamans conducted a parallel effort on the future military and national security space programs. The military space program covered those capabilities developed for military operations, principally led by the Air Force. The national security space program was the covert effort run by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), developing and operating reconnaissance satellites. The STG and Seamans' studies would shape the future U.S. space launch program.
Seamans' report went to Agnew on August 4, 1969. Seamans expressed the then contemporary wisdom that expending hardware made Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) more expensive than reusable systems. Seamans recommended avoiding a large development and opting for an experimental program to prove reusable technology. After reducing technology risks, later decisions would be made with confidence in schedules and costs. (3)
The September 1969 STG report concluded that eventual human spaceflight missions to Mars needed a sustainable support infrastructure, based on a permanent space station. The nation had to provide routine access to the space station using an Earth-to-orbit (and return) shuttle. The participants agreed the purpose of the shuttle was to provide a cost-effective space transportation system for all.
Agnew forwarded both the STG and the separate DoD reports to Nixon in September. (4) But Presidential approval was not forthcoming, as Nixon considered the implications of a major expansion of the civil space program, whose costs were only then beginning to come under control as the Apollo program waned. Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird had recently cancelled the DoD's Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) under pressures from the continuing war in Southeast Asia. At the time, the national security space program was undertaking a major new effort, and the additional budgetary burden of the space station, space shuttle, and flights to Mars were difficult effort to endorse all at once.
Bureau of the Budget Director Robert P. Mayo was leery of the STG's recommendations. On September 25, Mayo told Nixon that it was possible to move forward without significant near-term budget expansion. He suggested sequential development of a Space Shuttle followed by the Space Station. This clever inversion of the STG recommendations allowed the prospect of a cost-effective launch system and temporary or even permanent deferral of the Space Station. Mayo wanted to delay any official response for six months to allow further consideration of the report. (5)
Defining the Idea
During the noticeable delay, NASA Administrator Thomas Paine asked George M. Low, of the Houston Manned Spacecraft Center, to become the NASA Deputy Administrator. Low's mission was to "sell" the Space Shuttle. He understood enough of the politics to recognize that it was impossible, without DoD's people and budget. (6)
At their initial meeting on the subject, Seamans told Low of his qualified support for the Shuttle as a prudently paced technology development. Though encouraged, Low got no commitment from Seamans. (7)
Low expected resistance as he made the DoD rounds, since, after all, he was asking for money. Instead, he found the DoD civilians positive, professing interest in the technology without committing funding. Defense Secretary Laird insisted that Low could count on the DoD to encourage NASA's program, but that NASA would have to "pay its own way." (8)
In their first joint document on the Shuttle, in February 1970, the Air Force and NASA agreed that the STS had to be of maximum utility to both. What "maximum utility" meant remained unexplained. Their goal was reducing launch costs by an order of magnitude, that is, to one tenth of their prevailing costs. (9)
The Air Force Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) supported NASA's Space Shuttle definition studies, opening a program office to ensure DoD uses for the Shuttle were considered and included in the NASA program. Failing that, the Air Force would have little interest. This new group occupied the same offices that, about a year before, housed the cancelled MOL. MOL's engineers were in danger of being lost, so active participation in the Shuttle program provided a suitably large opportunity to keep an experienced cadre of people qualified to work on space systems. (10)
Nixon responded to the Space Task Group report on March 7, 1970 with what seemed like wonderful news. He endorsed substantially reducing the cost of space launch and other far-reaching goals. Those goals could cover the STG's long-range goal of exploring Mars and everything in between. The only thing missing was funding. (11)
Military requirements for the STS proved decisive for its design. The military and national security space programs projected the growth of their operational payloads into the Shuttle timeframe of 1978-1990. These projections required performance equivalent to delivering 65,000 pounds to low-inclination orbit for transfer to higher altitude (an East Coast mission). The West Coast equivalent mission's near-polar orbit actually made the lower total weight requirement of 32,000 pounds tougher to achieve. Furthermore, this near-polar mission also required the ability to return to a continental U.S. landing site after one orbit. Aerodynamically altering the flight path by 1,100 miles during reentry forced the Shuttle's double-delta wing shape versus smaller stub-wings. (12)
Projections for expected military and national security payload sizes and upper stages required a maximum payload bay of 60 by 15 feet. The minimum Shuttle size accommodating that bay defined the physical size of the Space Shuttle main engines, which had to fit roughly within the diameter of the Shuttle fuselage. Altogether, the military and national security requirements for the size of the payload bay and re-entry capabilities drove the Shuttle's structural size and shape, giving a maximum size for the engines, while the weight of these payloads, structure and fuel on top of all that to achieve a near-polar orbit determined the amount of thrust needed from each engine. (13)
The requirements were far larger and heavier with fewer launches than NASA expected, surprising NASA Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight Dale D. Myers. Myers requested DoD validation of the payload sizes and weights. (14)
The initial DoD response was that if NASA did not accept the sizes and weights, DoD would have to build an ELV to meet its needs. Actually, the Air Force had no additional major launch vehicle development under consideration beyond the various versions of the Titan III, which had been in use for some time. The intent was to push NASA to provide as much capability as possible. Whatever was left over would be accommodated by large ELVs such as the Titan III.
Low agreed with the thinking that a reusable Shuttle was needed and ELVs would provide supplementary capabilities. In October 1970, Low met with Caspar W. Weinberger, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). Low proclaimed the Shuttle as the single, economical system for all future space launches. (15) Privately, though, he considered NASA needed six Titan IIIs per year through the first generation of the Shuttle program. He expected similar DoD needs. (16)
A Shuttle and ELV fleet troubled Myers and other NASA officials because a "mixed" fleet was incompatible with Shuttle economics. To pay its own way, Shuttles had to launch 60 times per year--40 from Kennedy Space Center and 20 from Vandenberg AFB. (17)
Responding to Myers' validation request, the DoD forecast 149 military payloads for launch between 1981 and 1990. That meant the military and national security space programs, the major sources of U.S. space launches, needed only about 15 launches per year, falling far short of the 60 necessary for Shuttle economics. A smaller Shuttle with less performance supported only eight military payloads per year, forcing extensive Titan III reliance. Retaining any ELVs severely diminished the Shuttle's economic attractiveness. (18)
NASA's strategy needed all the military and national security traffic, but even after incorporating the larger payload bay within its own program costs, NASA faced a significant shortfall of civil and commercial launches thereby threatening Shuttle economics. (19)
Selling the Idea
NASA projected the large number of Apollo era space launches would not only continue but actually increase. Having gone to the Moon and returned, the U.S. was a truly space-faring nation, and that meant launching things into space more often and more routinely. That was the dream. Reality was about to change radically. Some key assumptions about future needs based on past accomplishments were being undermined.
The solid-state electronics revolution was about to make satellites more reliable and longer-lived. Solid-state devices were replacing high-voltage vacuum-tube systems at an accelerating rate. Solid-state devices not only drew less power; their smaller size enabled more backup systems in satellites. Pound for pound, solid-state systems packed vastly more capability than their vacuum-tube predecessors. Lower power and greater redundancy led to increased satellite reliability, and reliability translated directly...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.
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