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Article Excerpt
Abstract
This article reports the findings of a longitudinal study of temporary virtual teams and explores the role of behavior control on trust decline. We conducted an experiment involving 51 temporary virtual teams. Half of the teams were required to comply with behavior control mechanisms traditionally used in colocated teams. Their counterparts were allowed to self-direct.
Our analysis shows that the behavior control mechanisms typically used in traditional teams have a significant negative effect on trust in virtual teams. In-depth analysis of the communication logs of selected teams reveals that trust decline in virtual teams is rooted in instances of reneging and incongruence. Behavior control mechanisms increase vigilance and make instances when individuals perceive team members to have failed to uphold their obligations (i.e., reneging and incongruence) salient. Heightened vigilance and salience increase the likelihood that team members' failure to fulfill their obligations will be detected, thus contributing to trust decline.
Keywords: Virtual teams, trust, behavior control, control theory, psychological contract, teamwork
Introduction
Virtual teams are groups of geographically and/or temporally dispersed individuals brought together via information and telecommunication technologies (DeSanctis and Poole 1997; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999; Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Powell et al. 2004). Using available technology, individual contributions can be melded together without the expense and trouble of relocating members. Virtual teams can be temporary and focused on the completion of a specific project, or they can be long lasting, with stable membership over several months or years (Duarte and Snyder 1999; Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Townsend et al. 1998).
Virtual teams have the potential to deliver unique strategic flexibility by enabling the rapid formation and disbanding of teams comprised of the best talent available (Lipnack and Stamps 1997; Townsend et al. 1998). But these new organizational forms may also have a dark side (Victor and Stephens 1994). Some theorists have suggested that the dispersion of team members may engender low levels of trust and cooperation (Handy 1995; Nohria and Eccles 1992) that hamper a team's ability to perform adequately (lacono and Weisband 1997). Recent research has sought to uncover the antecedents of team trust in the virtual context (lacono and Weisband 1997; Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999). We extend this line of inquiry and concentrate on a specific managerial intervention, behavior control, and its effects on trust in temporary virtual teams.
Behavior control interventions are widely used in colocated teams (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997) and their use has been proposed for virtual teams as well (Townsend et al. 1998). Exploratory studies of virtual teams have shown that trust can indeed emerge in zero-history temporary teams with geographically and temporally dispersed members, while also showing that it can rapidly degrade and deteriorate (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Jarvenpaa and Leidner 1999). But early work has focused on self-directed virtual teams (2) and to date no attention has been devoted to the antecedents of trust decline and to the effects of managerial controls on trust in virtual teams (Powell et al. 2004). Our work provides a first attempt to fill this void. Our results indicate that behavior control mechanisms increase vigilance and make more salient instances when individuals perceive that team members have failed to uphold their obligations (i.e., reneging and incongruence). As a consequence they increase the odds that such incidents will be detected, and the likelihood of trust decline.
This article has four sections. The first section describes the theoretical underpinning of the study, followed by the second section describing the research methodology and data analysis procedures. The third section describes the quantitative and qualitative results of the study. The paper concludes with a discussion of the findings, limitations, and implications for future research and practice.
Theoretical Framework
Dynamics of Trust Decline
Team trust in the virtual environment is defined as the belief that an "individual or group (a) makes good-faith efforts to behave in accordance with any commitments both explicit and implicit, (b) is honest in whatever negotiations preceded such commitment and (c) does not take excessive advantage of another even when the opportunity is available" (Cummings and Bromley 1996, p. 303). Thus, individuals trust teammates who are perceived to be honestly and reliably attempting to fulfill their commitments to the team (Mayer et al. 1995). In virtual teams, trust is argued to be rooted in perceptions of teammates' ability, benevolence, and integrity (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998). Ability refers to the aptitude and skills that enable an individual to be perceived as competent by teammates (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1995). Benevolence refers to the extent to which an individual is believed to be willing to help teammates beyond personal motives or individual gain. Thus, a belief that teammates are concerned with the well-being and success of the team, and that they consciously avoid disrupting the project even when they may benefit directly, engenders perceptions of benevolence (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1995). Integrity refers to the extent to which an individual is believed to adhere to a set of principles thought to make her dependable and reliable. Thus, evidence that teammates have a solid work ethic, a strong sense of justice, and over time act in a manner consistent with these values fosters perceptions of integrity (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998; Mayer et al. 1995). Conversely, evidence that teammates behave inconsistently and that their actions contradict their own words hinders perceptions of integrity (Robinson 1996).
The literature on psychological contracts offers a useful starting point for the investigation of trust decline in virtual teams, since the breach of a psychological contract has been empirically linked to trust decline in colocated environments (Robinson 1996; Rousseau 1989). A psychological contract is defined as an "individual's beliefs about the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between the person and another party" (Robinson 1996, p. 575). Such contracts can be implicit and are defined in terms of individual perceptions (Morrison and Robinson 1997). When a virtual team is formed, teammates must communicate to evaluate the project requirements, make decisions regarding process and content, and provide feedback on one another's work. As the working relationship unfolds, team members develop expectations about individual workload, work processes, and individual contributions. As expectations arise about reciprocal obligations between teammates, a psychological contract is formed (Rousseau 2001).
Psychological contract breach, defined as an individual's belief that one's counterparts have failed to meet their obligations, is triggered by reneging or incongruence. Reneging occurs when others, recognizing that an obligation exists, "knowingly fail to follow through on that obligation" (Morrison and Robinson 1997, p. 233). Incongruence arises when the perception of obligations differ between some team members and the individual responsible for meeting them. Incongruence differs from reneging in that the individual who fails to follow through on her obligations does so unknowingly rather than deliberately. But incongruence, like reneging, leads to observable behaviors that are inconsistent with teammates' expectations (Morrison and Robinson 1997). (3)
Contract breach has been found to damage two important antecedents of trust: judgments of integrity and beliefs about benevolence (Robinson 1996). Trust is predicated on the belief that others will make good-faith efforts to honor their commitments (Cummings and Bromley 1996) and have consideration for others' well-being (Gambetta 1988). Early work lends support to the notion that integrity and benevolence are important components of trust in virtual teams (Jarvenpaa et al. 1998). As virtual team members interact, individuals form beliefs about teammates' benevolence and integrity, lf the interaction reveals that teammates have reneged on their obligations, judgments of integrity are revised and beliefs about teammate's benevolence are undermined (Robinson 1996). Incongruence-based incidents may also foster the perception that teammates have little interest in the success of the team and are not dependable, thus leading to a negative reassessment of beliefs about their benevolence and integrity. Furthermore, when reneging or incongruence occur, individuals tend to make attributions of malevolence, thus leading to the conclusion that teammates are not willing to respect their commitments and that trust has been misplaced (Robinson 1996). We, therefore, propose:
Hypothesis 1a: Trust declines in virtual teams that experience reneging. Hypothesis 1b: Trust declines in virtual teams that experience incongruence.
Because of the perceptual nature of breach of psychological contracts, it is not enough that reneging or incongruence occur for trust to decline; failures to fulfill mutual obligations must also be detected and recognized (Morrison and Robinson 1997). Whether individuals actually perceive a discrepancy between teammates' obligations and actual behavior depends on their vigilance and the salience of that discrepancy. Vigilance represents how closely individuals monitor their counterparts' actions (Morrison and Robinson 1997). Thus, vigilance is an active behavior that team members engage in when they scrutinize whether or not teammates are fulfilling their obligations to the team. Theorists hypothesize that vigilance intensifies when the costs associated with an unfulfilled promise are significant (e.g., the team is penalized for failing to produce required deliverables) and when there is significant uncertainty about whether obligations will be fulfilled (e.g., as a deadline approaches teammates have yet to deliver expected work) (Morrison and Robinson 1997). When vigilance is high, any instance of reneging or incongruence is more likely to be readily detected (Morrison and Robinson 1997).
Hypothesis 2a: Vigilance intensifies the negative effect of reneging and/or incongruence on trust.
Salience is defined as the degree to which a stimulus stands out from its context (Fiske and Taylor 1984). Thus, salience is defined as a characteristic (e.g., strength) of an instance of reneging or incongruence--not as a behavior in which the individual engages (i.e., vigilance). The degree of salience is affected by the magnitude of the discrepancy between perceived obligations and actual teammates' behavior (e.g., repeated calls for contributions go unanswered), by how vivid mutual obligations are for one or more team members (e.g., the obligation was recently or unequivocally set), or by the importance an individual ascribes to the obligation (Morrison and Robinson 1997). When any instance of reneging or incongruence is highly salient, the incident is more likely to be readily detected (Morrison and Robinson 1997).
Hypothesis 2b: The salience of mutual obligations intensifies the negative effect of reneging and/or incongruence on trust.
Behavior Control and Trust Decline
Control theory, as originally conceptualized, focused on the organization as the unit of analysis and addressed broad-based organizational control structures (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979). More recently, it has been adopted to study smaller work units, such as project teams (Guinan et al. 1998; Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997). Following Kirsch (1997), we conceptualize control as attempts to ensure that individuals working on organizational projects act in conformity with predefined strategies. Thus, control is exercised via mechanisms that, when successfully implemented, lead to the regulation of behavior (Kirsch 1997). Formal control mechanisms are classified into behavior and outcome controls. Behavior control mechanisms--the focus of this study--are designed to structure the transformation process of work, whereas outcome controls tie incentives directly to the outcomes of work activities (Ouchi 1977; Snell 1992). "In behavior control, specific rules and procedures are articulated, which, if followed, will lead to desired outcomes" (Kirsch 1997, p. 217). In colocated teams, behavior control mechanisms are used to stimulate team performance, foster cooperation, and improve individual psychosocial outcomes (Henderson and Lee 1992; Pinto et al. 1993). Typical behavior control mechanisms include the definition of explicit work assignments, the specification of rules and procedures, and the filing of project plans and project reports (Henderson and Lee 1992; Kirsch 1997; Pinto et al. 1993).
By their very nature, behavior control mechanisms reward compliance with the given rules and procedures (Snell 1992). As a consequence, teams are likely to pay significant attention to the requirements and the associated deadlines. For example, when asked to periodically provide reports, teammates are likely to structure their work around the reporting schedule (e.g., agree on due dates for individual contributions before reporting dates). As the deadlines for the delivery of individual contributions approach, individuals are likely to closely monitor teammates' fulfillment of their obligations. Moreover, in cases when a deadline approaches and some team members fail to contribute as expected, the ensuing increasing uncertainty may further stimulate vigilance. Thus, behavior controls act as a catalyst for heightened vigilance and create incentives to closely monitor whether teammates are fulfilling their obligations to the team.
Hypothesis 3a: Behavior control increases team members' vigilance in virtual teams.
When a team is required to comply with behavior controls (e.g., regularly report on team progress, future plans, or individual work assignments), mutual obligations are periodically documented. Team members' attention is also periodically drawn to these obligations (i.e., mutual obligations become vivid). Moreover, because explicit rewards are associated with compliance with behavior controls, team members may be more likely to regard mutual obligations as important. Imagine for example that a team is required to report periodically on project plans and individual responsibilities. As team members assume responsibility for various components of the team project, mutual obligations are crystallized. When the team is asked to report on its behavior and progress, failure by teammates to fulfill their obligations (i.e., any instances of reneging or incongruence that may have occurred) is likely to be highly salient.
Hypothesis 3b: Behavior control increases the salience of reneging and incongruence in virtual teams.
Behavior control mechanisms increase team members' vigilance and make perceived evidence that team members have failed to uphold their obligations (i.e., reneging and incongruence) salient. (4) Salience and vigilance moderate the relationship between these incidents and trust decline. Thus, when reneging or incongruence occur in virtual teams complying with behavior control, they are more likely to be detected. As a consequence, virtual...
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