Publication: Air Power History
Publication Date: 22-DEC-04
Delivery: Immediate Online Access
Author: Atkins, Sean
Article Excerpt
An often overlooked consideration in security planning is that severe and policy-shifting consequences can result from the deployment of military forces into an allied state. A negative reaction to the deployment within the host state itself is one of the most visible. In defiance of careful negotiations, domestic dissatisfaction has historically altered policies and security objectives of the host state, deploying state, and larger alliance structure, if applicable. With the rise in media and communication technology fueling international grassroots political movements, it is now more critical than ever that policy planners understand the factors that encourage negative domestic reactions. Growing international concerns have prompted many to establish, or consider establishing, postings in allied countries, and future deployments of this type are currently being planned. Thus, it is also vital to future security studies. Yet despite its importance and relevance, there has been little focus onto this general question within international relations literature. We are left asking: What motivates and encourages negative domestic reactions to the deployment of military forces into an allied state?
The answer is critical to a growing number of nations. Several states maintain a military presence within allied countries today. French military personnel are located in at least nine different allied countries outside of France. British troops can be found in Canada, Germany, and Cyprus. The U.S. military reports that it maintains 702 facilities worldwide. (1) Russian troops are located in several former Soviet countries. India has recently established a base at Farkhor in Tajikistan. (2) The placement of military forces into an allied state occurs often and is done by more than just the United States.
As the world's security landscape and alliance structures become increasingly interwoven, it is increasingly probable that extraterritorial military bases will become the norm. A current example is the Pentagon's plans to restructure the U.S.'s overseas military deployments in order to meet "the nation's evolving security challenges." (3) Kurt Campbell and Celeste Johnson wrote recently in Foreign Affairs that the U.S. "will shift people and assets from safe, secure, and comfortable rear-echelon facilities to jumping-off points closer to the flame." (4)
In these new areas the presence of U.S. forces might spark a negative public reaction. These future host states, which may be relatively less stable, will face heightened protest with intensified results. Being able to anticipate potential uprisings will assist planners and negotiators in determining where to deploy troops and how best to do so.
The following analysis of the U.S. deployment of cruise missiles to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s illuminates some of the more influential factors. These are: 1. the perceived level of threat incurred by hosting the allies, 2. the level of control the host state has over the actions of the visiting forces, 3. the level of mistrust and anti-ally sentiment present in the hosting state, 4. how protestable are the visiting forces.
Cruise Missiles in the UK
Throughout the Cold War, the arsenal disparities between the two super-powers and their allies was often the most critical issue in their relations. Toward the end of the 1970s, a widening asymmetry in U.S. and Soviet theater nuclear forces, which are limited in geographical range, led to "more attention being paid to long and medium range components." (5) Europe was easily within range of the Soviet Union's increasing number of theater nuclear forces and after the removal of Thor and Jupiter intermediate range missiles from Europe, NATO was left only with long range tactical nuclear forces (LRTN). These manned Vulcan and F-111 bombers were considered inadequate as they were too "old and vulnerable to pre-emptive attack, and would have difficulty penetrating Russian air defenses." (6)
NATO feared that the growing disparity would result in the greater vulnerability of its members. The U.S. was especially concerned that, based on the flexible response strategy, the existing NATO arsenal would no longer deter a Soviet attack at the intermediate level. (7) It was reasoned that "the Soviets would be more surely deterred" from striking Europe "if they knew that they could be defeated 'in theatre.'" (8) Europeans feared that "there was a real danger of decoupling European and American security." (9) Without an in-theater counter to Soviet LRTN forces, only the Soviet assumption that the U.S. would retaliate for an attack on Europe, using its home based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), gave credibility to deterrence. A U.S. attack on behalf of Europe with its ICBM's would most certainly precipitate a retaliatory strike on the U.S. from the USSR. Many questioned the U.S.'s willingness to "risk its own cities in defense of Europe." (10)
With these concerns in mind and European pressure building, NATO's Nuclear Planning Group created a High Level Group (HLG) to assess "NATO's requirements for theatre nuclear forces." (11) The HLG began work in December 1977 and decided to modernize NATO's LRTN. Cruise missiles, it was thought, provided an excellent option as "they were relatively cheap, promised to be highly accurate, capable of avoiding air defences when used in substantial numbers, and could be fired from a variety of different platforms." (12)
At the NATO conference of foreign and defense ministers in December 1979, the HLG's modernization plan was approved. On June 17, 1980, in the House of Commons, British Defence Secretary, Francis Pym, announced that 160 missiles were to be stationed at "the United States Air Force standby base at RAF Greenham Common, in Berkshire, and RAF Molesworth, a disused airfield in Cambridgeshire." (13) Three years later, the first cruise missiles were delivered to RAF Greenham Common on November 14, 1983, to a largely unenthusiastic British public. (14)
The Domestic Reaction in Britain
NATO's December 1979 announcement, that it planned to base cruise missiles in Britain, sparked immediate opposition. Within only a couple of years the anti-cruise movement had grown to include mass demonstrations, peace camps at the proposed bases, and many anti-cruise civil action organizations. Public opinion against the cruise missile deployment paralleled the movement and quickly grew to a majority in Britain. This sentiment was reflected by an increasingly vocal opposition within Parliament itself.
British public opinion against the cruise missile deployment was substantial to begin with, but it increased quickly to include a majority of Britons. A Marplan poll, conducted in September 1980, revealed that 43 percent of the UK was opposed to U.S. cruise missiles being stationed there. (15) By November, it had risen to 53 percent. (16) This majority was sustained well beyond the initial period. A national poll conducted for the Sunday Times, in January 1983, showed that 54 percent were against Britain allowing "cruise missiles to be based in Britain." (17)
RAF Greenham Common, the first deployment site, became the focus of much of the opposition. During the summer of 1981, a group of forty women, called "Women for Life on Earth," marched 120 miles from Cardiff, Wales, to Greenham Common in protest of stationing cruise missiles there. (18) Upon their arrival at Greenham the marchers demanded a public debate on the issue with the Ministry of Defence. The debate was denied and they "spontaneously set up a camp outside the U.S. Air Force Base." (19) Thus began the Greenham Women's Peace Camp that was to exist for nineteen years.
What began with a forty-woman march drew national attention and support. In the south of England alone there were forty-seven women's groups involved with the Greenham protest by April 1983. (20) Before the deployment of cruise missiles began, the Greenham camp aimed to "seriously disrupt all the work being done there in preparation." (21) In December 1982, more than 30,000 women gathered to join hands around the base in what was called the "Embrace the Base" event. Other disruptive tactics were more overt, such as those used on October 29, 1983, when 1,000 women "cut down four and a half miles of fence surrounding the air base." (22) Before and after the deployment, members of the peace camp were a constant disruption to Greenham operations.
The Greenham Peace Campers were not alone either. There were many other anti-cruise missile groups created with the same goal. Joan Ruddock, then chair of CND, noticed that "outrage at the secret NATO decision, revealed in December of 1979, to deploy American cruise missiles in Britain ... led to the formation of dozens...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos have been removed from this article.
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