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Dwight Eisenhower, 1963. (1) Introduction
Although the United States started an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) program shortly after World War II, it was conducted with minimal funding and with low priority for the first decade. As a result, developments were still in the conceptual phase in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became the thirty-fourth President of the United States. However, by the time Eisenhower left office eight years later, the U.S. was pursuing a major ABM program and had established a firm conceptual foundation for future ballistic missile defense (BMD) developments.
America's postwar ABM program was a direct response to the German rocket program of World War II, which produced the world's first long-range ballistic missile, the V-2. (2) While used only during the final months of the war, the V-2 and its airbreathing cousin the V-1 made a strong impression on Allied leaders, including Eisenhower.
Eisenhower and the Dawn of the Missile Age, 1944-1945
As Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Dwight Eisenhower witnessed the dawn of the missile age and was duly impressed by the destructiveness of the V-2 rocket. Indeed, while overseeing the preparations for Overlord, Eisenhower received "alarming intelligence reports concerning the progress of the Germans in developing new long-range weapons of great destructive capacity." He considered these warnings serious enough to give them as one reason for launching Overlord at the earliest possible moment. (3)
Eisenhower's sense of urgency was not misplaced. About a week after D-Day, German V-1 "buzz bombs" began falling on London. Three months after D-Day, the Germans ushered in the ballistic missile age when they began launching V-2 rockets against key Allied targets, especially London and the port city of Antwerp, Belgium. (4)
V-weapon attacks against England had "a very noticeable effect upon morale," according to Eisenhower. The successful lodgment of Allied armies on the continent in June 1944 had given the British "a great sense of relief." However, "their hopes were dashed" when the missile attacks started. Moreover, Eisenhower pointed out, it was not just civilian morale that was affected. "Soldiers at the front began again to worry about friends and loved ones at home, and many American soldiers asked me in worried tones whether I could give them any news about particular towns where they had previously been stationed in southern England." (5)
Eisenhower understood the operational characteristics of Germany's "V" weapons. The V-2, he noted, "was a rocket, shot into the air to a great height, which fell at such high speed that the first warning of its coming was the explosion. During flight it could not be heard, seen, or intercepted." Because of its velocity, the V-2 tended to penetrate whatever it hit before exploding. If it struck in the open and penetrated the ground, the missile's explosive forces were channeled upward, causing little damage to surrounding structures. However, if it hit a building within a cramped urban area, the V-2 detonated inside the building so that its explosive forces were coupled to the structures around it. In this case, Eisenhower wrote, "the destruction was almost complete." (6)
Between September 8, 1944, and March 27, 1945, the Germans aimed 1,359 V-2s against London; 1,190 of these attempted launches were successful. The V-2s which struck England destroyed or damaged thousands of homes and buildings. They also killed 2,724 civilians and seriously injured another 6,467 civilians. On the average, according to Sir Winston Churchill, England's wartime prime minister, each V-2 killed twice as many people as did a V-1. The main reason for this disparity was the fact that the sound of the approaching V-1 warned people to take cover; there was no such warning in the case of the hypersonic V-2. (7)
While these losses were small compared to overall wartime casualties, the impact of the V-2 on morale was serious enough to justify a search for countermeasures. This search spawned the world's first missile defense architecture, which included the same basic components that still make up today's architectures: weapons, sensors, and a command and control system.
The London missile defense system called for the city to be laid off in a grid and surrounded by anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Radar would pick up the V-2s once they reached an altitude of 5,000 feet. Radar data would then be used to calculate the missile's trajectory and determine which square in the grid it would hit. At the right moment, the AAA guns would fire a barrage of shells timed to go off at the optimum altitude over the proper square. In theory, the V-2 would have to fly through this barrage and be destroyed. To be sure that the barrier of shell fragments was in place to meet the approaching V-2, the guns would have to be fired while the missile was still thirty miles away. Before advocates of the missile defense concept could secure permission to test their ideas, Allied ground forces had overrun the last launching sites within range of London, ending the V-2 attacks. (8)
The final Allied drive that resulted in the occupation of the last V-2 launch sites had depended to a great extent on supplies entering the continent through the port of Antwerp. According to General Eisenhower, Antwerp became a sine qua non for the final all-out battle to overthrow Hitler's Third Reich. Churchill expressed similar views: "Without the vast harbour of this city no advance across the lower Rhine and into the northern plains of Germany was possible." (9)
Not surprisingly, then, once the Allies gained control of Antwerp, the Germans launched a major V-weapons campaign against the port. Indeed, Allied records show that more V-2s (1,712) struck the Antwerp area than hit London and its surroundings (1,190). In addition to the V-2s, the Germans hit Antwerp and the area around the city with 4,248 V-1s. More than 150 V-2s and a similar number of V-1s hit Antwerp's dock area. Because of these attacks, the port's handling capacity was reduced by as much as a third, due in part to the fact that stevedores were routinely forced to abandon their work and seek shelter. Furthermore, because of the dangers posed by the V-weapons, the Allies placed severe restrictions on the shipment of ammunition through Antwerp. As a result, "most of the ammunition for the theater had to be transported the 500 miles from Cherbourg or 275 miles from Le Havre." Finally, Antwerp was the scene of the single worst V-2 attack--on December 16, 1944, a lone missile struck a crowded theater killing 567 and seriously injuring another 291. By end of March 1945 when the V-weapon attacks stopped, 3,752 civilians had been killed and 6,072 seriously injured. (10)
The Antwerp experience may explain Eisenhower's sobering assessment of how the V-2 might have changed the course of the war had it been developed earlier. In his memoir, Crusade in Europe, the general wrote:
It seemed likely that, if the German had succeeded in perfecting and using these new weapons six months earlier than he did, our invasion of Europe would have proved exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible. I feel sure that if he had succeeded in using these weapons over a six-month period, and particularly if he had made the Portsmouth-Southampton area one of his principal targets, Overlord might have been written off. (11)
Beginnings of the U.S. Missile Defense Program, 1946-1948
Eisenhower's experience with the V-2 and other World War II weapons impressed upon him the vital role science and technology had come to play in national security. However, these experiences did not make of him an uncritical supporter of new weapon systems. In 1946, while serving as Army Chief of Staff, Eisenhower visited Fort Bliss, Texas, where some of the earliest work on missile defense was taking place. During a briefing on this work, Eisenhower expressed skepticism about the idea of intercepting a missile with another missile. This, he said, was tantamount to hitting a bullet with a bullet, a feat that was too difficult to accomplish. (12)
Eisenhower's skepticism was not shared by other American officials who reviewed Germany's rocket program after the war. These officials were impressed by the challenges the new weapon posed for defenses. Given the potential of the long-range rocket, especially if it should be combined with an atomic warhead, these investigators believed the U.S. had little choice other than to pursue the development of ballistic missile defenses. (13)
Perhaps the most disturbing discovery made by these officials was that the Germans had plans for an ICBM that might have been used against New York City had the war continued long enough. Report number 237-45 of the United States Naval Technical Mission stated:
There is little of humorous nature in the statement so often heard that the Germans intended to bombard New York from launching sites in Europe, as two missiles, the A-9 and A-10 [which would have been combined into a two-stage missile] were under development for use against the U.S. in the early months of 1946. This contemplated use was scientifically possible and undoubtedly would have been realized had time permitted. (14)
Concern with the future threat of missiles was a major theme in a post-war study completed by the War Department's Equipment Board, which was chaired by General Joseph W. Stilwell, legendary commander of American forces in the China-Burma-India Theater. Completed in January 1946, the Stilwell Report concluded that "guided missiles, winged or non-winged, traveling at extreme altitudes and at velocities in excess of supersonic speed, are inevitable." Among these new weapons would be missiles with "intercontinental ranges of over 3,000 miles and pay load sufficient to carry [an] atomic explosive." (15)
The lethality of such weapons revolutionized the requirements for effective defenses. In the past, the major goal of air defense was to simply make air attacks so costly that an enemy air force could not sustain the effort long enough to produce decisive results. "In future wars," the report noted, "no single airplane...
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