|
...historically The architects of the Iraqi intervention point to the success of America's occupation of postwar Germany and Japan as evidence that occupation can deliver on democratic objectives. But careful examination of the historical record suggests that we should be tentative about drawing lessons from these cases to guide our endorsement of military occupation today. Germany and Japan began with a set of endowments, many of them anticipated by democratic theory, but others peculiar to the cases' unique historical context and time, that favored democratic outcomes. These endowments are not replicated in Iraq, nor does military occupation guarantee them elsewhere. Cases of occupation more comparable in initial endowment to Iraq suggest more pessimism about occupation's capacity to deliver democracy. Historical experience suggests that although military occupation may increase the likelihood of democratization, and wise policy choices certainly improve its chances, the outcome is largely shaped by factors, both domestic and international, that cannot be controlled by military engineers operating within the confines of current cultural norms and conventional limits of time and treasure.
To elaborate upon this argument, this essay will begin by identifying the essential noncomparability of the German, Japanese, and Iraqi cases. Given their dissimilarities, it seems an oddly selective reading of history to focus on the German and Japanese occupations (out of a much larger universe of cases) to draw lessons about occupation's political potential in Iraq. The essay will then turn to two other cases of occupation better (although not perfectly) matched in initial endowments to Iraq: Haiti and Bosnia. This comparison will suggest some pessimism about military occupation's capacity to deliver democracy. The essay will conclude with lessons, both positive and negative, about occupation's potential contribution to democratization that can be gleaned from the German and Japanese cases. Although military occupation cannot fashion democracy out of whole cloth, it nevertheless can steer countries in a democratic direction through wise policy choices.
NONCOMPARABLE CASES
It is highly problematic to use the military occupation of Japan and Germany as the standard of comparison for occupation's potential to deliver democracy in cases such as Iraq.
The comparison is ill-conceived, primarily because the starting conditions that characterize these cases are dissimilar in ways that are crucial for democratic outcomes, favoring them in Japan and Germany and disfavoring them in Iraq. As such, they obscure the independent impact of military occupation as a force for democracy. At least five of these starting conditions are factors anticipated by democratic theory that alone would have made us optimistic about democracy's chances in Germany and Japan, irrespective of foreign intervention. Several other factors favored democratic outcomes in the postwar cases that were specific to the historical context and time in which these occupations occurred and are unlikely to be replicated in contemporary cases of occupation. All told, eight factors will be identified that make for crucial noncomparability of these cases and that counsel wariness about drawing historical lessons too hastily.
The most obvious dissimilarity between our cases, and one that is crucial for democratic outcomes, is their dramatically different levels of economic development. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, both Germany and Japan were great powers. Both were highly industrialized countries with developed economies that boasted impressive GNP per capita. (1) And although the war devastated much of the physical capital in both countries, Japan and Germany retained the human, organizational, and social capital (that is, skilled workers, skilled managers, and social networks) that is the lynchpin of economic development. As the economist Luigi Zingales has written, Japan and Germany in the aftermath of World War II were akin to a firm whose plant has burned down. To restart the enterprise, all that was needed was an infusion of financial capital to rebuild the plant, a comparatively simple prospect. (2)
By contrast, a country such as Iraq has never achieved an advanced level of economic development. Although the country has enjoyed the bounty of oil wealth, it has not yet developed into an advanced industrialized country, and it is woefully lacking in the social and human capital essential to such ambition. To continue Zingales's metaphor, Iraq is not like a firm whose plant has burned down. Rather, it is akin to a firm putting its business together from scratch. This is a much more daunting objective, especially given the reality that in the United States at least, nearly 70 percent of all new businesses fail within their first five years. (3)
Democratic theory suggests that this differential level of economic development has a huge impact on democratic outcomes. One of the most robust findings of twenty-five years of political science rumination on democratization is that durable democracy is strongly correlated with economic development. The reasons are complex and not fully fleshed out, but statistically, it seems irrefutable that democracy is most likely to flourish and survive when a country enjoys more than $5,500 per capita GNP. (4) This is not to argue that economic development is either a necessary or a sufficient condition for transition to democracy. Contrary to the modernization school, Adam Przeworski et al. have shown that, statistically speaking, such a transition can occur at any level of economic development. But for democracy to endure, historical experience suggests that the chances for democratic survival are directly linked to per capita GNP. They are most favorable once a country surpasses the $5,500 mark. (5)
Now, truth be told, none of our cases, not even Germany and Japan, had achieved this level of wealth at the time of occupation. (6) But Germany's and Japan's endowment with rich supplies of human and social capital meant that both countries were capable of absorbing foreign aid...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos
have been removed from this article.
More articles from Political Science Quarterly
Collective Political Violence: an Introduction to the Theories and Cas..., December 22, 2004
The Modern Prince: What Leaders Need to Know Now.(Book Review), December 22, 2004
Thomas Jefferson.(Book Review), December 22, 2004
The Regulars: the American Army 1898-1941.(Book Review), December 22, 2004
Presidents, responsiveness, and competence: revisiting the "golden age..., December 22, 2004
Looking for additional articles?
Search our database of over 3 million articles.
Looking for more in-depth information on this industry?
Search our complete database of Industry & Market reports by text, subject, publication
name or publication date.
About Goliath
Whether you're looking for sales prospects, competitive information, company
analysis or best practices in managing your organization,
Goliath can help you meet your business needs.
Our extensive business information databases empower business
professionals with both the breadth and depth of credible,
authoritative information they need to support their business
goals. Whether it be strategic planning, sales prospecting,
company research or defining management best practices -
Goliath is your leading source for accurate information.
|
