|
...effective organization able transport heavy cargo and troops great distances. Strategic airlift adds "global reach" to American power and capabilities. But this has not always been the case.
The history of American airlift can be divided into two phases. During the first fifty years or so of aviation airlift was low in priority, unappreciated, and thus neglected. During this time, American airmen had a pecking order that put the delivery of bombs and bullets well above all other functions of air power. Consequently members of the "combat" arms, had a corner on both the glamour of flying and advancement. Another factor that degraded airlift was that in contrast to fighters and bombers that flew a distinctive air force mission, airlift served as a support function. The status of airlift can be gauged further by two measures. First, transports were not an assignment of choice for newly graduated pilots. (1) Second, airlift status was clearly reflected in the equipment of the air lifters. While modern, cutting edge equipment went to the bomber and fighter units, the transport command soldiered on with equipment no better than, and increasingly (in the mid to late 1950s) inferior to, the airlines. But toward the end of that decade, there were signs that decision makers wanted to improve America's airlift capabilities. This trend began during the second Eisenhower administration, but can be clearly seen (in the airmen's expressive language, "with rubber on the ramp") in the 1960s. What follows is a discussion of this period of prop airlift, when airlift was neglected: The Dark Ages. (2)
Overall, strategic airlift is the easiest for the layman to understand. Its function is seemingly identical to that of commercial air transport. Indeed, aircraft flown by commercial airlines and military airlifters look alike. This similarity makes the distinction between military and civilian applications more difficult for the layman to determine. Nevertheless, these differences have generated important issues that directly affect strategic airlift, specifically, who provides the service and the equipment to be used.
A major issue for the Air Force concerned the relationship between strategic and tactical airlift. In short, would the same organization and the same aircraft perform both missions? While both involve delivery of troops and military equipment, strategic airlift is conducted at greater range, as in the case of the U.S., intercontinental range (thousands of miles), whereas the tactical airlift mission can be measured in hundreds of miles. While these ranges sometimes overlap, the means of delivery can be markedly different. Normally, strategic airlift operates from long and wide, hard-surfaced runways accessible to extensive support facilities. On the other hand, tactical airlift may require air drops of men and equipment into the target area, perhaps under enemy fire, or operations from short, rough (or perhaps soft), hastily-prepared airstrips that are close to the front and the enemy. To build aircraft to effectively operate in both environments is expensive and requires compromises of other performance aspects, such as payload and speed. Yet to maintain and operate two different types of aircraft is costly.
Another significant issue stems from the fact that civilian aircraft cannot perform certain military airlift tasks. Strategic airlift involves more than moving passengers and cargo between airports. Some military equipment exceeds the capacity of civilian aircraft due to size (missiles, for example), weight, or density (tanks). Military demands may require operations into airfields that are below commercial standards. Another function foreign to commercial airlines is the ability to airdrop equipment and personnel, requiring specialized aircraft, equipment, and training. Some missions may include flying at ranges that necessitate aerial refueling, again mandating both special equipment and training. These specialized aircraft are expensive, particularly when purchased in small numbers, and therefore are difficult to justify.
There is a great temptation to use commercial aircraft for airlift. Such aircraft have been technically proven and can perform many of the required tasks. Lower costs result from the fact that development expenses have already been paid and to long production runs. If the transport is currently in production, quick delivery is also ensured.
U.S. Airlift
The development of military airlift was slow compared to that of both military and civilian aviation. The limited performance of early airplanes and the emphasis on fighting activities during World War I meant that little followed the first passenger flight in September 1908. While commercial air transport grew in the years between the wars, these were difficult times for the military airmen, who were hardly able to keep their organization together and barely able to maintain and develop their combat skills. Thus, little effort was devoted to military airlift.
When World War II came, American military airlift was severely limited compared to bomber and fighter aviation. The airmen had neither special aircraft nor doctrine, and perhaps most telling, no strong institutional or individual spokesman. With the exception of transporting high value items, there had been no thought of airlifting troops or supplies. Not anticipated prior to the war, military airlift arose from the demands of that great conflict. (3)
American military airlift over long distances began as a result of the sales of U.S. aircraft to the British. To ease the shortage of Royal Air Force (RAF) pilots, American airmen began to ferry aircraft to Britain in November 1940. The airmen organized Air Corps Ferrying Command to handle this task in May 1941, and in July 1941 established round-trip passenger service. (4)
America's entry into war in December, found the airlift unit very small, consisting of only 2,800 officers and men, and 20 aircraft. The war ignited an explosive growth of airlift; by December 1944, Air Transport Command, as it was then known, expanded one hundred-fold, to over 227,000 officers and men who operated 3,090 aircraft. These aircraft were civilian airliners and converted bombers; of the 697 four-engine Army Air Forces (AAF) transports in December 1944, 347 were C-54s (the military version of the Douglas DC-4), 46 were B-17s, and 301 were B-24s. These aircraft left much to be desired as military transports because they had limited cargo carrying and loading/unloading capabilities. This hodgepodge of aircraft was thought to be "good enough," a refrain that dominated the airlift business for decades. (5)
The demobilization following World War II greatly cut U.S. military strength, of course including airlift. In December 1947, the airlift command had shrunk to 60 percent of its four-engine aircraft and 22 percent of the personnel strength of 1945. Congress established the USAF in September 1947, and in May 1948 the new Department of Defense (DoD) formed a joint command for strategic airlift, the Military Air Transport Service (MATS). Some have viewed the creation of MATS as a move toward unification, a paper victory for the new DoD. (6) This then was the situation when the next major challenge arose.
The Berlin Airlift
In June 1948 the Soviets cut surface transportation between Berlin and the west in an effort to force the western Allies out of the city. It seemed as if the Allied alternatives were either war or surrender. Fortunately, there was a middle course: an airlift into the blockaded city in what the Americans called "Operation Vittles." There were three major obstacles to the successful air supply of the city. First, the task was enormous. Prior to the blockade, the two million Berliners had imported 15,500 tons daily. They required an average of 3,800 tons of food and coal per day during summer, and 4,500 tons in winter. Second, the weather was bad, very bad. In brief, the worst U.S. flying weather in winter was better than the best of Germany's winter weather, and Berlin had the worst weather in Germany. Third, airfields, especially in Berlin, limited the airlift, as did the capabilities of the available aircraft. The Soviets--reflecting on these facts and their World War II experience with airlift, especially the German inability to supply their garrison at Stalingrad--believed a successful airlift operation was impossible.
Almost immediately MATS and the RAF began a modest airlift with the available men and machines. By 20 July 1948, the Americans had 54 C-54s and 105 C-47s in action, with a potential maximum daily lift of 1,500 tons, to which the British could add 750 tons a day. This was inadequate. (7) The USAF made changes to accomplish the mission, most noticeably replacing the twin-engine C-47s with the larger four-engine C-54s by the end of September. Eventually the USAF had as many as 287 of its 456 C-54s involved in the airlift, while the British used an average of 140 military and civilian aircraft. (8)
The support elements involved in airlift are often overlooked. Critical to this operation was the ground-control approach radar that aided both control and landing operations. Each aircraft had one shot at landing in Berlin, and if unsuccessful on its initial approach, returned to its home base in West Germany. The Americans used three airfields in Berlin, one built during the crisis. Takeoff procedures were carefully choreographed, with taxi...
NOTE: All illustrations and photos
have been removed from this article.
More articles from Air Power History
Towards a place in history., September 22, 2003
The night we bombed the Emperor's Palace., September 22, 2003
50 years of executive directors and editors., September 22, 2003
Memoirs: a Twentieth-Century Journey in Science and Politics.(Book Rev..., September 22, 2003
Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in K..., September 22, 2003
Looking for additional articles?
Search our database of over 3 million articles.
Looking for more in-depth information on this industry?
Search our complete database of Industry & Market reports by text, subject, publication
name or publication date.
About Goliath
Whether you're looking for sales prospects, competitive information, company
analysis or best practices in managing your organization,
Goliath can help you meet your business needs.
Our extensive business information databases empower business
professionals with both the breadth and depth of credible,
authoritative information they need to support their business
goals. Whether it be strategic planning, sales prospecting,
company research or defining management best practices -
Goliath is your leading source for accurate information.
|
