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Article Excerpt
Ever since the declaration of independence in 1991, successive governments in the Former Yogoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) have been hailed for engineering a successful transition to democracy with relatively few blemishes. International commentators have applauded the ability of government to avoid ethnic conflict in its territory despite the multiethnic character of its population. Observers repeatedly pointed out that all other former republics that declared independence from the Yugoslav federation witnessed bloody ethnic revolts. Exemplifying this view, Duncan Perry boldly asserts that "Macedonia has had more success than most emerging democracies regarding coping with ethnic issues, despite the international trend toward smaller but ethnically 'pure' states.... Democracy has given Albanians and others a platform from which to speak and speak loudly. It has also integrated Albanians into more mainstream political activity. Minorities, who had little role in governance during the Tito era, now have more representation in government, and a growing role in society." (1) Albanians, however, did not see it this way. Ten years after independence, FYROM's government found itself addressing the same demands it did in 1991, albeit made by a more radical Albanian population. A civil war ensued, with the country being stitched back together only by strong Western pressure. How did this happen? Were international observers uninformed or did they misrepresent reality?
I argue that neither explanation is true. The answer lies in the unintended consequences of public policy. Attempting to explain such unforeseen effects, Robert Merton argues that an actor's paramount concern with immediate consequences excludes the consideration of other consequences of the same act. Labeling this explanation "the imperious immediacy of interest," he contends that in the face of social complexity, "action ramifies, its consequences are not restricted to the specific area in which they were initially intended to center, they occur in interrelated fields explicitly ignored at the time of action." (2)
Using this logic as a platform, I maintain that political strategies crafted by FYROM's elites to deal effectively with external interventions retarded attempts to address Albanian grievances and at the same time provided strong incentives to all involved not to give due attention to growing ethnic tension. In this way, the dispute with Greece over international recognition under the name Macedonia gave rise to an ethnonational conception of the country that was antithetical to its multiethnic character and served to alienate ethnic Albanians. The presence of troops under the aegis of the United Nations raised and dashed expectations among ethnic Albanians. The eruption of armed conflict in neighboring Kosovo widened the chasm between ethnic Albanians and the governing Slav majority and served as a model of how to draw NATO to the Albanian cause. The end result of the external interventions, whose effects were mediated by government policy, was a ferocious armed conflict that caught everyone by surprise. I do not suggest that external interventions caused ethnic conflict. I argue that domestic strategies designed to deal with them had negative consequences that should and could have been considered.
My argument informs debates on transitions to democracy and ethnic conflict. Equality of minorities with the majority cannot be legislated. Respect for human rights and an appreciation of demands for social and economic change are important lessons that leaders in the West and in former Eastern Europe may ignore only at their peril.
A MODEL OF ETHNIC GROUP MOBILIZATION
While many attempts have been made to explain the mobilization of ethnic groups, one stands out as particularly appropriate to the task at hand. (3) Michael Hechter's argument of internal colonialism provides a good explanation of ethnic group mobilization and has three additional benefits. (4) First, it is most relevant to industrialized societies. Second, it focuses on combining cultural and economic factors, as opposed to explicitly political ones. The end result is that it points attention to cultural and economic grievances in the face of political participation. Third, it is specific to ethnoregional movements that are formed within specific regions. This is particularly relevant to my case.
According to Hechter's theory of internal colonialism, ethnic groups mobilize as a result of a hierarchical cultural division of labor. There are many differences between ethnic groups, but not all of them lead to ethnic mobilization. In areas where members of an ethnic group have been made to feel peripheral by the core dominant ethnic group, ethnic identity among members of the peripheral group becomes stronger. The more that group membership determines an individual's life chances, the more significant ethnic membership is likely to be. (5) The greater the distance between members of two ethnic groups--be it cultural or economic--the greater the marginalization is likely to be. Such internal colonialism, as Hechter calls it, leads to reactive group formation and mobilization. The group's identity is formed in response to its environment.
The situation of ethnic Albanians in FYROM before and after independence certainly seems to fit this pattern. Ethnic Albanians have been poorly integrated into FYROM's society. (6) As a constituent republic of Yugoslavia, FYROM was the least prosperous of the six republics. It had the lowest per capita income in 1989 and actually experienced a loss of income between the years 1952 and 1989. By 1989, real per capita income was lower than it was in 1978. (7) Albanians tend to be concentrated in certain areas in the west and north of the country bordering Albania and Kosovo. Although they are not the dominant element in large urban areas such as Tetovo, they constitute a significant presence in cities such as Skopje and in the majority of the rural countryside. Albanians are predominantly Muslim, in stark contrast to the Christian Orthodox Slav majority of the country. They are also engaged mostly in agriculture and have low levels of educational attainment. Mixed marriages are not considered desirable by either side. (8) This cultural distance has tended to reinforce a sense of separateness between the two main ethnic communities in FYROM.
The cultural division of labor has become hierarchical and has given rise to ethnic mobilization because of the perceived lack of opportunities for Albanians in the new state, the loss of rights enjoyed previously under the Yugoslav federation, and the organizational capacity to mobilize politically. Albanians complain of the lack of opportunities for their kin in the new republic. Although this was the same problem when FYROM was still part of Yugoslavia, the complaints have taken on new urgency in light of the deterioration of the economy in the first ten years of independence brought on by events related to the Yugoslav conflict--embargoes, corruption, and a shift of resources to build a viable defense system. The UN-mandated embargo on Yugoslavia, which was lifted only recently, and Greece's closure of the border until 1995 crippled the fledgling economy by leading to a loss of the major trade routes and the loss of the two main export markets. According to the official government estimates, losses from both embargoes were put at more than $2 billion in an economy of a little more than $3.1 billion. (9) Though these numbers may be inflated, FYROM's President Kiro Gligorov estimated a loss of 60 percent of trade, because the country's infrastructure relied heavily on transport to Serbia in the north and Greece to the south. (10) The economy further lost steam as reforms aiming to convert the system into a free market economy failed, were derailed or delayed, or were generally marred by corrupt business deals. As a result, the state continued to be the main employer in the country. Albanians, however, complained that they were largely excluded from the public sector.
Paradoxically, even though FYROM declared independence and was hailed by Westerners as a democracy, Albanians bitterly complained that they enjoyed more rights under the communist Yugoslav federation. (11) For example, members of ethnic groups were allowed on public holidays and other occasions to fly the flag of kin foreign states. This right was deleted from the new constitution largely because the new Slav majority feared it would lead to secessionist tendencies among Albanians. When Albanians in Tetovo tried to fly the Albanian flag, they were quickly reminded through brutal force that this action was now illegal. In addition, the loss of educational opportunities was a major grievance. When FYROM was still part of Yugoslavia, educational opportunities and instruction in languages other than Serbo-Croatian or Macedonian were very limited but still protected under the constitution. In practice, ethnic Albanians could receive university education and instruction in Albanian in Kosovo. When FYROM declared independence, the situation changed considerably as these outlets were no longer available.
On the eve of FYROM's independence in 1991, ethnic Albanians bitterly complained of economic and social marginalization, the lack of educational opportunities, and the loss of constitutionally-guaranteed rights. Ten years later on the eve of civil war, Albanians complained more vocally of the same deprivations of rights and privileges they once enjoyed under communist rule.
ETHNONATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MINORITY IDENTITY
Nationalism is an essential ingredient in binding together disparate people into a group called the nation. Nationalism is defined here as "an ideological movement for the attainment and...
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