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Article Excerpt
[Review Essay: Glenn C. Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002), xi + 226 pp.]
Introduction
In the conclusion of his recent book, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, Glenn Loury presents the reader with a stark analysis:
Confronted by the facts of racially disparate achievement, the racially disproportionate transgression of legal strictures, and racially unequal development of productive potential, observers need to give an account. They need ... to embrace some framework for gauging how best to respond. In effect, observers must answer the question, Where does the problem lie, with us or with them? (158)
On Loury's view, our collective answer to this question is unmistakable: the problem, of course, is with "them." This is why we--or "we"--have given so very little attention to ameliorating profound and obvious racial disparities, and why even half-hearted and minimally disruptive attempts to encourage racial equality meet with such outcry on the part of mainstream society's powerful. The racial disparities described do not engender great alarm because they do not upset our general expectations, and the only way that can be true, Loury urges, is if we as a nation believe (consciously or not) in some essential difference between them and us. Loury's book masterfully relays a troubling but convincing account of the durable racial inequalities that plague the U.S. While he offers no clear programmatic remedy, he lays the foundation for more effective policy efforts than we have yet seen--in part, simply by properly diagnosing the problem.
Loury's argument is grounded in his empirical research as an economist, as well as his own theoretical commitments to anti-essentialism and racial equality. He begins, importantly, by noting that racial inequality is starkly visible in the U.S., (1) and yet less attended to in terms of policies and programs than would be expected in a society committed to human equality. Revealing the depth of the problem and its causes--itself a nearly revolutionary project--will not, Loury emphasizes, be sufficient to bring about racial equality. He explains that our deep policy commitments to liberal autonomy and individualism exacerbate inequality by requiring policymakers to leave be the patterns and practices most responsible for the durability of racial inequality. The crucial question is, then, whether we value these principles more than that of racial equality.
It is a tremendous virtue of Loury's account that he is able to identify specific mechanisms by which racial inequality is perpetuated, even if we are--as some political centrists and conservatives keep insisting--by and large a colorblind nation. (2) While Loury does not deny the operation of racial discrimination based on stereotypes, much of his analysis depends upon the systemic inequalities that continue to characterize access to wealth in the U.S. (3) The historical legacy of slavery and Jim Crow quite clearly explains the fact that African-Americans find themselves with fewer ready resources than most white people do; further, this history involved pseudo- and social scientific efforts to "explain" the inherent inferiority of persons of African descent as compared with "white" people. As I will explore in some depth below, Loury articulates how this history resulted in a stigmatized social identity for African-Americans, such that what it means to be "black" in this nation has been deeply tainted; the "meaning" of this racial identity is fraught with embedded assertions about inferiority and even subhumanity.
Stereotyping
First, Loury's analysis is not entirely based on this concept of unconscious racial stigma; in many instances, racial stereotypes are consciously and actively employed in a way that disadvantages individuals while reinforcing the tainted meaning of devalued racial identities. In fact, Loury offers, it seems only rational for an agent to act on information gleaned from stereotypes in a situation in which the stakes are high and he or she has no other available information. A cab driver, for example, acts rationally in trying to determine the potential dangerousness of passengers before offering her services to them. Unfortunately, there is little information available to the driver; in this case, what Loury calls "racial information" may have to do the job. If the cabbie (rationally) believes that an African-American fare is more likely to put her in danger (either by assaulting her or by needing a ride to a "dangerous" neighborhood) than a white fare, the cabbie acts rationally when she engages in "discrimination" based on the reputation of the relevant racial group.
Of course, as Loury notes, discrimination based on racial stereotypes is not always rational, depending on what other information is available to one. The police officer who can use an...
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